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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the theoretical context for the security of wireless 
communication between ubiquitous computing devices and presents an 
implementation that addresses this need. The number of Resource-Limited Wireless 
Devices utilized in many areas of the IT industry is growing rapidly. Some of the 
applications of these devices pose real security threats that can be addressed using 
authentication and cryptography.  
Many of the available authentication and encryption software solutions are predicated 
on the availability of ample processing power and memory. These demands cannot 
be met by the majority of ubiquitous computing devices, thus there is a need to apply 
lightweight cryptography primitives and lightweight authentication protocols that meet 
these demands in any application of security to devices with limited resources. 
The analysis of the lightweight solutions is divided into two major sections: 
Lightweight Authentication Protocols and Lightweight Encryption Algorithms.  Further 
sections of this work describe the proposed prototype‟s Wireless Sensor Network 
including a study of its limitations.  
A number of protocols in the field of Authentication and in the field of Encryption are 
analyzed. The Gossamer Authentication Protocol and the Scalable Encryption 
Algorithm (SEA) are chosen as the basis of prototype implementation in the C-
language on a development platform of the 8051-compatible Nordic Semiconductor 
nRF9E5 microcontroller. A security framework is developed that combines the 
attributes of the Gossamer protocol and the SEA to provide an implementation of 
inter-device security. The Gossamer Protocol is additionally used as a means of 
exchanging session keys for use with the SEA encryption protocol.  A brief 
performance analysis of the prototype running on the nRF9E5 microcontroller is 
provided by way of conclusion. The resuls of the software implementation of the 
Gossamer were unsatisfactory both in terms of the code space needs (approximately 
1700 bytes excluding shared libraries) and the execution time (almost 150 
milliseconds). In contrast, the SEA implementation‟s results were satisfactory above 
expectations with the code space requirements smaller than 600 bytes (excluding 
shared libraries) and the performance of 27 milliseconds per one 96-bit block of data.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The number of Resource-Limited Wireless Devices utilized in many areas of the IT 
industry is growing rapidly. This growth rate is expected to rise even higher when 
RFID transponders begin to replace Barcodes on a larger scale. Some of the 
applications of these devices pose a security threat which can be addressed using 
cryptographic techniques. Most of the currently used cryptographic solutions are 
predicated on the existence of ample processing power and memory. These 
demands cannot be met by the majority of ubiquitous computing devices, thus there 
is a need to apply lightweight cryptography primitives that meet security demands 
when considering devices with low resources. 
 
1.1 Project Background 
This dissertation is written for a fulfilment of the M.Sc. research requirements and a 
partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Hybrid Inter-Networking Technologies 
(HINT) Project hosted by the Letterkenny Institute of Technology.  
The HINT Project is funded under Enterprise Ireland's Innovation Partnership 
programme and establishes cooperation between the Letterkenny Institute of 
Technology and Cora Tine Teo of Falcarragh, Co. Donegal. The main research fields 
of this project include the integration of various RF technologies (inclusive of 
Bluetooth, WiFi, and proprietary UHF technologies) and the utilization of Wireless 
Sensor Networks and active RFID solutions in the context of an item-level stock 
control and temperature monitoring in the pharmaceutical industry. 
One of the key requirements of the HINT project is to provide confidentiality of data 
exchange between the computing devices used in an entire infrastructure. A major 
part of this infrastructure will rely on a network of constrained devices with limited 
memory size and computational power. This M.Sc. will attempt to provide a security 
framework which can be implemented within the boundaries imposed by Resource-
Limited Devices. 
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1.2 Risk Analysis - Pharmaceutical Industry Example 
 
Figure 1.1 Risk Analysis Example for the Pharmaceutical Industry 
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Rogue Data Injection (0.2, 6) 
Cryptanalysis Attack (0.1,10) 
The security impact is measured in the scale of 1 to 10, where 10 is the 
highest. 
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Figure 1.1 illustrates an example of a Risk Analysis concerning the threats 
associated with the usage of Wireless Sensor Networks or RFID systems for the 
item-level stock control and temperature monitoring. The following security threats 
were identified: 
 Tag/Sensor cloning - a serious threat related to the counterfeiting of medicines 
with a high likely-hood of occurrence (Juels 2005). Can be addressed with a 
strong encryption and authentication system. Risk measure = 1*10 = 10. 
 Tag/Sensor tracing - a threat related to unauthorised Track & Trace of a 
Sensor/Tag movement throughout a given area, which has negative privacy 
implications. It can be addressed with a proper authentication system that 
doesn‟t allow the disclosure of a Tag's/Sensor's unique ID. Risk measure = 
0.6*3 = 1.8. 
 Data Eavesdropping - unauthorized retrieval of sensor/tag data. A strong 
encryption algorithm provides a counter-measure to this threat. Risk measure 
= 0.5*5 = 2.5. 
 Denial of Service attack - affects the operation of the entire network or a group 
of Tags/Sensors. The likely-hood of occurrence can be regarded as medium. 
Such an attack would require appropriate hardware and in-depth knowledge of 
the radio protocol used. A proper Authentication system provides counter-
measures to this threat. Risk measure = 0.5*10 = 5. 
 Rogue-Data Injection - an adversary can inject malicious data into the network 
causing improper configuration of the sensors for example. The probability of 
occurrence can be low as this kind of attack is not valuable to an adversary in 
most cases. A Mutual-Authentication system prevents accepting rogue data 
from unknown sources. Risk measure = 0.2*6 = 1.2. 
 Cryptanalysis Attack - secret key discovery through a cryptanalysis attack on 
the authentication and/or encryption system‟s secret data. Such an attack 
compromises the whole security and leads to a full disclosure of all data. The 
likely-hood of such an event is very low if the encryption key-space is large 
enough to prevent brute-force attacks (assumes unbreakable algorithm). Risk 
measure = 0.1*10 = 1. 
1.3 Objectives 
The main objectives of this research are as follows: 
 To conduct a thorough academic study of authentication and encryption for 
resource-limited devices. 
 To select implementable algorithms for authentication and encryption. 
 To select protocols for sensor communications, mutual authentication and 
establishing secure wireless communication channels. 
 To implement a working prototype based on identified algorithms and 
protocols. 
 To evaluate the performance of the prototype. 
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1.4 Research Hypothesis 
Lightweight Authentication and Encryption Protocols can be implemented and fulfil 
basic security requirements of the wireless communication between Resource 
Limited Devices without hardware modifications. 
1.5 The structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 of this Thesis contains a general statement of the problem and an in-depth 
study of security solutions for resource-limited wireless communication devices. This 
chapter is split into two main sections: Authentication and Encryption. Each of these 
sections provides an introduction to the problem in the context of a prototype 
Infrastructure Wireless Sensor Network, lists possible attacks and provides an 
overview of possible solutions. 
Chapter 3 introduces the implementation platform (nRF9E5 microcontroller) and the 
conceptual Infrastructure Wireless Sensor Network used as a reference for the 
prototype design. This chapter also provides an in-depth study of the limitations of 
the reference platform in terms of processing power, memory and the radio 
transceiver capability limitations. 
Chapter 4 describes the implementation process and explains the key program 
functions. The Gossamer Authentication Protocol and the Scalable Encryption 
Algorithm (SEA) C-language implementations were chosen to create the prototype. 
At the end of this chapter one can find the results of the prototype testing. 
Chapter 5 provides a brief performance analysis of the prototype in terms of code 
space requirements and the execution speed on the development platform of the 
8051-compatible nRF9E5 microcontroller. 
Subsequent chapters list conclusions resulting from this research and provide 
recommendations for future work. 
The source code of the software prototype in C-language dedicated for an 8-bit CPU 
(with minor nRF9E5-specific adaptations) can be found in Appendix B. 
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2. Security in Wireless Resource-Limited Devices 
2.1 General Statement of the Problem 
Typically, the application of security to wireless networks, such as the Wi-Fi 
Protected Access specification (Wi-Fi Alliance 2003), requires complex mathematical 
computation and significant protocol data overhead. Since these requirements 
cannot be fulfilled by the types of Resource-Limited Devices used in Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSN) and Radio Frequency-Identification (RFID) systems due to the 
constraints imposed by limited computational power, limited  memory size and the 
requirement for low power consumption (Akyildiz et al. 2002), there is a need to 
provide a lightweight security mechanism that can be implemented within device 
specifications. 
The primary aspects of the security of data exchange are listed by (Menezes et al. 
1997): 
 Mutual Authentication – ensures that all parties involved in communication can 
trust each other. 
 Confidentiality – no unauthorised party should be able to view plaintext data. 
 Integrity – assures that data was not altered during transmission to the 
recipient. 
 Availability – ensures that a service is constantly available (the Denial of 
Service (DoS) attack prevention). 
Another important aspect of security especially in the context of Wireless Sensor 
Networks, is Data Freshness (Perrig et al. 2002) also referred to as Forward Security. 
Data freshness ensures that the data received is fresh and the adversary cannot 
replay old messages. Perrig et al. define two types of data freshness: weak, ensuring 
the order of messages, and strong, allowing additionally for the delay of the message 
estimation. 
This MSc examines the nature of inter-device security in the context Wireless 
Resource-Limited Devices by decomposition; splitting it into the sub-problems of 
authentication and encryption. These sub-problems address the key security issues 
identified in the literature (Schneier 1996, Menezes et al. 1997, Mollin 2007, 
Ranasinghe & Cole 2008, Karlof et al. 2004). 
2.2 Authentication 
Mutual Authentication is a process of ensuring that all parties taking part in the 
communication can validate each other‟s identity. An intruder should not be able to 
masquerade as someone else (Schneier 1996). The physical properties of the radio 
frequency communication channel (the ease of eavesdropping), computational 
efficiency and power consumption constraints (Akyildiz et al. 2002) impose limitations 
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on the range of authentication protocols which can be taken under consideration. The 
problem of authentication in the context of networking resource-limited devices is 
explained in the following subsections. 
2.2.1 Authentication with Resource-Limited Devices 
The issue of Authentication in the networking of wireless resource-limited devices 
was given very little attention until RFID systems became popular. As RFID systems 
are expected to be widely used for item-level tagging of consumer products the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and researchers like Juels (Juels 2006) 
promoted interest in the issues of privacy and security. One of the first papers to 
draw attention to these issues was published by Sarma (Sarma et al. 2003). Sarma 
et al. drew attention to the need for the application of lightweight cryptographic 
primitives and protocols in the development of solutions for RFID.  
The two major threats to consumer‟s privacy (Juels 2006) are: tracking (traceability) 
and inventory. Under normal operating conditions, a tag reader will interrogate and 
read all tags in its proximity. Thus an unsecured RFID tag reveals its unique identifier 
in the absence of authentication between tag and reader. Any reader compliant with 
a given RFID specification is able to interrogate and identify the tag. In consequence, 
a person carrying a given tag, e.g. in a shopping bag, can be tracked around an area 
by a series of purposely located interrogators without the person‟s consent. If an 
unsecured tag conforms to the Electronic Product Code (EPC) specification (Leong 
et al. 2006) it also carries a unique identification of the item to which it is attached. 
This poses a threat in respect of itemising the contents of say, a shopping trolley, and 
identifying an individual‟s purchasing patterns 
Privacy, although drawing most of the attention, is not the only set of issues 
associated with the absence of an authentication mechanism. RFID systems and 
Wireless Sensor Networks are facing the threat of data forging and manipulation.  
Using commonly available equipment an adversary can easily inject messages 
(Perrig et al. 2002), causing for example false sensor readings.  
The majority of commonly used authentication mechanisms rely heavily on 
computationally intensive mathematical techniques requiring the manipulation of, for 
example, long keys. Resource Limited Devices share a number of constraints which 
in the case of RFID systems make the implementation of computationally intensive 
mathematical routines impossible due mainly to significant reduction in processor 
power and the absence of sufficient memory to store lengthy keys.  A secondary 
argument is that an increase in the number of logic gates implementated on an 
Integrated Circuit dramatically increases the overall price per tag (Sarma 2001). 
Although Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) use more capable hardware they are 
also tightly constrained by power limitations. WSN sensor battery life requirements 
force limited usage of the CPU and the radio bandwidth. Additionally, a node in a 
WSN is imbued with many tasks such as the Analogue to Digital Converter (ADC) 
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readings interpretation, radio protocol handling, reprogramming behaviours etc., thus 
the code space left for security mechanism implementation is very limited. 
In recent years the field of lightweight security has emerged rapidly and is offering 
solutions mostly for RFID but also covering the area of WSNs. A number of 
researchers (Juels 2005, Chien 2007, Peris-Lopez et al. 2009, Lee et al. 2009) 
proposed a group of Ultra-Lightweight Authentication protocols which mainly target 
RFID but additionally, promise ways of providing a resource-saving authentication 
mechanism for Infrastructure Wireless Sensor Networks (see Section 3.1) due to 
their computational simplicity and small data overhead. These protocols are 
discussed in section 2.2.3 of this document. 
2.2.2 Known and possible attacks 
Authentication Protocols applicable for a Wireless Network of constrained devices 
can be grouped into three broad attack categories: 
 passive attacks, where the adversary eavesdrops on transmitted messages. In 
this case we assume that the adversary is not able to alter the messages or 
inject new ones; 
 active attacks, where the adversary is able not only to eavesdrop the 
communication but also inject new messages or alter and replay the previous 
ones. 
 physical invasive attacks, where the adversary has a physical access and 
toolset required to access the device's circuitry and for example read the 
EEPROM memory contents. 
While the physical access attack threat cannot be fully negated by a protocol, it has 
to be noted that the results of such an attack have to be minimised: a compromise of 
one tag/node should not compromise the security of other nodes/tags. It should not 
be possible to crack a node's previously recorded and stored communications with a 
recently discovered key. This requirement is known as the data freshness (see 
Section 2.1). 
Traceability (ID disclosure) Attack 
It is a requirement of RFID systems and Wireless Sensor Networks that it should not 
be possible to track nodes without express authority to do so. This is known as a 
Traceability (ID disclosure) Attack (Juels 2006). The attack is performed to obtain a 
device's unique ID number which can be further used to track the device's 
movements using an appropriate RF transceiver. The ID disclosure attack may be 
performed using passive or active methods and typically targets the authentication 
protocol as the ID has to be transferred in one of the protocol's messages. 
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Full Disclosure Attack 
The success of this type of attack means that the entire security of the protocol has 
been compromised and all secret information used during the protocol flow is 
disclosed. This allows the adversary to fully impersonate (spoof) one of the devices 
taking part in the communication and effectively 'Clone' one of the nodes/tags. 
Typically a full disclosure attack requires active methods, but weak authentication 
protocols can be fully compromised using passive eavesdropping of consecutive 
rounds only (Bárász et al. 2007a). 
De-Synchronization Attack 
A de-synchronization attack is one of the most serious threats for an authentication 
protocol that is used in wireless networks. Synchronization means that both parties 
are aware of the status of the protocol and are able to continue executing the 
protocol with a normal flow. A de-synchronization attack breaks the protocol by 
altering the state of one (or both) of the parties authenticating each other in  a way 
which renders further phases of the protocol not executable (Li & Wang 2007). This 
kind of attack may effectively cause a denial-of-service of one or more nodes in the 
network. 
2.2.3 Identified protocols effective in the context of Infrastructure Wireless 
Sensor Network (IWSN) 
This review focuses on Ultralightweight and Lightweight Authentication Protocols and 
other authentication-related security schemes. Ultralightweight protocols, which were 
designed for low-cost RFID systems, rely on minimalistic cryptography techniques 
and provide a viable alternative for securing a heavily constrained Infrastructure 
Wireless Sensor Network (IWSN) with minor modifications. Other more 
computationally intensive schemes designed specifically for Wireless Sensor 
Networks (although filtered by the specific requirements of IWSN) or advanced RFID 
systems are also discussed. 
M²AP - Minimalist Mutual-Authentication Protocol 
Peris-Lopez et al. proposed a family of Ultralightweight Mutual Authentication 
Protocols (UMAP) initiated by the M²AP (Minimalist Mutual-Authentication Protocol) 
(Peris-Lopez et al. 2006c). The M²AP proposes a usage of an index-pseudonym 
(IDS) to avoid disclosing device‟s ID which prevents the privacy issues (Traceability 
and Inventory) associated with both RFID and some applications of WSN, for 
example Wireless Body Sensor Networks (WBSNs). The IDS (96-bit long) is 
effectively an index to a record in a database storing tag-specific information. Each 
tag stores a key consisting of four concatenated 96-bit long parts (K = K1 II K2 II K3 II 
K4). It is assumed that the communication link between a reader and the back-end 
database is secure. 
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The protocol is divided into four main stages: tag singulation, mutual authentication, 
IDS updating and key updating.  
 Tag singulation: the reader sends a “hello” message and the tag replies with 
current IDS. The interrogator can now access a record in the database 
containing sub-keys K1-K4 associated with a given tag.  
 Mutual Authentication is split into two distinct parts: Reader Authentication and 
Tag Authentication. In the first stage the reader generates two random 
numbers n1 and n2. The n1 and sub-keys K1 and K2 are used to generate A 
and B authentication sub-messages which are further concatenated (A II B). 
The following computation is performed during a round (n) for a tag(i):  
               
   
         
   
                  
            
        
Where  = exclusive OR,     = concatenation,   = logical AND,   = logical OR. 
The n2 number and K3 key are used to generate sub-message C (further used 
to update the IDS and the key K): 
             
   
         
       
These sub-messages are then concatenated and sent to the tag (message = 
A II B II C). 
The next stage is the Tag Authentication. The Tag uses sub-messages A and 
B to authenticate the reader. The message C provides random number n2 
which is used by the Tag to update the key K and the IDS. After a successful 
reader authentication the tag sends a message comprising of two 
concatenated sub-messages D II E. 
              
   
         
        
             
                 
Sub-message D allows the reader to authenticate the tag. Part E is used to 
send the ID in a secure form. 
 IDS Updating: in case of a successful authentication the reader and the tag 
update the index-pseudonym using the following operation: 
         
     
             
   
                    
 Key Updating: after a completion of the IDS updating the reader and the tag 
have to update all 4 sub-keys K1-K4 using the following equations: 
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Peris-Lopez et al. chose only simple operations (      and sum mod    ) 
forced by the computational power constraints of low-cost RFID tags and tag 
reading speed requirements (limited time for computation). He claims that the 
probability of ones and zeros in every sub-key is spread almost evenly and the 
Hamming distance between two consecutive keys         
   
 and         
     
 is 47.5 
bits on average. 
The protocol's author provided a security analysis of the proposal in terms of 
resistance to ID disclosure, Man-in-the-middle, replay attacks and Data Integrity 
assurance. The anonymity of the tag (ID hiding) is ensured by the usage of an index-
pseudonym (IDS). The Data Integrity is guaranteed by the IDS and four sub-keys - 
the attacker would have to be able to modify these values on both the database and 
the tag, otherwise even a single bit manipulation would stop the protocol execution. 
The mutual authentication mechanism based on two random numbers refreshed with 
every iteration of the protocol renders the Man-in-the-middle attack impossible. Peris-
Lopez et al. also claimed that the IDS and sub-keys updating mechanism prevents 
Replay Attacks. 
The M²AP was analysed and proven insecure by (Bárász et al. 2007b). Bárász 
describes specifications of a passive attack (eavesdropping only) against the M²AP 
which is able to retrieve the IDS and all sub-keys by eavesdropping over a few 
consecutive runs of the protocol. Two main weaknesses of the M²AP were 
discovered. The first is the fact that the usage of the bit-wise operations and the 
modulo     addition only implies that every bit affects only bits which are to the left of 
it and the least significant bit is independent of any other bits. Such operations are 
called triangular functions or T-functions and per Klimov and Shamir “A T-function is 
a mapping in which the i-th bit of the output can depend only on bits 0,1,..., i of the 
input“(Klimov & Shamir 2004). The second weak part is the OR and AND operations 
used in messages B and D which can help to derive n1 and n2 values with the help 
of set and reset bits of IDS. Bárász showed that the attacker can learn the ID, K1, K3, 
n1 and n2 after eavesdropping only two consecutive rounds of the M²AP which 
already allows for Traceability of the tag. K2 and K4 sub-key discovery requires 
eavesdropping more rounds but provides the attacker with the ability to impersonate 
the Tag or the Reader. 
EMAP - An Efficient Mutual-Authentication Protocol 
After weaknesses (Bárász et al. 2007b) were discovered in the M²AP Protocol, Peris-
Lopez et al. proposed a new EMAP Protocol (Peris-Lopez et al. 2006a). The protocol 
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is similar in concept to the M²AP: It has the same four stages and uses IDS and four 
sub-keys K1-K4. The only changes which were applied were the mathematical 
operations used to construct sub-messages A, B, C, D, E and the formulas for 
updating the IDS and four sub-keys. The new formulas for the sub-messages are as 
follows: 
             
   
         
   
    
              
   
         
   
     
             
   
         
   
    
              
   
         
   
     
              
   
                         
   
         
   
         
   
         
   
 
The IDS updating formula was supposed to have better statistical properties than the 
M²AP as the entire number use bit-wise XORed with a random number n2. 
         
     
            
   
            
   
 
The key updating formulas now contain a parity function         which divides the 96-
bit number into 24 4-bit blocks, calculates and outputs a parity bit for each block. The 
formulas are as follows: 
        
     
           
   
                               
                
      
        
     
           
   
                
                
                      
        
     
           
   
                               
                
      
        
     
           
   
                
                
                      
The security analysis provided by Peris-Lopez et al. was largely similar to the one 
provided in M²AP specification. 
(Li & Deng 2007) highlighted the weaknesses of the protocol allowing for a de-
synchronization and a full disclosure attack. It was highlighted that the tag is not able 
to verify if the reader successfully received correct messages D and E and updated 
the keys and IDS accordingly. Li & Deng described two types of possible attacks on 
LMAP: de-synchronization attack and full disclosure attack. As both of the protocols 
rely on a synchronization of IDS and keys stored on a tag and in the back-end 
database, a full round of the protocol has to take place in order to keep 
synchronization on both sides. Li & Deng proposed two man-in-the-middle de-
synchronization attacks: 
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 Changing the message C – by intercepting message (A II B II C) and XORing 
sub-message C with a series of zeros excluding the least significant bit set to 
1 and forwarding the set of messages to the tag. The tag can still authenticate 
the reader as A and B remain unchanged, but it will get the wrong n2 number. 
Despite this the protocol will continue and the tag will reply with incorrect D 
and E messages; however, the reader will not be able to discover changes in 
D and will accept in all cases. It was shown that there is a 75% chance on 
average that the reader will accept an incorrect value E and update its 
database using original n2. The tag will do the same using incorrect n2 and 
both devices will lose synchronization. 
 Changing the messages A and B – similar to the previous attack but in this 
case A and B sub-messages are altered and in the result n1 value used by the 
tag for an update is changed. 
The full disclosure attack is based on a stateless nature of the tags - there is no way 
to save the state of the protocol execution on a tag. The attack consists of four 
stages, the first three of which are performed on a single protocol run and disclose all 
secret values apart from K2, K4 and the tag ID. The fourth stage requires 
approximately (         runs to fully disclose tag's ID (m-bits long). 
LMAP - A Real Lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocol 
After several weaknesses were discovered in M²AP and EMAP Peris-Lopez et al 
addressed them in the LMAP proposal (Peris-Lopez et al. 2006b). LMAP and EMAP 
share some similarities: the same size of the IDS and the same size and number of 
sub-keys. However, the Tag to Reader message (previously consisting of sub-
messages D and E) was reduced only to a single message D. The rest of the sub-
messages are now created using the following equations: 
             
   
         
   
    
              
   
         
   
     
             
   
         
   
    
              
   
                 
The IDS index-pseudonym is now created with the following operation: 
         
     
             
   
             
                
The sub-key K1 and K2 equations are identical to the ones proposed in M²AP: 
        
     
           
   
             
   
           
13 
 
        
     
           
   
             
   
           
The operations used to create the last two sub-keys K3 and K4 were slightly modified 
in comparison to M²AP and are as follows: 
        
     
            
   
              
   
           
        
     
            
   
              
   
           
The LMAP and the M²AP protocols were analysed by (Li & Wang 2007) and serious 
weaknesses were discovered in both. The vulnerabilities highlighted and possible 
attacks are very similar to the EMAP security flaws analysis in (Li & Deng 2007). 
Again, the main issue is related to the fact that the tag is not able to verify if the 
reader successfully received and verified message D, which may lead to a protocol 
de-synchronization. The de-synchronization attacks are practically identical to the 
one proposed earlier: message C alteration and messages A&B alteration attacks 
performed by XOring the message with zeros and one as the least significant bit. The 
probability of the success of the first attack remained at 50%. The full disclosure 
attack is slightly more difficult than in the case of the M²AP protocol. The attacker has 
to obtain the current IDS of the tag and then try all possible (A II B II C) messages by 
sending them to the tag and changing the j-th bit in A and B at each try. This reveals 
the n1 random number value and allows the calculation of K1 and K2. The rest of the 
secret values can be discovered by interacting with the reader and the tag one more 
time and then derived from the known sub-message creation equations and a simple 
algorithm described in (Li & Wang 2007). Several countermeasures were proposed, 
the most interesting one proposes a tag status storage mechanism preventing de-
synchronization attacks: an additional status bit on the tag indicating whether a 
protocol has been successfully completed and two additional 96-bit memory spaces 
for storing n1 and n2 values used in the last protocol run. A Similar mechanism was 
included in (Peris-Lopez et al. 2006b) as a LMAP+ extension. 
However, the above protocols including Li & Wang's countermeasures were proven 
still susceptible to de-synchronization and full disclosure attacks by (Chien & Huang 
2007). Chien & Huang showed that the attacker can flip some bits without being 
noticed by the reader or the tag so the protocol round would complete and both sides 
would update the IDS and keys with different n1 and n2 random numbers. The 
authors also revised the Li & Wang's full disclosure attack and showed even more 
efficient version of the attack. 
The Li & Wang's paper was also followed by (Bárász et al. 2007a) describing a fully 
passive full disclosure attack against LMAP, which requires only eavesdropping a few 
(about 10) consecutive rounds of the protocol. The main weaknesses of the protocol 
mentioned in (Bárász et al. 2007b) were related to triangular functions properties 
(weak propagation of bits from left to right). 
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SASI - Strong Authentication and Strong Integrity 
The family of UMAP protocols proposed by Peris-Lopez et al. influenced an 
interesting SASI protocol specification by (Chien 2007). The concept is similar to that 
of the UMAP family. The tag has a unique 96-bit ID and pre-shares an index-
pseudonym (IDS) and two keys K1 and K2 with a back-end database accessible by 
the reader (secure link assumed). In order to resist de-synchronization a state-
verification has been employed: the tag stores two sets of (IDS, K1, K2) – the old 
values and the potential new values. In each protocol instance the reader may probe 
the tag twice: the first time the tag replies with its potential new IDS and if it was not 
found it may probe the tag again and this time the tag will use the old IDS value. 
The protocol flow is also similar to UMAP family: 
 The reader sends a “hello” message. 
 The tag replies with its potential next IDS. 
 The reader uses IDS to find a matched record in the database. It generates 
two random values n1 and n2 and uses stored keys K1 and K2 to generate 
messages A, B and C which are further concatenated and sent to the tag. The 
following equations are used to generate A and B:  
             
   
         
   
    
              
   
         
   
     
Keys K1 and K2 are rotated using a rotation function „ROT‟, which was not 
clearly specified in Chen‟s paper but revealed in (Hernandez-Castro et al. 
2008) to be a Hamming rotation. The rotations are described as follows: 
                  
                  
According to Hernandez-Castro et al. Chien intended to use a Hamming 
rotation                  , where       stands for the Hamming weight 
of vector B. If a modular rotation                   was chosen, then 
the protocol would be susceptible to a passive attack proposed in (Hernandez-
Castro et al. 2008). 
 After rotations are performed, the rotated and original keys are used to form 
the message C: 
                    
 The tag receives A II B II C and extracts n1 from A, and n2 from B. Then it 
performs the same two rotation functions as the reader in previous step, 
calculates message C and compares it with the received one. Upon successful 
verification the tag replies to the reader with a message D: 
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After sending the message the tag updates the IDS and keys K1 and K2 using 
the following equations: 
                                        
                     
                     
 After the message was received and successfully verified by the reader, the 
reader updates the IDS and keys entries using the same equations as the tag. 
Chien provided a security analysis of the protocol claiming that it is secure against 
de-synchronization attacks, ID disclosure attacks and it should provide privacy, 
anonymity, mutual authentication and forward secrecy (keeping the past 
communication secure even if a tag is compromised later) while retaining the ultra-
lightweight properties and requiring a message length of 4L1 and the total memory 
size on a tag of 7L as opposed to 6L in UMAP family protocols. 
There have been no published successful passive attacks against the SASI protocol 
using Hamming rotation function. However, several active attack possibilities were 
discovered. Two de-synchronization attacks on the SASI protocol were described by 
(Sun et al. 2008). Both attacks were targeting the anti-de-synchronization mechanism 
of the SASI protocol: the possibility of re-trying the communication with the old IDS in 
case the next-possible IDS was not found in the database. Another paper by (Cao et 
al. 2009) described a denial-of-service and ID disclosure attacks. A de-
synchronization, ID disclosure and finally a full disclosure attack against the SASI 
protocol was proposed by (D‟Arco & De Santis 2008). 
Gossamer Protocol 
The Gossamer Protocol derived by (Peris-Lopez et al. 2009) is one of the most 
recent proposals in the field of lightweight cryptography. Peris-Lopez et al. 
summarized that most of the weaknesses are related to the fact that all simple 
bitwise operations like AND, OR, XOR and modulo     addition are T-functions 
(Klimov & Shamir 2004), thus suffer from weak propagation of bits from left to right. 
Another weakness highlighted was the bias in the probability (75%) of obtaining a bit 
„1‟ when using bitwise AND operation. 
Peris-Lopez proposes a Gossamer Protocol that is largely similar to the SASI 
protocol in general concept: each tag has a static identifier (ID), an index-pseudonym 
(IDS) and two keys K1 and K2 in memory. Additionally each tag is required to store 
two sets of the tuple (IDS, K1, K2): old value and the potential next value. It is 
assumed that the only mathematical operations that will be used are bitwise XOR, 
                                            
1
 L denotes the length of one key or the IDS in bits. 96-bits in the case of the EPC RFID specifications. 
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addition modulo    and left rotation function         . The rotation function performs 
a circular shift on the value of   by        , positions to the left for a given N (96 in 
case of the EPC RFID). The most computationally expensive operation of generating 
two random numbers required in each protocol run is designed to be done on the 
reader side. An additional security layer is added with a lightweight function 
called       , which is based on a methodology described in (Hernandez-Castro et 
al. 2006) and uses only bitwise right shift. The pseudocode describing the algorithm 
for the MixBits function is shown in Figure 2.1. 
Z = MixBits (X, Y) 
Z = X 
FOR counter = 0 to 32 
Z = (Z>>1) + Z + Z + Y 
ENDFOR 
 
Figure 2.1 MixBits Function 
The author of the protocol divided it into three stages: tag identification, mutual 
identification and updating phase. 
 Tag Identification phase – just as in previously described SASI protocols the 
reader sends a “hello” message and the tag replies with its next 
potential        . The reader performs a search in the database to find a 
matching entry and if successful it continues to the next phase. Otherwise the 
reader queries the tag again and the tag replies with the old       .  
 Mutual Authentication phase – the reader generates two random values n1 
and n2 and build messages A, B and C using the following equations 
(assuming that                              - 96 bits) : 
                                  
                                  
                  
                                        
                                        
                   
                                           
Now the tag extracts n1 from A and n2 from B and performs the same 
operations as the reader to construct    . Then it compares   received with 
   calculated and upon success constructs message D to be sent to the 
reader: 
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The tag performs Tag Updating phase. The reader upon receiving message D 
performs the same calculation and compares D received with    calculated. If 
this is successful the reader performs Updating phase. 
 Updating phase – the tag updates the two (IDS, K1, K2) tuples as follows: 
                    
            
                    
                                   
         
                     
                             
         
                           
                       
           
  
        
 
The reader updates the back-end database using the following formulas: 
                    
                                                  
                                              
                                             
 
The protocol requires exchanging four messages between the reader and the tag. All 
stages are illustrated in Figure 2.2. Hello message length is not specified, the IDS 
and D messages are 96-bits long and the concatenated A II B II C message consist 
of three 96-bit long sub-messages. A total of 384 bits (excluding Hello message) 
needs to be transmitted during one protocol run. 
The Storage Requirements on the tag side are limited to 7 times the key-length (96-
bits in the original specification) to hold two IDS, K1, K2 tuples and the static identifier 
ID. Each database record is required to story only one IDS, K1, K2 tuple and the 
static ID. 
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Figure 2.2 The Gossamer Protocol 
The Gossamer Protocol prevents attacks listed in section 2.2.2 as follows: 
 ID Disclosure Attack – the notion of an index-pseudonym (IDS) and private 
keys K1 and K2 changed for every authentication session prevents disclosure 
of the unique identifier (ID) of the tag. 
 Full Disclosure Attack – the secret data (ID, K1, K2) is always scrambled using 
two random numbers and sum, Mixbits and Rot functions before being 
transmitted over the wireless link. 
 De-Synchronization Attack – each tag stores (IDS, K1, K2) tuples used in a 
previous protocol run. In case of an unsuccessful update on the reader side in 
the last stage of the protocol (message D) the tag can be still identified using 
old values. The result is that both the tag and the reader can recover their 
synchronized state. 
The requirement of the Data Freshness (see section 2.1) is fulfilled by updating 
secret values K1, K2, n1 and n2 at each protocol run. 
To the knowledge of the author only one paper describing attacks against the 
Gossamer protocol was published (Ahmed et al. 2010) shortly before this dissertation 
was finished. Ahmed et al. described two attacks against the protocol. The first one 
was feasible if both random numbers n1 and n2 were equal to zero allowing the 
discovery of all secret values after eavesdropping two consecutive runs of the 
protocol. The latter attack concerned a case where both K1 and K2 values are equal 
to zero which leads to disclosure of all secret values during a single authentication 
round. Ahmed et al. proposed modifications to the protocol.  However their proposal 
has a major flaw in that it renders the extraction of n1 and n2 impossible.  
The original Gossamer protocol is given in fig. 2.1 replicated below for clarity of 
explanation.   
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An attack on the original Gossamer protocol is feasible if both random numbers n1 
and n2 were equal to zero permitting the discovery of K1 and K2 after eavesdropping 
two consecutive runs of the protocol. 
The proposed Ahmed et al modification substitutes K1 for n2 in A and K2 for n1 in B.  
                                  
                                  
The values n1 and n2 are known to the reader. In A above,              
          is rotated by n2 by the reader and likewise in B,               
          is rotated by n1. Messages A & B are exchanged with the tag. The tag‟s 
job is to extract the values n2 and n1 from messages A and B and to perform the 
appropriate inverse rotation to verify the remainder of the contents of messages A 
and B.  However, in this modification, the tag is not aware of the value n1 or n2 and 
therefore cannot perform the inverse rotation to retrieve               
         . This is a flaw in Ahmed‟s analysis that will not permit the completion of 
authentication.   
Another modification proposed by Ahmed et al. concerning the MixBits function has 
also a very weak effect on overcoming the weakness of both random numbers n1 
and n2 equal to zero. In the original Gossamer protocol, the mix-bits function exists 
during the creation of the new IDS and Key values.   
Z = MixBits (X, Y) 
Z = X 
FOR counter = 0 to 32 
Z = (Z>>1) + Z + Z + Y 
ENDFOR 
Figure 2.3 MixBits function (repeated) 
Where X and Y are the input 96-bit numbers and Z is the final result of the MixBits 
function. The weakness identified by Ahmed et. al is that if both of the MixBits input 
values (n1 and n2 in the first run) are equal to 0 then the result of the function is also 
equal to 0. As a result all transformations are dependent on the Key values, the IDS 
and Pi. This weakens the effective security of the Gossamer Protocol. Ahmed et al 
proposed the following modification: 
Z = MixBits (X, Y) 
Z = X 
FOR counter = 0 to 32 
Z = (Z+counter) + Z + Z + Y 
ENDFOR 
Figure 2.4 Modified MixBits Function 
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It is obvious that in a case where both n1 and n2 numbers are equal to zero then the 
result of the MixBits function will be always the sum of numbers 1 to 32 which is 528. 
The proposed attack on the MixBits functions where n1 and n2 are 0 has been 
rectified but now the first attack proposed can be still performed but using the value 
of 528 instead of 0 at the first call of the MixBits function within the Protocol (n3 
calculation) and the result can be applied to the subsequent formulae to generate 
keys and messages. 
Temporarily as a solution to the first attack it is recommended not to allow both 
random generated numbers to hold a value of zero at the same time. This verification 
should be performed by the PRNG function before the values are forwarded to the 
reader. 
An altered Gossamer Protocol is suitable as a mechanism for authenticating 
Resource Limited Devices. The reader-tag relation is close to the master-slave one in 
the Infrastructure WSN scenario (see section 3.1). The main difference is the fact that 
a RFID tag is triggered by the reader, where in the IWSN all slaves will periodically 
initiate the communication. This difference is not significant in terms of the Gossamer 
specification as the „Hello‟ message send by the reader to initiate the communication 
does not carry any protocol-specific data, thus can be discarded without any effect. It 
has to be pointed out that the Gossamer protocol was designed to be implemented in 
hardware but the simplicity of the mathematical operations renders it easily 
implementable in software on the reference platform nRF9E5 (see section 3.4). In 
consequence, this protocol is chosen for the implementation and further performance 
analysis. 
Ultralightweight RFID Protocol with Mutual Authentication (UMA-RFID) 
Shortly after the Gossamer Protocol was published Lee at al. proposed UMA-RFID 
alternative (Lee et al. 2009). The protocol is very similar to the Gossamer 
specification but simplified to use only bitwise operations (XOR, OR, AND) and a left 
bitwise rotation function ROT. Each tag contains a static identifier ID, pseudonym 
called the dynamic temporary identifier (IDT) and a secret key (K). All variables are 
128-bits long and shared between the tag and the back-end database accessible by 
the reader (secure channel assumed). The reader is assumed to be capable of 
generating random number (N). The protocol consists of two stages: Authentication 
Phase and Update Phase. 
 Authentication Phase: the reader sends a request message and the tag 
replies with a temporary identifier (IDT). The reader searches the database to 
find a secret key     corresponding to the IDT received, generates random 
number   and calculates messages     and     as follows: 
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The messages are concatenated and sent to the tag. Upon receiving these 
messages the tag obtains    from message     and calculates message      in 
the same way as the reader previously. Then message      is compared 
with   . If they are the same then the reader is authenticated and the tag 
generates reply message     as follows: 
                                      
The message is sent to the reader and the reader calculates a local copy and 
verifies the correctness. After successful verification the tag is authenticated. 
 Updating phase: the tag performs this phase after authenticating the reader. 
The updating on the reader side is done upon successful authentication of the 
tag. Both sides use the following equations to update         and    : 
                      
                  
Peris-Lopez et al. analysed the UMA-RFID protocol (Peris-Lopez et al. 2009) and 
found serious weaknesses in the scheme which led to ID Disclosure, Full Disclosure 
and De-Synchronization attacks. Peris-Lopez et al. described 5 attacks: ID-disclosure 
attack, two passive Full Disclosure attacks and two active De-Synchronization 
attacks. The most significant Full Disclosure attack allowing cloning of the tag to be 
performed after eavesdropping of only two consecutive runs of the protocol and 
requires only computing XOR among some of the messages transmitted over the 
radio channel. 
SQUASH – A New MAC with Provable Security Properties for Highly 
Constrained Devices Such as RFID Tags 
Adi Shamir proposed an authentication mechanism based on a challenge-response 
scheme and Message Authentication Code (MAC) called SQUASH (short for 
SQUare-hASH) specifically for Resource Limited Devices (Shamir 2008). The 
proposed challenge-response scheme allows tag-to-reader authentication and does 
not address the ID disclosure issue. The document focuses on describing a strong 
one-way hashing function (H) performed by the tag upon receiving a random 
challenge message (R). The MAC is computed with (R) and secret key (S) as inputs: 
           
The reader shares the secret key S and performs the same calculation upon 
receiving the MAC to validate if a tag is legitimate. The author made an interesting 
observation that most of the standard one-way hash functions such as SHA-1 
(Eastlake & Jones 2001) are primarily designed to be collision resistant as their main 
area of usage concerns digital signatures. The requirement for collision resistance 
typically adds complexity to the algorithm. Since a collision is not a security threat in 
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a challenge-response scheme, the author proposed an algorithm based on the Rabin 
encryption scheme (Rabin 1979). In the Rabin scheme the ciphertext (c) is computed 
as            , where (m) is a message and (n) is a product of at least two 
unknown prime factors. Shamir has shown how the calculation can be simplified 
using a step-by-step process that has no adverse effects on the strength of the 
security and has proposed a hardware implementation using mixing function (M) 
applied to the secret and challenge (S, R) and then the SQUASH function 
SQUASH(M(S,R)) as follows:  
1. Start with j which is the index at lower end of the desired extended window of t + u bits, and set 
carry to 0. 
2. Numerically add to the current carry (over the integers, not modulo 2) the k products of the form 
 mv *            for v = 0, 1, 2, ..., k − 1. 
3. Define bit cj as the least significant bit of the carry, set the new carry to the current carry right-
shifted by one bit position, and increment j by one. 
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 t + u times, throw away the first u bits, and provide the last t bits as the 
response to the challenge.(Shamir 2008) 
 
The proposed SQUASH-128 hash function uses a modulus           a 64-bit key S 
and a 64-bit challenge R to produce a 32-bit response. The security of this scheme 
was questioned by Ouafi & Vaudenay, who discovered a key recovery attack known 
as "known random coins attack" against the Rabin scheme using 1024 chosen 
challenges (Ouafi & Vaudenay 2009). The “known random coins attack” allows an 
adversary to request many encryptions of the same plaintext and in consequence get 
the random coins. The attack is only effective if a linear mixing function is used, thus 
the security of SQUASH is still regarded as strong, assuming that a non-linear mixing 
function is used. 
SPINS - Security Protocols for Sensor Networks 
Perrig et al. proposed a security mechanism consisting of two blocks: Secure 
Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP) and µTESLA (Perrig et al. 2002). SNEP‟s 
security goals are data confidentiality, mutual authentication and the evidence of data 
freshness2. µTESLA provides a mechanism for an authenticated broadcast. 
 According to the authors SNEP achieves previously mentioned security goals with a 
very low communication overhead of only 8 bytes per message. SNEP ensures 
semantic security3 using two counters    and    shared by the communicating 
nodes. These counters are further used by the block cipher in counter mode. 
Counters do not have to be attached to messages but Perrig et al. described a 
mechanism of counter synchronization. The mutual authentication is achieved 
through the usage of a MAC function. Both communicating nodes A (sender) and B 
(receiver) share a master secret key     used to derive keys through a 
pseudorandom function. It has to be noted that the authors advised deriving different 
                                            
2
 Data freshness ensures that the data received is fresh and the adversary cannot replay old 
messages. 
3
 Semantic security ensures that an eavesdropper is not able to deduct any information about the 
plaintext even after analysis of multiple encryptions of the same plaintext. 
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key sets for MAC and encryption. Each key set consists of two keys - one for each 
direction of the communication. 
Encryption keys: 
    =       
    =       
MAC keys: 
     =       
     =       
The sender node A encrypts (symmetric block cipher) the data using     and   : 
                  
The encrypted result is then used by the MAC function in the following manner: 
              
Finally the sender node sends the message: 
                                                  
This scheme does not provide data freshness. A solution for this issue is provided by 
the usage of a random number    and a request message    send by the node A: 
          
The Receiving Node B responds with an encrypted message and a MAC function 
with a cryptographic nonce    as one of the inputs: 
                          
 
                           
Upon receiving the message and MAC verification the node A is sure that the node B 
generated the message using the cryptographic nonce supplied in a request 
message. 
SNEP messages require synchronized counters on both sides of the communication. 
If the synchronization is lost for example due to lost messages, counter values can 
be re-synchronized through the following messages: 
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The concept of µTESLA was based on a TESLA protocol providing a mechanism of 
an authenticated broadcast (Perrig et al. 2001). This scheme achieves asymmetry 
through a delayed disclosure of symmetric keys rather than using computationally 
expensive Public Key Cryptography. The TESLA proposal is not suitable for 
implementation within a constrained devices environment. In order to adapt it for the 
Wireless Sensor Networks the following issues were addressed: 
 TESLA authenticates the initial packet with a digital signature. The 
computation of a digital signature is too expensive on sensor nodes so 
µTESLA uses only a symmetric mechanism. 
 Standard TESLA discloses the key for the previous intervals with every 
packet. Since this generates too much overhead µTESLA discloses the key 
once for each pre-defined epoch. 
 Sensor nodes are not able to store an entire one-way key chain in the 
memory. This is addressed in µTESLA by limiting the number of authenticated 
senders. 
The µTESLA requires that all receiving nodes are loosely time synchronized with the 
base station. In order to send an authenticated broadcast, the base station computes 
a MAC using the packet and a key which is secret at that point in time. The receiving 
node stores the packet in the buffer in order to validate its authenticity later when the 
base station broadcasts the verification key. Each MAC is a key of a key chain, 
generated by applying a one-way hash function. A successive key is generated by 
applying the hash function on the previous key. The time synchronization can be 
achieved by the means of the SNEP protocol. The protocol consists of the following 
phases: 
 Sender setup – the sender node generates a one-way key chain by 
successively applying one-way hash function. 
 Broadcasting authenticated packets – the time is divided into inform intervals. 
The sender associates each key in the key chain with one particular interval 
and uses this key to compute MAC of all packets sent in that interval. The key 
   is disclosed after a delay which is greater than a few time intervals and has 
to be greater than a message round-trip time between the sender and the 
receivers. 
 Bootstrapping a new receiver – each receiver needs to authenticate one key in 
the one-way key chain which allows it to commit to the entire chain: further 
keys will be calculated using one-way hash function. The receiver needs to be 
loosely time synchronized with the sender and has to know the key disclosure 
schedule. Both of these requirements are fulfilled as follows: the Receiver 
node sends a request message containing a random number    and the 
Sender replies with a message containing its current time   , the key    used 
in the past interval  , the starting time of this interval   , the duration of this 
interval      and the key disclosure delay  . These values are sent with clear 
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text along with a MAC calculated using these values,  the random number 
   and shared secret key    : 
         
                          
                                     
 Authenticating broadcast packets – upon receiving a message the receiver 
needs to make sure that this packet is safe by verifying if the key used to 
compute the MAC was not disclosed yet. This can be achieved thanks to loose 
time synchronization between the sender and the receiver. When a node 
receives a new key    it computes the one-way hash function on the previous 
key    in order to verify the correctness of  . If the check was successful then 
a node can authenticate all packets which arrived in the time interval of     
Perrig et al. did not specify exactly which encryption algorithm should be used in 
SNEP, or which one-way hash function should be used by µTESLA, or indeed which 
Random-number generation should be used in both protocol blocks. However, Perrig 
et al. provide example functions for the experimental implementation. In order to 
tackle the issue of limited code space and RAM size all cryptographic primitives are 
based on a modified subset of the RC5 encryption algorithm (Rivest 1995). 
The µTESLA‟s main disadvantage is the need for an initial unicast-based parameter 
distribution. This issue has been addressed by Liu & Ning  in the Multi-Level µTESLA 
specification (Liu & Ning 2004). The scheme provides a way to predetermine and 
broadcast the initial parameters. Additionally, Multi-Level µTESLA introduces a mulit-
level key chain scheme which removes the need for very long key chain. The authors 
claim that the key chain commitment distribution mechanism described in their 
document improves the survivability of the scheme against message loss and Denial 
Of Service (DOS) attacks. 
Since the SPINS specification does not propose exact cryptographic primitives to be 
used no security weaknesses were identified in the scheme to the knowledge of the 
author. However, several papers were published addressing efficiency and key 
management issues found in SNIPS (Liu & Ning 2004), (Yu-Long et al. 2007), 
(Hegazy et al. 2007). 
Both of the SPINS schemes suffer from using Pseudo-Random Number Generator 
(PRNG) engines not only on the base station side but also on the sensors. Perrig et 
al. suggested that sensor nodes may draw random numbers from the actual sensor 
readings. However, the Analog-to-Digital Converters (ADCs) which are sometimes 
only 8 or 10-bit wide may not be able to provide random values in a magnitude large 
enough for cryptographic usage. Thus a resource expensive PRNG functions need to 
be implemented within a limited sensor node code space. 
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Due to a high computational overhead on the sensor node side, the SPINS 
implementation was not considered during this MSc project.  
2.3 Encryption 
Bruce Schneier said that “Cryptography is the art and science of keeping messages 
secure”(Schneier 1996). A message (referred to as a plaintext) undergoes a process 
of hiding its substance (encryption) and converting it into a non-meaningful gibberish 
(ciphertext or cipher) that can be sent over an insecure communication channel. The 
process of retrieving a plaintext from a ciphertext received is referred to as 
decryption. 
The general rule followed in modern cryptography states that the security of the 
system cannot rely on the secrecy of its components (security by obscurity) – the 
secrecy must reside entirely in the encryption key. This principle was stated by 
Auguste Kerchoff in the nineteenth century (Menezes et al. 1997), who assumed that 
a cryptanalyst has a complete knowledge of the algorithm and implementation. An 
algorithm that has its security based on keeping its foundations secret is called 
restricted. Such a security system can be compromised through an information leak, 
reverse engineering, etc. Quality control and standardisation cannot be maintained. 
The most common type of cryptography is the Secret-Key Cryptography (symmetric 
cryptography), where a message „M‟ gets encrypted with encryption function E, using 
a key „k‟ to generate a ciphertext „c‟. Therefore, c = E(k,M). The decryption function D 
should provide a way to recover the plaintext „p‟ using shared secret „k‟, such that p = 
D(k,c). 
2.3.1 Problem of Encryption in the context of IWSN 
Resource-Limited Devices (RLDs) are highly constrained in terms of available 
memory and processing power (see Section 3.3). The reference platform nRF9E5 
(see Section 3.4) used in the example IWSN does not provide any hardware support 
for any encryption algorithm, thus the entire mechanism needs to be implemented in 
software. The following characteristics are used to evaluate possible encryption 
algorithms: 
 The code-space required for the implementation is limited (algorithm 
simplicity) and will be used as one of the metrics. 
 The algorithm should be optimized for 8-bit word size. 
 The expected data payload size is limited, thus the resource efficiency of the 
algorithm will take precedence before the data throughput. 
 The single data payload size is limited to 24 bytes on most occasions. 
 It may be not possible to implement a random number generator on the node 
side due to general hardware and execution time constraints. 
 Thanks to the proposed authentication algorithm (see Section 2.2.3) the key 
management problem may be resolved through a re-use of the authentication 
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key for the purpose of a session key fed into a symmetrical block or stream 
cipher.  
The most security critical aspect of wireless sensor operation is the reconfiguration of 
the nodes. An attack enabling an adversary to alter the control messages may lead 
for example to Denial Of Service (DOS) attacks affecting the entire network of 
sensors. It is assumed that the authentication system will guarantee frequent session 
key changes for the purpose of maintaining the data freshness (see Section 2.1). In 
consequence, the control messages have to remain safe for a relatively short period 
of time, until the next session key is exchanged. In most IWSN applications the data 
transferred by sensors will not be valuable to an attacker and will not require infinitely 
long secrecy. Given the analysis above, the encryption algorithm may be based on 
relatively short encryption keys. 
2.3.2 Known and possible attacks 
Attacks can be generally divided into two categories - passive and active attacks. 
Passive attacks concern monitoring the communication channel and gathering data 
(eavesdropping) but not altering it in any way. Wireless Sensor Networks are 
especially prone to passive eavesdropping.  
Cryptanalysis is an area of science heavily used in performing passive attacks on 
Encryption Algorithms. It concerns recovering plaintext of a message without knowing 
the Encryption Key. Schneier divided cryptanalytic attacks into several groups 
(Schneier 1996). The most important are as follows: 
 Ciphertext-only attack – the attacker analyses the ciphertext of several 
messages encrypted with the same algorithm in order to recover the 
encryption key. 
 Known-plaintext attack – the attacker has access to a block of plain text and a 
ciphertext produced by the algorithm out of this block. The analysis tries to 
extract information on the encryption key by examining changes between input 
and output. 
 Chosen-plaintext attack – similar to the known-plaintext attack but the attacker 
is able to choose a plaintext block to be encrypted. 
 Adaptive chosen-plaintext attack – the cryptanalyst sequentially applies 
chosen-plaintext attack on variable size plaintext blocks, where each choice is 
dependent on the outcome of previous attack. 
 Chosen-ciphertext attack – this kind of attack assumes that the cryptanalyst 
has access to the decrypted plaintext corresponding to the ciphertext he chose 
(without knowing the decryption key). 
Attacks requiring alteration of the transmitted ciphertext or alteration of the 
computation in a device are referred to as active. These types of attacks commonly 
target specific protocol implementation of the security system rather than 
cryptographic algorithms on their own. 
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A special case of an active attack is a physical invasive attack - the adversary has a 
physical access and toolset required to access the device's circuitry and for example 
read the EEPROM memory contents. Since a full protection against this types of 
attack requires advanced hardware (such as a sensor case destroying the EEPROM 
chip during opening), it is assumed that such attack cannot be prevented. The 
consequences of the physical invasive attack have to be limited in such a way that 
the security of the entire system is not compromised when a single node‟s key is 
revealed and the past communication remains safe (see Section 2.1). This issue 
introduces a requirement to maintain session keys unique to each of the sensor 
nodes. 
2.3.3 Identified algorithms effective in the context of Infrastructure WSN 
The field of research concerning cryptography for low cost embedded devices was 
not given much attention until the last two decades. The papers concerning 
lightweight cryptography are focused either on finding solutions easily implementable 
in hardware (Bogdanov et al. 2007, Eisenbarth et al. 2007, Poschmann et al. 2007) 
or solutions focused on a software implementation efficiency on low resource 
microcontrollers (Standaert et al. 2006, Wheeler & Needham 1994). The reference 
platform used in this research forces a software encryption solution. 
Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) family 
The Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) (Wheeler & Needham 1994) was the initial 
proposal of a family of algorithms (chronologically): XTEA and Block TEA (Needham 
& Wheeler 1997) and XXTEA (Wheeler & Needham 1998). The main principle behind 
the TEA algorithm design was the simplicity of the implementation and the ease of 
translation to many programming languages (including Assembly). The initial 
proposal was a block cipher operating on 64-bit blocks with 128-bit key. Each of the 
identical 64 rounds of the algorithm uses only logical AND, OR, as well as bit-shift 
operations and addition/subtraction       . The sample C-language source code 
consisted of less than 10 lines. The authors favoured large number of iterations over 
the complexity of the code. The set up time is relatively short and there is no need to 
store any Look-Up-Tables (LUTs) in the memory.  
The first weakness discovered in TEA was the fact that each key is equivalent to 
three others which effectively reduces the key size to 126 bits. This vulnerability was 
used to construct an attack against Microsoft's Xbox game console, which uses TEA 
as a hash function (Russell 2004). Since the initial proposal in 1994 several attacks 
were published, for example a Key-schedule cryptanalysis (Kelsey et al. 1997) and 
Related-key cryptanalysis (Kelsey et al. 1997). Wheeler & Needham addressed the 
issue mentioned above when proposing Block TEA and XTEA algorithms. The key 
schedule was revised and other computations (bit-shifts, XORs and additions) were 
rearranged to introduce the key material more slowly. The XTEA algorithm and it‟s 
block version Block TEA also suffer from weaknesses discovered by shortly after 
publication by Saarinen (Saarinen 1998): slow diffusion in the decryption direction 
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exploited by chosen plaintext attack. Several other cryptanalysis attempts were also 
published in (Andem 2003, Hong et al. 2004, Ko et al. 2004, Lu 2009, Moon et al. 
2002). The slow decoding propagation pointed by Saarinen was addressed by 
Wheelar & Needham in their XXTEA proposal as a short amendment to the Block 
TEA (Wheeler & Needham 1998).  
XXTEA operates on a block consisting of at least two 32-bit words using a 128-bit 
key. A single round of the algorithm can be viewed as operations on a word and its 
two adjacent words (previous and the next one). Figure 2.5 shows one round of 
XXTEA cipher, where    represents a current block and the four-squares symbol 
represents addition Modulo the size of the word. The number of rounds equivalents 
to the number of words in the block. 
 
Figure 2.5 One round of XXTEA (el Ruptor 2007) 
In (Rinne et al. 2007), Rinne analysed the performance of several ciphers, including 
DES (Federal Information Processing Standards 1993), AES (Daemen & Rijmen 
1999), IDEA, SEA (Standaert et al. 2006), HIGHT and the TEA family. Rinne 
indicated that the TEA family requirements in terms of the code space required are 
among the lowest (after the IDEA algorithm) throughout all ciphers analyzed. The 
small code space footprint was achieved thanks to the lack of substitution tables 
common in other block ciphers. The XXTEA optimisation and performance analysis 
were also provided in (Jinwala et al. 2008) proving it to be a viable encryption 
algorithm for WSNs.  
Shortly before this dissertation was completed E. Yarrkov published a chosen-
plaintext attack against the XXTEA requiring     queries (Yarrkov 2010). Yarrkov 
took advantage of the fact that the number of full cycles to perform over each block is 
equivalent to         , where   represents the number of rounds. If the block 
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consists of at least 53 words then the number of cycles per word is reduced to only 6. 
This characteristic was used to perform differential cryptanalysis, where the 
difference was considered subtraction per word. The author described two attacks 
proving that XXTEA does not provide the intended 128-bit security. 
Scalable Encryption Algorithm (SEA) 
The Scalable Encryption Algorithm (SEA) proposed in (Standaert et al. 2006) aims to 
provide a low cost encryption implementable on resource limited processors. 
Similarly to the TEA family it uses basic operations such as logical AND, OR, XOR, 
word/bit rotations, modular additions and a simple substitution box. Apart from the 
limited instruction set, the other design criteria were the low memory requirements 
and small code size. Per the authors the algorithm allows “on-the-fly” key derivation. 
The proposal includes a comprehensive security analysis showing the resistance of 
the protocol against major modern cryptanalytic techniques. 
The scalability of the algorithm is achieved through the flexibility in the size of the 
input parameters. The following parameters are used: 
                           
                           
   
 
  
                                   
                                  
There is one constraint on the size of the key/plaintext that the   is a multiple of   : 
      
The security analysis provided in the proposal suggests the minimum required 
number of rounds to provide security against well know attacks (assuming word size 
equal or greater than 8 bits) is: 
  
 
        
 
 
   
Figure 2.6 shows one encryption and key round, where   denotes the word rotation, 
  the bit rotation and   the substitution box (                     in C-like notation). 
The      represents a   -word vector with all words of a value 0 except the least 
significant word which value is equal to    The Li and Ri represent left and right halves 
of the word or the key (KLi, RKi). 
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Figure 2.6 Encrypt/decrypt and key round of SEA 
The functions for encrypt (  ), decrypt (  ) and key (  ) rounds are defined as 
follows: 
                                               
                      
                           
                        
                                  
The authors analyzed the performance of the algorithm using the Atmel AVR ATiny 
reference 8-bit CPU platform among others. The expected code size for a 96-bit key 
implementation was estimated at 386 bytes and the amount of clock cycles required 
for encryption/decryption was estimated at 17745. A performance analysis (Rinne et 
al. 2007) performed by Rinne on AVR Atmel163 showed a code size of 2132 bytes 
for the 96-bit SEA (compared to 1160 bytes for XTEA) and the number of CPU cycles 
required to complete encryption/decryption was 9654 (compared to 6718 with XTEA).  
The performance and code space requirements of the XTEA algorithm look more 
promising than the SEA according to Rinne‟s analysis. However, due to the recent 
Yarrkov‟s discovery of security weaknesses in XXTEA the implementation of this 
algorithm will be abandoned in favour of the Scalable Encryption Algorithm in 96-bit 
version. 
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3. Resource-Limited Devices 
 
The term Resource-Limited Device (RLD) will be further used to describe a 
microcontroller device with significantly lower processing power and limited memory 
in comparison to a modern Personal Computer. This group of devices range from 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) transponders to a wide spectrum of embedded 
devices equipped with small (typically 8-bit) microcontrollers. Such devices are 
utilised in wireless sensor networking for example. 
This dissertation focuses on the security of the communication over the radio 
channel, thus the area of research will be restricted to Wireless Sensor Networks and 
advanced RFID systems. 
The work in this MSc dissertation is predicated upon the application of the Nordic 
Semiconductors nRF9E5 Integrated Circuit (Nordic Semiconductors 2009b) as the 
target device. This microcontroller was chosen due to its low price (approximately 
2$US per unit at quantities over 1000), integrated UHF radio transceiver and 
excellent power saving characteristics which make it an ideal solution for the design 
of a low-cost wireless sensor. The nRF9E5 entire chip will be referred to as a 
microcontroller and the Intel 8051-compatible Central Processor Unit - a subset of 
this system will be referred to as CPU or microprocessor. 
Hardware Platform - nRF9E5 
The nRF9E5 microcontroller is a single chip system with an integrated sub-1GHz 
Radio-Frequency (RF) transceiver, 8-bit 8051-compatible processor and 4-input 10-
bit Analogue to Digital (AD) converter. The design of the chip was based on the 
Dallas DS80C320 CPU in terms of hardware specification and instruction cycle 
timing. It is a low cost solution with extended power saving capabilities. The minimum 
power consumption in power down mode (where the chip can be woken up by a timer 
or an external pin) is only 2.5µA. The microprocessor draws 2.2 mA of current at a 
clock frequency of 16MHz and the radio transceiver (nRF905) uses 10 to 30 mA in 
Transmit Mode (depending on output power setting). Receive Mode power usage is 
estimated at 12.5 mA on average. 
The CPU is an 8-bit Intel 8051 derivative with the addition of Special Function 
Registers (SFRs) used to control the nRF9E5 radio transceiver. The microcontroller 
is equipped with 512 bytes of ROM that contains the bootstrap loader, 256 bytes of 
Internal Data Memory, 128 SFRs and 4 kilobytes of external on-chip RAM. The 
memory is organized with the Harvard Architecture in contrast to the Von Neuman 
architecture commonly used in desktop PCs. The bootstrap loader loads the program 
from the bottom area of external EEPROM memory upon each power-up or reset 
cycle. The manufacturer did not provide any possibility to extend the size of the on-
chip RAM, thus the binary program size is limited to 4 kilobytes.  
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The on-chip radio transceiver subsystem is the Nordic Semiconductors nRF905 
connected to the microcontroller through the SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) port. It 
utilizes the nRF ShockBurst™ technology allowing high speed radio signal 
processing without the assistance of the microprocessor, which further reduces the 
power consumption requirements. The transceiver is able to generate the preamble 
and calculate CRC for each data payload when transmitting signals. Additionally, it 
can validate CRC for each incoming data payload. The CRC calculations are 
performed by an on-board circuit without the CPU's assistance. NRF905 supports 
standby mode, where the current consumption is limited but the short startup times 
are still maintained, and 4 different Radio Frequency (RF) transmitting power modes 
ranging from -10dBm (at 9mA of current consumption) to 10dBm (at 30mA of current 
consumption). The current consumption in receiving mode is estimated at 12.5mA 
and can be reduced to 10.5mA when using reduced receiving power mode. The 
modulation used for the air interface is Gaussian Frequency Shift Keying (GFSK) with 
Manchester Encoding yielding an effective data transfer rate of 50kbps. The 
transceiver is able to operate on radio frequencies 430 to 434.7MHz or 868 to 
928MHz. 
3.1 IWSN introduction. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Wireless Sensor Network Architecture 
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A typical Wireless Sensor Network consists of a set of Wireless Sensor Nodes and 
one or more Upload Stations (also referred to as Gateway Sensor Nodes or sinks) 
(Akyildiz et al. 2002) that provide a connection to a Host Computer on an external 
network. The external network uses a communication media not available to the 
Wireless Sensor Nodes, such as Ethernet or a different RF technology. The most 
commonly used architecture (Ye et al. 2002) is an ad-hoc network (see Figure 3.1), 
where every sensor node either broadcasts the message to all other nodes (using an 
endless message repetition preventing mechanism) or uses a routing mechanism to 
forward the message to the upload station through a series of other sensor nodes 
used as 'hops'(Kamble et al. 2007). Once the upload station receives the message it 
is uploaded to the External Network. 
Such architecture is useful in applications where sensors are distributed in an 
unplanned manner (e.g. battlefield sensor network deployed from an aircraft) and 
messages can be sent unreliably with no confirmation of the delivery from the Upload 
Station (although the acknowledgement system can be implemented in this 
architecture if the routing mechanism allows that).  
Infrastructure Wireless Sensor Network (IWSN) example (HINT Project 2010) used 
further in this dissertation describes an architecture consisting of the following: 
 Master device - an equivalent of the Upload Station in Classic WSN, linked to 
the External Network using for example an Ethernet controller or 802.11 WiFi 
controller. 
 Sensor (Slave) - a battery operated Wireless Sensor Node in the network 
equipped with microcontroller, radio transceiver and ADC converter allowing 
readings from the attached sensors. 
 Repeater - a bridge forwarding messages between wireless sensors and a 
master device. Uses similar radio hardware to sensors but is assumed to have 
a regulated power source. 
 Host PC - Host computer used by an operator to control the IWSN. 
This type of architecture (see Figure 3.2) can be found in WSN with a planned 
distribution of sensors, e.g. a network of temperature monitoring sensors deployed 
within a large building. It is assumed that all devices operate on the same radio 
frequency. All battery operated sensors (Slaves) attempt to connect to the Master 
device at a pre-programmed interval. The Master device uses an acknowledgement 
mechanism to guarantee the delivery of a single packet or an entire multi-packet 
transmission (depending on the configuration and packet type). Each Slave repeats 
the transmission attempt a pre-programmed number of times if an acknowledgement 
was not received. Repeaters are used to extend the coverage area of the network by 
forwarding each received packet to the Master (or other Repeater) and forwarding 
acknowledgements back to Sensors.  
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Figure 3.2 Infrastructure Wireless Sensor Network Architecture 
All devices using the radio link utilise a simple collision avoidance mechanism with a 
back-off system similar to Pure-Aloha Protocol (Abramson 1970): every node listens 
to determine if the radio carrier is busy prior to a transmission attempt. If the carrier is 
sensed as busy then a node backs off for a random period of time before another 
transmission attempt.  
The main advantage of this architecture is the simplicity of communication between 
devices as no routing tables need to be maintained, even though the delivery of 
specific (user pre-defined) data packets can be confirmed by the acknowledgement 
mechanism. Thanks to this simplicity the radio-handling part of the software can be 
implemented within the limited code space and run efficiently on many Resource 
Limited Devices. However, this architecture is not ideal in environments, where 
Repeaters and Masters cannot be provided with a fixed power source. The other 
disadvantage is that as more slaves are introduced to the network performance 
degrades.  The simplicity of the collision avoidance mechanism inhibits the use of a 
large number of slaves because slaves share a common frequency channel for 
transmission. 
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3.2 Description of the technical problem of authentication and 
encryption in the context of the IWSN. 
Infrastructure WSNs experience common issues related to the use of modulated 
radio frequency spectrum (radio waves) as the communication medium: 
Eavesdropping is possible on any wireless link using virtually any radio transceiver 
tuned to a given frequency with the ability to demodulate the signal. The architecture 
(described in 3.1) assumes that the link between the Master and the Host is secure. 
The Repeaters are used only to receive and forward data packets, without 
processing them and act as radio range extenders. Repeaters will not perform any 
active role in the security mechanism. The only parties requiring mutual 
authentication and secured (encrypted) communication channel are the Master and 
the Slave. 
Since the encryption and decryption mechanism has to be implemented on the Slave 
device, choosing such a mechanism must involve consideration of the limitations 
listed in Section 3.3. Ideally, the Master device will have an always-on, secured link 
with a Host (server) and this Host device can perform all of the computationally heavy 
encryption and decryption-related calculations.  In other words, the master can 
offload all computationally heavy tasks to a back-end server and accept returned 
values.  This permits the processing power of the master device to be used to handle 
service requests from a number of slave devices, rather than becoming occupied with 
computations associated with authentication and encryption. 
 
3.3 What are the specific problems associated with Resource Limited 
Devices 
The constraints imposed on possible implementations of security systems for RLDs 
can be categorised as Central Processor Unit (CPU) limitations, memory limitations, 
power consumption and cost barriers. 
CPU constraints 
The main CPU constraint in resource-limited devices is obviously the limited 
processing power of the processor. Passive RFID transponders (powered by an 
external interrogator) with a very limited number of logic gates on the circuit may be 
only capable of performing simple logical operations with one-bit values. More 
powerful embedded devices may be using 8-bit CPUs for example the Intel 8051 
derivative nRF9E5 clocked at 12MHz, which is able to execute only 750,000 
operations per second (assuming that 50% of operations require  two CPU cycles 
and the remaining require one). 
The number of operations per second is not the only constraint relating to the 
processor. Another issue related to microcontrollers is the word size. The most 
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commonly used cryptographic standards were designed to be implemented either in 
hardware (e.g. the first proposals of the Data Encryption Standard - DES (Federal 
Information Processing Standards 1993)) or more flexible using software. However, 
the majority of standards assume that 32-bit CPUs will be used, thus their 
mathematical basis and implementation is commonly optimized to use 32-bit (e.g. the 
Rijndael cipher (Daemen & Rijmen 1999)) or even 64-bit word. 8-bit microcontrollers 
would be forced to perform numerous instructions to handle 32-bit numbers 
manipulation, e.g. it takes approximately 35 CPU operations to multiply two 32-bit 
numbers on the 8051 8-bit CPU (Vault Information Services 2009). 
Memory limitations 
Low-cost passive Electronic Product Code (EPC) RFID tags can have as little as 104 
bits of non-volatile memory (EPCGlobal 2008) and may not even contain any 
Random Access Memory. More advanced tags however, may be equipped with 1-
2KB of memory. Microcontrollers are typically equipped with no more than 64KB 
memory, but this amount can be subject to limitations also due to 8-bit addressing 
issues causing slow access to some parts of the memory. 
Heavyweight cryptographic techniques using large keys (even 2048-bit in some RSA 
implementations) cannot be implemented in resource-limited device environments 
not only due to the amount of memory needed but also due to slow memory access 
times and limited read/write lifecycle. Most of the EEPROM memory chips allow for 
one million Read/Write cycles.  
Power consumption 
Resource-limited devices are heavily constrained in terms of power availability for 
their operation. Passive RFID tags draw the whole power from the interrogating 
device; active RFID solutions and wireless sensors are often powered by small cell 
batteries and are expected to provide a reasonably long operation time between 
battery replacements. Wireless Sensors are typically designed for one-time use, thus 
their lifetime can be increased only by power saving. All CPU-intensive operations 
and memory manipulations required by most cryptographic algorithms along with the 
radio transceiver usage are the most power consuming activities performed by such 
devices so they have to limited to a minimum. 
Cost Barriers 
Most of the resource-limited devices are designed to be manufactured in high 
volumes with a very low price per item. An addition of a single logic gate to the 
electronic circuit may seem inexpensive but if multiplied by millions of manufactured 
items may have a substantial influence on the profit made by the manufacturer. This 
constraint forces solutions requiring little or no additional hardware modifications. 
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3.4 Technical description of the processor and its implications for 
effective security implementation 
 
The nRF9E5 single chip system uses an 8-bit microprocessor with an instruction set 
compatible with the industry standard 8051 processor. The instruction timing differs 
from the industry standard: each instruction uses 4 to 20 clock cycles instead of 12 to 
48 in the standard. The hardware specification of the chip (Nordic Semiconductors 
2009b) allows utilizing a 4-20MHz crystal oscillator to generate clocking signal on the 
circuit (shared by microcontroller, AD converter and radio transceiver). The crystal 
oscillator can be started and stopped as requested by software. While it is stopped, 
nRF9E5 uses the internal low power 4KHz RC oscillator which runs continuously (as 
long as 1.8V of power is supplied) and  ensures that vital functions such as the wake-
up timer are functioning even in deep power saving modes. 
 
The microcontroller‟s architecture is 8-bit: each machine language opcode (operation 
code) is a single 8-bit value, which allows for 256 different instruction codes. Most of 
8051‟s registers are 8-bit values, e.g. the Accumulator, each of the Register Banks. 
There are several special cases where a given register is referred to as 16-bit (such 
as the three Timers), but in fact these registers are addressed as two separate 8-bit 
registers often referred to as High and Low indicating which part of the 16-bit value 
they hold. The only truly 16-bit values that the 8051 handles are the Program 
Counter (PC) indicating the address of the next instruction to be executed and Data 
Pointer (DPTR) used for memory addressing. The CPU is only capable of performing 
basic mathematical operations on two 8-bit numbers at each cycle. There is no 
additional hardware support for calculation of numbers larger than 8-bit or any 
decryption/encryption coprocessors. In consequence manipulation of larger numbers 
requires numerous 8-bit calculations, for example a multiplication of two 16-bit 
numbers requires 9 CPU instructions. 
 
The 8-bit word size, relatively low CPU clock frequency and the lack of mathematical 
hardware coprocessors in the nRF9E5 narrow the area of possible security protocols 
and algorithms which can be successfully implemented to those that do not require 
exhaustive calculations (required by most of the Asymmetric Cryptography 
techniques) and those that are optimized for 8-bit values. In consequence, only 
lightweight authentication protocols and lightweight encryption algorithms are 
reviewed and analysed in this dissertation. 
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3.5 Technical description of the memory structure and its limitations for 
effective security implementations 
The nRF9E5 microcontroller has 256 bytes of Internal Data Memory used as a RAM 
with fast access, 128 Special Function Registers (one byte each) used to set different 
operating modes of the CPU and the Radio Frequency Transceiver. Additionally it 
contains 4 kilobytes of external on-chip RAM. The memory uses Harvard Architecture 
and is organized into six different memory spaces (see Figure 3.3). It provides 128-
bytes of directly addressable DATA RAM (8052 compatible) but may also be used to 
hold IDATA-addressed variables. The next 128 bytes are the IDATA memory area 
which is accessible through indirect addressing and effectively interleaves with the 
Special Function Register (SFR) which in turn is directly accessed. The entire 4K of 
memory (addresses above 0FFh) is accessible as an external XDATA memory but 
this area is shared with the CODE memory, so the use of XDATA variables 
effectively limits the available code space. The first of 256 bytes of XDATA can be 
addressed in paged mode and in this configuration it is referred to as PDATA. 
Memory addressing diagram can be seen in Figure 3.3.  
 
Figure 3.3 8051 Memory Addressing 
The memory structure can be represented in the following manner: 
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Figure 3.4 Physical organization of memory on 8051 
Additionally, there is a small 512 byte ROM area located on-chip and containing 
bootstrap program executed automatically after power on or reset. The bootstrap 
loads the user program into on-chip 4K RAM from the off-chip external EEPROM 
memory required for operation. 
The manufacturer of the chip did not include any options to extend the RAM size 
above the 4KB - it is not possible to connect any additional external memory directly 
to the CPU pins. Additionally, the bootstrap program in ROM cannot be updated. The 
only memory size expanding option is to use an external EEPROM memory (generic 
25320 with SPI) attached through one of the GPIO pins and interfacing through a 
common SPI bus. Accessing external memory through the SPI bus has major 
consequence on the performance of the CPU as each of the SPI read/write 
(performed byte-by-byte) operations takes several processor cycles. The CPU is not 
able to perform additional tasks while in this process. One of the major limitations is 
the fact that external EEPROM cannot be used to expand the possible program size. 
In consequence, the program code size is always limited to 4KB – the bootstrap 
program will ignore anything above 0FFFh address in EEPROM when loading the 
program. Section  will attempt to provide a solution to overcome this limitation with 
the support of 8051 dedicated software Assembly Language Linker. 
Possible security implementations have to be filtered through the following 
constraints imposed by nRF9E5: 
 Limited code/RAM space – The CODE and XDATA space are shared in this 
CPU‟s architecture, so variables and constants allocated here limit the overall 
code space. The existing Infrastructure WSN programs already occupy a vast 
amount of the code/RAM space (HINT Project 2010), so the 
algorithms/protocols have to be implementable with a minimum machine code 
size and there must be a limited need for variable memory allocation. In case 
the solutions used to overcome the memory limitations (see section 3.7) fail 
the space for the machine code may be limited to approximately 200 bytes 
SFR (128B) 
 
DATA / IDATA (128B) 
IDATA (128B) 
 
XDATA / CODE (interleaved, up 
to 64KB) 
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only (assuming that for an existing sensor program already occupies 95% of 
the available code space). 
 Extremely slow access to the external non-volatile memory – the 
reference platform utilizes 32Kb 25320 generic EEPROM. The amount of the 
data which needs to be accessed from the external EEPROM memory and the 
frequency of the access has to be limited. This imposes restrictions on 
possible encryption key sizes and the usage of non-volatile protocol-specific 
data. 
 Hacking the EEPROM - The EEPROM memory can be read by freely 
available EEPROM programmers, thus in the case of a physical access attack 
the amount of information disclosed cannot compromise the security of the 
entire system. This forces solutions without global pre-shared encryption keys. 
An example of a physical access attack compromising the security of the 
entire WSN using the TinySec Protocol (Karlof et al. 2004) was described in 
(Hartung et al. 2005). 
3.6 Technical description of the radio transceiver and its limitations for 
effective security implementations 
The nRF9E5 single chip microcontroller integrates a nRF905 (Nordic Semiconductors 
2009a) compatible Radio Frequency (RF) transceiver operating on 433/868/915MHz 
bands (sub-1GHz). The transceiver consists of a fully integrated frequency 
synthesizer, a power amplifier, a modulator and receiver chain with demodulator.  
The modulation type used in nRF905 is Gaussian Frequency Shift Keying (GFSK) 
with a data rate of 100kbps. The data bits are encoded and decoded using 
Manchester Encoding/Decoding and the effective symbol rate is limited to 50kbps 
(one symbol per two clock signals); however, no scrambling on the microcontroller is 
needed. 
The transceiver uses SPI bus for reprogramming and data input/output. It is equipped 
with a circuit able to calculate the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) checksum of the 
incoming or outgoing data packets. Transmitting (TX) and Receiving (RX) addresses 
can be 1 to 4-byte long and the data payload length may vary from 1 to 32 bytes.  
 
Figure 3.5 NRF9E5 packet structure 
Each data packet contains the following (see Figure 3.5): 
 Preamble - predefined 10-bit sequence used to adjust the receiver for optimal 
performance. 
 TX Address - programmable recipient‟s address with a length of 1 to 4 bytes. 
 Payload - user data, length of the field configurable within 1 to 32 bytes range. 
Preamble TX Address Payload CRC 
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 CRC - 8 or 16-bit CRC checksum. 
During the TX mode the packet is assembled automatically by the transceiver once 
the Payload and TX address is supplied – the CRC is calculated and added with a 
Preamble. After a transmission the RF transceiver sets the Data Ready (DR) pin 
high, so the microprocessor can be notified of a finished transmission.  
In RX mode the radio is used to listen for incoming transmissions and if one occurs 
the Carrier Detect (CD) pin is set high. After this action the nRF905 analyses the 
Address field and discards the packet if it is destined for a different address or 
accepts it if the address matches, sets the Address Match (AM) pin high, reads in the 
payload to the buffer and verifies the CRC checksum. 
The way the RF transceiver handles incoming packet addressing (automatic packet 
discarding when the address does not match) imposes constraints on the possibilities 
of protection against traceability (ID disclosure related) attacks (Juels 2006). In 
consequence in a situation where the communication is initiated by the Master device 
the packet will need to hold a broadcast address and all Slaves should be able to 
temporarily reconfigure themselves to accept such packets. A frequent usage of 
broadcast addressing may negatively impact the performance of the entire network 
(Ni et al. 1999). Another solution would require Slaves to ignore address mismatch 
and examine each packet which again reduces the performance of the network. 
The maximum Payload size of 32 bytes seems large but the bandwidth of only 
50kbps has to be taken into consideration too. In the presence of multiple devices 
operating on the same frequency the transmission time has to be limited to avoid 
network congestion. It has to be noted also that the entire NRF9E5 consumes the 
highest possible amount of power during radio transceiver operations (up to 30mA at 
10dBm output power comparing to 2.2mA when only the 8051 CPU is active), thus 
large data transfer, although possible, can severely degrade the sensor‟s lifetime.  
In consequence of the above limitations, the security system has to impose low radio 
bandwidth requirements.  
3.7 Overcoming limitations: Code Banking on the nRF9E5 
The major limitations of the reference platform nRF9E5 chip are the code space size 
and the lack of any coprocessors enhancing mathematical calculations. While the 
latter can be overcome by using less CPU intensive security protocols and 
algorithms, the program size and RAM limitations are hard to overcome without 
changing the entire microcontroller platform. A software solution to this issue using 
the concept of Code Banking with the native support of the 8051 Assembler Linker 
(similar solutions are available from KEIL (ARM Ltd. 2009a) and Raisonance 
(Raisonance SAS 2010) Integrated Development Environments) is proposed below. 
The origin of the Code Banking concept (ARM Ltd. 2009b) comes from the 16-bit 
memory addressing limitation of the 8051 CPU. Due to the addressing bit width the 
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maximum memory which can be allocated is limited to 64Kb. The Code Banking 
mechanism permits and increase in the Code memory size up to 1MB (KEIL linker) or 
4MB (Raisonance linker) by splitting the program into a Common Area section and a 
number of memory banks (see Figure 3.6). The Common Area (of a user-defined 
size s) and one of the Code Banks is loaded at a given time, so the microcontroller 
can effectively “see” and address 64KB of the Code memory. If a function makes a 
call to another function the linker generates a code performing that switch, called a 
Bridge. All bridges are located in the Common Area which remains the same 
regardless of which Code Bank is currently used. The full description of the assembly 
language routines performing bank switches and limitations such as interrupt vector 
handling are outside the scope of the document and can be found in Raisonance and 
KEIL linkers‟ documentation (ARM Ltd. 2009b). 
 
Figure 3.6 Code Banking Layout 
A typical hardware design scenario permits connecting the memory directly to the 
CPUs I/O ports. In this case a bank switch process would only require changing the 
input/output port number to access different blocks of memory, where additional code 
banks are located (see Figure 3.7). The Common Area has to be duplicated across 
all memory blocks so it would still be accessible in the same form after changing the 
I/O ports.  
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Figure 3.7 8051 with 156Kb EEPROM attached to ports P0-P3 
In case of the reference platform with the nRF9E5 microcontroller, where it is not 
possible to connect any additional memory directly to the CPU, the Code Banking 
mechanism can be utilized to overcome the Code space limitation but in a manner 
different  to the original design. Instead of using the directly attached memory chip an 
external EEPROM connected to the SPI bus can be utilized to hold additional code 
banks. However, the I/O pin switching routine has to be replaced with a function that 
overwrites the code bank space in the on-chip RAM with the content of this bank 
located on the external EEPROM. Every bank switch will be a very slow process 
since the entire code bank binary file (2-3Kb) has to be read through the SPI bus 
from the external EEPROM (see Figure 3.8). Initial experiments performed by the 
HINT Project team (HINT Project 2010) proved that it takes 65 milliseconds to load a 
Code Bank of 2Kb in size. 
 
Figure 3.8 nRF9E5 code banking with an external SPI-accessed EEPROM 
Despite the negative effect on the microcontroller‟s performance this mechanism 
permits the effective expansion of the available code space above 4Kb without any 
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hardware modifications in the existing reference platform. This would allow providing 
a relatively large code space for the implementation of the security mechanism. The 
failure of this concept would result in significant code space limitations for the security 
algorithms and force the usage of slow –access EEPROM-located variables. 
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4. Implementation 
4.1 Hardware-related requirements for the implementation 
The main development platform used is the Nordic Semiconductors nRF9E5 
microcontroller that is used for both master and slave devices.  The nRF9E5 has 
limited resources (see Section 3.4 for details) and this has implications for the 
implementation of authentication and encryption on these devices.  This limitation is 
somewhat eased by (a) offloading computationally heavy tasks from the master to a 
back-end server, allowing the master to more effectively handle service requests 
from slave devices and (b) by improving code memory space using code banking.  
Neither of these enhancements has been used in this project. Since a vastly scaled 
down communication and radio protocol is used, the inherent memory of the nRF9E5 
is sufficient to effectively run the security mechanisms. Variables that would 
otherwise be serviced from a back-end server have been hard-coded into master and 
slave, negating the use of the back-end server in the developed prototype. However, 
in a field implementation of secure sensor networking, where many slaves 
communicate with a master, it would be necessary to use a back-end server and 
overcome the code space limitations through code banking. Considering the 
limitations of the devices, a C language implementation was chosen instead of 8051 
native Assembly code to allow faster porting to other platforms.  
The main limitation of the nRF9E5 microcontroller in terms of the implementation was 
the maximum code size of only 4 kilobytes. The prototype was implemented to fit 
under this barrier However, some protocol simplifications were needed to achieve 
small code space. These simplifications are further described in section 4.4. The 
amount of RAM (256 bytes for both Data and Idata) was sufficient but almost entirely 
used by both master and slave prototypes. 
The radio transceiver embedded on nRF9E5 requires pre-configuration and manual 
handling of the OSI Model Data Link and upper layers. This generates another code 
space requirement, thus a simplified radio protocol is used in the prototype. The 
hardware design of the radio transceiver offers two useful tools that simplify the radio 
protocol implementation: Address Match and Carrier Detect bits. These tools were 
used to implement a simple Listen-Before-Talk collision avoidance scheme. 
4.2 Integrated Development Environment (IDE) and Hardware utilised. 
There are two well known Integrated Development Environments offering packaged 
Assembler and ANSI-C compilers for the 8051-compatible microcontrollers: KEIL 
(ARM Ltd. 2009a) and Raisonance RC51 IDEs (Raisonance SAS 2010). Raisonance 
RKit Eval51 was utilised as it offers an 8051 compiler fully functional with the 
exception of a code size limited to 4 kilobytes. The code size limitation perfectly 
matches the hardware limitation of the nRF9E5 microcontroller. 
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The hardware used in the implementation stage were two Nordic Semiconductor 
Evaluation Boards nRF9E5-EVBOARD with EEPROM emulator/programmer USB 
dongles nRF24E1. The programming dongles were controlled by the nRFPROG 
software supplied by Nordic Semiconductors. 
4.3 Design - algorithms for both authentication and encryption 
The prototype is designed to fit within 4 kilobytes of total code space available for 
programs on the nRF9E5 reference platform. The usage of code banking or other 
techniques overcoming the 4KB limitation is not considered in the prototype 
implementation. Instead some minor simplifications in the protocol (explained below) 
are used. The scope of the prototype is explained in Fidure 4.1. The back-end 
database and PC Host software are outside the scope of the implementation – it will 
focus only on the 8-bit microcontroller code written in the C language with nRF9E5-
specific radio transceiver handling functions. 
PC Host [PRNG]
EthernetDatabase 
[IDSs, keys] Master (nRF9E5)
Slave (nRF9E5)
Slave (nRF9E5)
Slave (nRF9E5)
Prototype‟s 
Scope
Production Environment 
Requirements 
 
Figure 4.1 The Scope of the Implementation part 
Radio Protocol 
The prototype uses a simplified radio protocol allowing communication between the 
Master and the Slave. Both devices utilise Address Match (AM) and Carrier Detect 
(CD) bits. The Carrier Detect bit will be used to implement a simple Listen-Before-
Talk collision avoidance mechanism. Both devices test the CD bit before switching 
the radio into transmitting (TX) mode. In this simplified model a transmitting device 
will loop forever waiting for the CD bit to be clear and attempt the transmission 
straight away after this bit is cleared. Due to code space constraints random TX 
back-off period (Pure-Aloha Protocol) or wait-until-CD timeout is not implemented in 
the prototype. 
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Authentication 
The Gossamer lightweight authentication protocol (see Section 2.2.3 for full 
description) was chosen to fulfil the requirement for mutual authentication between 
the Master and the Slave devices (see Section 0) in Infrastructure WSN (see Section 
3.1). This protocol was chosen mainly thanks to its proven security, low memory and 
computation requirements, and the expected simplicity of the implementation of all 
necessary mathematical operations on 8051-compatible CPU. 
The original design of the Protocol is simplified for the prototype implementation 
purposes in the following areas: 
 The keys and IDS are not stored persistently on the Slave device due to code 
space overhead imposed by the EEPROM read/write routines. Upon each 
power loss these values will be reset to the initial ones. 
 Master side: random numbers n1 and n2 will be replaced by hard-coded 
values for experimentation purposes. The IDS of a sample Slave will also be 
hard-coded, so the back-end database will not be needed in the simplified 
model. 
 Slave side: in the original Gossamer Protocol the Slave device sends the 
value D but there is no acknowledgement that D has been received and 
verified by the Master.  The Slave then updates its keys and IDS and saves 
the previous IDS and key values.  In a subsequent round, if the slave cannot 
verify value C, in which case authentication of the master will not have been a 
success, the slave can roll back to the previous keys and IDS values.  This de-
synchronization attack prevention mechanism has not been implemented in 
the simplified protocol.   
Figure 4.2 shows the full round of the Gossamer authentication protocol adapted to 
the needs of the Infrastructure WSN. The main difference was the removal of the 
„Hello‟ message as in IWSN the Slave device (Tag equivalent in standard Gossamer 
specification) initiates the communication. 
Encryption 
The Scalable Encryption Algorithm (SEA - see Section 2.3.3 for full description) was 
chosen as the encryption mechanism. SEA(96, 8) mode was used, meaning that the 
block and the key size of 96-bits and 8-bit word matching the word size on the 
nRF9E5. The choice of the algorithm can be justified by the lack of proven 
weaknesses in the algorithm and the fact that the algorithm can be implemented with 
a very limited code space by sacrificing the throughput of the encryption (number of 
words that can be encrypted over a given period of time). The reduced throughput of 
the algorithm is not a significant issue in the context of IWSN, where the amount of 
data transferred is very small in most cases. 
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Figure 4.2 Gossamer Protocol Adapted to the Infrastructure WSN 
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Another advantage of this algorithm is its scalability which permits increasing key and 
word sizes to 192 bits without major modifications of the code. This can be applied in 
cases where the 96-bit security is not regarded as strong enough. 
Since the Gossamer authentication protocol exchanges two new 96-bits keys at each 
round, one of these keys can be used as an encryption key for the SEA(96,8) 
algorithm during one communication session between the Master and the Slave. 
4.4 Coding - Main elements of code explained 
Both the Master and the Slave programs were written in two separate modules: 
Master.c and Slave.c. Each of the modules contains the following main elements: 
 Initialization (UART timers, radio), 
 Utilities Block (UART handling, SPI handling), 
 Radio Handling Block (TX and RX), 
 Gossamer functions, 
 SEA functions. 
The organization of the main module for both Master.c and Slave.c is explained in 
Figure 4.3. The full code can be found in Appendix B. This sub-section describes the 
Gossamer and SEA function. 
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Figure 4.3 Main Program Components 
4.4.1 Gossamer Implementation 
The Gossamer Protocol implementation uses the main gossamerMaster and 
gossamerSlave loops following the design explained in Figure 4.2. All 96-bit values 
are implemented as an array of 12 unsigned characters (one byte each) in Big-
endian (Most Significant Bit first) notation. The IDS, ID, K1, K2 and Pi values are 
initialized on the startup of the main loop, thus on every power-loss they are reset to 
the hard-coded values. 
All Gossamer-Related mathematical operations are implemented in separate 
functions explained below. 
  
Initialization 
InitUartTimer1 SetClock InitRadio 
Utilities Block 
SpiReadWrite PutChar GetChar PutString 
itoa longDelay printArray 
Radio Handling Block 
ChangeRXAddress TransmitBytes ReceiveMode 
Gossamer 
additionMod96 subtractionMod96 xorArrays 
getModulo96 
mixBits 
bitRotation bitShift indexShift arrayReverse 
Scalable Encryption Algorithm 
seaCryptRound seaKeyRound seaBitRotation seaSBOX 
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Addition Modulo96 
Performs addition Modulo96 on two arrays passed as parameters and saves the 
result into the second argument's memory location. The function simply adds each 
element in the array one-by-one starting with the last element (12) and carries a bit 
over to the lower element if the result is larger than 255. If the lower elements are 
255 already then the bit is carried over to lower elements until the head of the array if 
needed. 
 
void additionMod96 (unsigned char idata *array1, unsigned char idata 
*result) 
{ 
 unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char j; 
     
    for (i=11; i>0; i--) 
    {  
        result[i] += array1[i]; //Add two bytes (no carry) 
        if (result[i] < array1[i]) //Check if carry needed and append to 
      //upper byte 
        { 
            result[i-1]++; 
            //check if previous byte was not 255 overloaded to 0 and step 
  //back to lower elements to do the same 
            j=i; 
            //If a carry bit overloads upper byte increment upper to  
  //overloaded 
            //Continue until the array head is met if needed 
            while(result[j-1] == 0 && j > 1)    
            { 
                result[j-2]++; 
                --j; 
            } 
        } 
    }  
    result[0] += array1[0]; //Got to the MSB - just add and ignore carry  
} 
Figure 4.4 Code: Addition Modulo96 
Subtraction Modulo96 
Performs subtraction Modulo96 on two arrays passed as parameters and saves the 
result into the second argument's memory location. Similarly to the Addition function 
it simply subtracts each element one-by-one starting with the last element. If the 
minuend is smaller than the subtrahend, then a bit is borrowed from the lower 
element. If the lower elements are zeros then the borrow bit is taken from lower 
elements until the array head is met. This function is only required on the Slave side 
as it is only needed when extracting random numbers n1 and n2 form message A 
and B respectively. 
void subtractionMod96 (unsigned char idata *array1, unsigned char idata 
*result) 
{ 
 unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char j; 
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    for (i=11; i>0; i--) 
    {     
        if (result[i] < array1[i])  //Verify if the minuend is not smaller 
      //than the subtrahend 
        { 
            result[i-1] -= 0x01;    //borrow LSB from the lower element 
            j=i; 
            //If a borrow bit overloads upper byte decrement upper byte to 
  //the overloaded one 
            while(result[j-1] == 0xFF && j > 1)    
            { 
                result[j-2] -= 0x01; 
                j--; 
            }    
        } 
        result[i] -= array1[i]; //Subtract (no carry) 
    }  
    result[0] -= array1[0]; //Got to the MSB - just add and ignore carry  
} 
Figure 4.5 Code: Subtraction Modulo96 
XOR two 96-bit numbers 
This function loops through all elements in the array and performs a bitwise exclusive 
OR operation on them one-by-one. 
void xorArrays (unsigned char idata *array1, unsigned char idata *result) 
{ 
    unsigned char i; 
 
    for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
    { 
        result[i] ^= array1[i]; 
    } 
} 
Figure 4.6 Code: XOR two 96-bit numbers 
Bit Rotation (ROT) on two numbers 
The bitRotation function performs circular bit rotation of a 96-bit number by a 
Modulo96 of a second number passed as a second parameter. This function uses 
four sub-functions to perform the bit rotation: 
 getModulo96 - returns Modulo96 of a 96-bit number passed in the array of 12 
one-byte elements. The function uses a command and conquer approach. 
Starting from the lowest element a Modulo96 of each element (split into two 4-
bit numbers and multiplied by 256) is calculated one-by-one and added to the 
overall result. At each iteration the overall result is reduced Modulo96. 
unsigned char getModulo96 (unsigned char idata *array) 
{ 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char modulus = 0; 
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    for (i=0; i<11; i++) 
    { 
        //Divide and conquer approach: sum of two 4-bit numbers multiplied 
//by 256 
        modulus +=  (( (array[i] & 0x0f) + (array[i] >> 4) )*256)%96; 
        modulus %= 96;  //Reduce each result Mod96 - can be done less 
//frequently 
    } 
    return (array[11] + modulus)%96;    //Add the result to the LSB and 
//calculate Mod96 again 
} 
Figure 4.7 Code: Get Modulo96  
 bitShift  - performs circular bit-shift (up to 7 places) of each element in the 
array in both directions. Depending on the direction the remainder of the shift 
is appended to the lower or upper element. 
void bitShift (unsigned char idata *array, unsigned int direction, unsigned 
int bitsToShift) 
{ 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char element0; 
    unsigned char temp; 
 
    //Direction: 0 for left shift, 1 for right shift 
    if (!direction)     //Shift bits to the left with carry to the lower 
element  
    { 
        element0 = array[0]; 
        array[0] = array[0] << bitsToShift; 
         
        for (i=0; i<11; i++) 
        {          
            temp = array[i+1]; 
            array[i+1] = array[i+1] << bitsToShift; 
            array[i] |= temp >> (8 - bitsToShift); 
        } 
        array[11] |= element0 >> (8-bitsToShift); 
 
    } 
    else    //Shift bits to the right with carry to the lower element  
    {      
        element0 = array[11]; 
        array[11] = array[11] >> bitsToShift; 
     
        for (i=11; i>0; i--) 
        { 
            temp = array[i-1]; 
            array[i-1] = array[i-1] >> bitsToShift; 
            array[i] |= temp << (8 - bitsToShift); 
        } 
        array[0] |= element0 << (8-bitsToShift); 
    } 
} 
Figure 4.8 Code: Bit Shift 
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 indexShift - rotates the elements of the array by up to 11 positions left or right. 
It takes advantage of the arrayReverse function and a formula assuming that 
the array is split into two sub-arrays A and B (A.B), where the size of array A is 
the number of places the elements are to be rotated. The formula is as follows: 
B.A = reverse( reverse(A).reverse(B) ). 
void indexShift (unsigned char idata *result, unsigned int direction, 
unsigned int indexShift) 
{ 
    //Direction: 0 for left shift, 1 for right shift 
    if (!direction) 
    { 
        arrayReverse(result, 0, indexShift-1); 
        arrayReverse(result, indexShift, 11); 
        arrayReverse(result, 0, 11); 
    } 
    else 
    { 
        arrayReverse(result, 12-indexShift, 11); 
        arrayReverse(result, 0, 11-indexShift); 
        arrayReverse(result, 0, 11); 
    } 
} 
Figure 4.9 Code: Index Shift 
 arrayReverse - reverses the elements in the array (array[beginning] becomes 
array[end] and so on). 
void arrayReverse(unsigned char idata *result, unsigned char left, unsigned 
char right) 
{ 
    unsigned char temp; 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char j; 
 
    //Start with edges and continue until middle elements are processed 
    for (i=left, j=right; i<j; i++, j--) 
    { 
        temp = result[i]; 
        result[i] = result[j]; 
        result[j] = temp; 
    } 
} 
Figure 4.10 Code: Array Reverse 
The bitRotation function calculates the Modulo96 of the first argument (array to be 
rotated by) and then analyses the result to verify if bitShift and indexShift functions 
need to be called and calls them accrodingly. 
void bitRotation (unsigned char idata *array1, unsigned char idata *result, 
unsigned int direction) 
{ 
    unsigned char modulo = getModulo96(array1);     //First get modulo 
    unsigned char indicesToShift; 
    unsigned char bitsToShift; 
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    //Second divide modulo by 8 and rotate the array (if modulo is bigger 
 //than 8) 
    //Direction: 0 for left shift, 1 for right shift 
    if (modulo > 8) 
    { 
        indicesToShift = modulo/8; 
        indexShift(result, direction, indicesToShift); 
    } 
 
    //Then bitshift with carry each element by the remaining shift (shift 
 //amount will be <8) 
    bitsToShift = modulo%8; 
    if (bitsToShift != 0) 
        bitShift(result, direction, bitsToShift); 
} 
Figure 4.11 Code: Bit Rotation 
MixBits function 
The MixBits function implements the Gossamer author's recommendation shown in 
Figure 4.12. 
Z = MixBits (X, Y) 
Z = X 
FOR counter = 0 to 32 
Z = (Z>>1) + Z + Z + Y 
ENDFOR 
 
Figure 4.12 MixBits Function pseudocode 
The function uses two arrays passed as parameters and a temporary array returned 
with the result. Functions described above (additionMod96 and bitShift) are utilized. 
unsigned char* mixBits (unsigned char idata *array1, unsigned char idata 
*array2) 
{ 
    // Z = mixBits (X,Y) 
    unsigned char idata result[12]; 
    unsigned char i; 
 
 // Z = X 
    for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
    { 
        result[i] = array1[i]; 
    } 
 // 32times: Z = (Z>>1) + Z + Z + Y 
    for (i=0; i<32; i++) 
    { 
        bitShift (array1, 1, 1); 
        additionMod96 (array1, result); 
        bitShift (array1, 0, 1); 
        additionMod96 (array1, result); 
        additionMod96 (array1, result); 
        additionMod96 (array2, result); 
    } 
    return result; 
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} 
Figure 4.13 Code: MixBits 
The main Gossamer loop following the procedures listed in Figure 4.2 can be found 
in Appendix B. 
4.4.2 Scalable Encryption Algorithm (SEA) Implementation 
The SEA(96, 8) implementation uses a word size of 8-bits (unsigned char) with a 
block and key size of 96-bits. Both are passed as an argument in a form of a 12-
element array of unsigned characters. The main components of the SEA 
implementation are the following functions: cryptographic round, the key round, the 
S-Box, the bit-rotation, the word-rotation and the main SEA wrap-up function. In this 
prototype the key used in encryption will be either k1 or k2 updated by the Gossamer 
function at each authentication round.  
SEA Substitution Box 
Per SEA author's suggestions the S-Box can be applied bitwise to any 3 elements of 
a block-half currently being processed (for blocks of 96-bits). Since there are 6 one-
byte elements in each half of the block the S-Box can be applied on two different set 
of words. (Standaert et al. 2006) suggested a function ('i' equals 0 or 1) shown in 
Figure 4.14. 
void seaSBOX (unsigned char data *block, unsigned char i) 
{ 
    block[3*i] = (block[3*i+2] && block[3*i+1]) ^ block[3*i]; 
    block[3*i+1] = (block[3*i+2] && block[3*i]) ^ block[3*i+1]; 
    block[3*i+2] = (block[3*i] || block[3*i+1]) ^ block[3*i+2]; 
} 
Figure 4.14 Code: SEA S-Box 
Standaert agrees that it is safe to simplify this function so the S-Box is only to the first 
three elements in order to reduce the code space required by this function. 
void seaSBOX (unsigned char idata *block, unsigned char i) 
{ 
    block[0] = (block[2] && block[1]) ^ block[0]; 
    block[1] = (block[2] && block[0]) ^ block[1]; 
    block[2] = (block[0] || block[1]) ^ block[2]; 
} 
Figure 4.15 Code: SEA S-box modified 
SEA Bit Rotation 
The Bit Rotation function in SEA(96,8) implementation performs circular bit-rotation 
one place to the right on words numbered 0 and 3, and one place to the left on words 
numbered 2 and 5. The seaBitRotation function implemented uses Raisonance RC51 
compiler's intrinsic functions '_cror_' and '_crol_' to save the code space. 
58 
 
void seaBitRotation (unsigned char idata *block) 
{ 
    block[0] = _cror_(block[0], 1); 
    block[2] = _crol_(block[2], 1); 
    block[3] = _cror_(block[3], 1); 
    block[5] = _crol_(block[5], 1); 
} 
Figure 4.16 Code: SEA Bit-Rotation 
SEA Word rotation 
The seaWordRotation function performs circular right- or left-rotation of the block-half 
array elements by one place. The Gossamer indexShift function can be re-used to 
save the code space but this function was also implemented to make the SEA 
module independent and re-usable without the Gossamer functions overhead. 
void seaWordRotation (unsigned char idata *block, unsigned char direction) 
{ 
    //Direction 0 for left and 1 for right rotation 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char temp; 
     
    if (direction == 0) 
    { 
        temp = block[0]; 
        for (i=0; i<5; i++) 
            block[i] = block[i+1]; 
        block[5] = temp; 
    } 
    else 
    { 
        temp = block[5]; 
        for (i=5; i>0; i--) 
            block[i] = block[i-1]; 
        block[0] = temp; 
    } 
} 
Figure 4.17 Code: SEA Word-Rotation 
SEA Encrypt/Decrypt round 
The seaCryptRound function performs one round encryption or decryption round 
using left and right half of the block and one half of the key - left or right depending 
on the round. This function implements the following SEA equations:   encryption 
function and   decryption function (below). See Figure 2.6 for a graphical 
representation of the SEA encryption/decryption round.  
Fe(Li, Ri, KeyHalf) = RightWordRot(Li) XOR bitRotation(sbox(Ri+ KeyHalf)) 
Fd(Li, Ri, KeyHalf) = LeftWordRot(Li XOR bitRotation(sbox(Ri+ KeyHalf))) 
The function takes advantage of previously described word rotation, bit rotation and 
substitution box functions. 
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void seaCryptRound (unsigned char direction, unsigned char idata 
*blockLeft, unsigned char idata *blockRight, unsigned char idata *keyHalf) 
{ 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char temp[6]; 
 
    //Every operation will be performed on blockLeft as this memory 
 //location will become the right block for the next round. 
    //Save the right block 
    for (i=0; i<6; i++) 
        temp[i] = blockRight[i]; 
 
    //ENCRYPTION 
    //Fe(Li, Ri, K/2i) = RightWordRot(Li) XOR bitRot(sbox(Ri+K/2i)) 
    //DECRYPTION 
    //Fd(Li, Ri, K/2i) = LeftWordRot(Li XOR bitRot(sbox(Ri+K/2i))) 
 
    //Step by step: 
    //Ri+K/2i 
    for (i=0; i<6; i++) 
        blockRight[i] += keyHalf[i]; 
    //sbox(Ri+K/2i) 
    seaSBOX(blockRight, i%2); 
    //bitRot(sbox(Ri+K/2i)) 
    seaBitRotation(blockRight); 
    //RightWordRot(Li) - encryption only 
    //Direction 0 for encryption and 1 for decryption 
    if (direction == 0) 
        seaWordRotation(blockLeft, 1); 
    //RightWordRot(Li) XOR bitRot(sbox(Ri+K/2i)) 
    for (i=0; i<6; i++) 
    { 
        blockRight[i] ^= blockLeft[i]; 
        blockLeft[i] = temp[i];     //BlockLeft(i)+1 becomes BlockRight(i) 
    } 
    //LeftWordRot(Li XOR bitRot(sbox(Ri+K/2i))) - decryption only 
    if (direction == 1) 
        seaWordRotation(blockRight, 0); 
} 
Figure 4.18 Code: SEA Encrypt/Decrypt Round 
SEA Key Round 
The seaKeyRound function performs one round of the key scheduling. These rounds 
are interleaved with encryption/decryption rounds. Each key round performs the 
following key scheduling function (see Figure 2.6 for a graphical representation): 
Fk(KLi-1,KRi-1,Ci) <=> KRi = KLi-1 XOR RightWordRot(bitRot(sbox((KRi-1)+Ci))) 
The function takes advantage of previously described word rotation, bit rotation and 
substitution box functions. 
void seaKeyRound (unsigned char idata *keyLeft, unsigned char idata 
*keyRight, unsigned char Ci) 
{ 
    //Fk(KLi-1,KRi-1,Ci) <=> KRi = KLi-1 XOR RightWordRot(bitRot(sbox((KRi-
1)+Ci))); 
    unsigned char i; 
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    unsigned char temp[6]; 
     
    //Save the left key (left key will become right after the round) 
    //Every operation will be performed on keyLeft as this memory location 
 //will become a right key for the next round. 
    for (i=0; i<6; i++) 
        temp[i] = keyRight[i]; 
    //Step-by-step: 
    //init Ci (LSW equals i) 
    ////Ci[5] = i; 
    //(KRi-1)+Ci 
    keyRight[5] += Ci; 
    //sbox((KRi-1)+Ci) 
    seaSBOX(keyRight, (Ci%2)); 
    ////seaSBOX(keyRight, 1); 
    //bitRotation(sbox((KRi-1)+Ci)) 
    seaBitRotation(keyRight); 
    //RightWordRot(bitRot(sbox((KRi-1)+Ci))); 
    seaWordRotation(keyRight, 1);    
    //KRi = KLi-1 XOR RightWordRot(bitRot(sbox((KRi-1)+Ci))); 
    for (i=0; i<6; i++) 
    { 
        keyRight[i] ^= keyLeft[i];     
        keyLeft[i] = temp[i];   //KeyLeft(i)+1 becomes KeyRight(i)  
    } 
} 
Figure 4.19 Code: SEA Key Round 
 
SEA main function 
The main SEA(96, 8) function takes two 12-byte parameters: block and key. 
(Standaert et al. 2006) advised that the minimum safe number of 
encryption/decryption rounds can be calculated using the following formula: 
  
 
     
 
  
   
 
 
                                                         
The odd result in case of SEA(96, 8) is 93. The main function runs interleaved 
encryption (or decryption) and key scheduling round 46 times. After the initial 46 
rounds the key halves are swapped and another further 46 rounds are executed. 
After the 92nd round another one encryption/decryption round runs - the key is in its 
final state already. It has to be noted that this final state of the key is identical to its 
initial state, thus no additional memory locations are needed to store a temporary key 
at each round. After the last round the block halves need to be swapped and the 
execution of the algorithm stops. 
void sea (unsigned char direction, unsigned char idata *block, unsigned 
char idata *key) 
{ 
    //Direction 0 for encryption and 1 for decryption 
    unsigned char i; 
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    //initialization 
    unsigned char* idata keyLeft = &key[0]; 
    unsigned char* idata keyRight = &key[6]; 
    unsigned char* idata blockLeft = &block[0]; 
    unsigned char* idata blockRight = &block[6]; 
    unsigned char* idata temp;    //temp pointer used for swapping key 
 //sides 
    unsigned char tmp; 
     
    //First half of all rounds (93 as per author's recommendation for a 
 //minimum number of rounds) 
    for (i=1; i<47; i++) 
    { 
        //Key scheduling 
        //[KLi, KRi] = Fk(KLi-1, KRi-1, C(i)); 
        seaCryptRound (direction, (unsigned char idata *)blockLeft, 
(unsigned char idata *)blockRight, (unsigned char idata *)keyRight); 
        seaKeyRound((unsigned char idata *)keyLeft, (unsigned char idata 
*)keyRight, i); 
    } 
     
    //End of round half - swap pointers 
    temp = keyLeft; 
    keyLeft = keyRight; 
    keyRight = temp; 
 
    //for (i=46; i<92; i++) 
    for (i=46; i>0; i--) 
    { 
        //Key scheduling part 2 
        //[KLi, KRi] = Fk(KLi-1, KRi-1, C(r-i)); 
        seaCryptRound (direction, (unsigned char idata *)blockLeft, 
(unsigned char idata *)blockRight, (unsigned char idata *)keyLeft); 
        seaKeyRound((unsigned char idata *)keyLeft, (unsigned char idata 
*)keyRight, i); 
    } 
    seaCryptRound (direction, (unsigned char idata *)blockLeft, (unsigned 
char idata *)blockRight, (unsigned char idata *)keyLeft); 
     
    //Final: switch Block halves 
    //indexShift (block, 0, 6); Gossamer function may be used to save space  
    for(i=0; i<6; i++) 
    { 
        tmp = block[i]; 
        block[i] = block[i+6]; 
        block[i+6] = tmp; 
    }    
} 
Figure 4.20 Code: SEA Main Function 
The experimental implementation takes Gossamer K1 key as an encryption key for 
the SEA algorithm. After a successful authentication round the Master encrypts a 
message using K1 and sends it to the Slave. The Slave decrypts the message using 
K1 and outputs it to the UART. 
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4.5 Testing 
4.5.1 Testing environment 
The code implemented in the course of this research was tested using the same 
hardware and software as in the implementation stage. During the testing stage two 
nRF9E5-EVBOARD development boards with nRF24E1 EEPROM programmers 
were used. The EEPROM programmers were connected over the USB link and the 
UART input/outputs from the development boards were connected through serial 
cables to the RS-232 ports on the development PC running Microsoft Windows XP 
Operating System. 
Since the RC51 compiler used does not offer nRF9E5-compatible debugger, the 
debugging was performed on-device using manually written debug messages sent to 
the UART I/O. 
4.5.2 One Round Step-By-Step Test 
Test Procedure 
The goal of this test is to verify the proper functioning of all core functions used by the 
Gossamer Authentication Protocol and the SEA encryption/decryption algorithm. 
Both the Master and the Slave programs are pre-configured with a Gossamer 
Protocol test data and set to output the data at each of the modifications so that the 
result can be verified with a 'paper-test' (manual calculation). The integer-to-ascii 
(itoa) function will be employed to output the data to the UART in a human-readable 
form. The SEA algorithm will not be tested step-by-step due to a large number of 
rounds. Instead, a result of the entire encryption and decryption loop will be 
displayed. 
Test data 
Master Side: 
unsigned char idata Pi[12] = { 0x32, 0x43, 0xF6, 0xA8, 0x88, 0x5A, 0x30, 
0x8D, 0x31, 0x31, 0x98, 0xA2 }; 
unsigned char idata IDS[12] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 
0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01 }; 
unsigned char idata ID[12] = { 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 
0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44 }; 
unsigned char idata k1[12] = { 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 
0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10 }; 
unsigned char idata k2[12] = { 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20 }; 
unsigned char idata n1[12] = { 0x22, 0x22, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 
0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22 }; 
unsigned char idata n2[12] = { 0x23, 0x23, 0x00, 0x00, 0x23, 0x23, 0x23, 
0x23, 0x23, 0x23, 0x23, 0x23 }; 
 
Figure 4.21 Code: Master Side Test Data 
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Slave side: 
unsigned char idata Pi[12] = { 0x32, 0x43, 0xF6, 0xA8, 0x88, 0x5A, 0x30, 
0x8D, 0x31, 0x31, 0x98, 0xA2 }; 
unsigned char idata IDS[12] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 
0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01 }; 
unsigned char idata ID[12] = { 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 
0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44 }; 
unsigned char idata k1[12] = { 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 
0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10 }; 
unsigned char idata k2[12] = { 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20 }; 
 
Figure 4.22 Code: Slave Side Test Data  
After the Gossamer round the Master will use the modified key k1 to encrypt a 
message (temp array) and send to the Slave. After successful transmission the Slave 
will use modified k1 to decrypt the message and display it. 
Test Results 
The test was split into several stages to allow better readability. 
Stage 1: Messages A and B creation (Master side - below).  
                                  
                                  
 
Figure 4.23 Gossamer messages A and B creation (Master). 
 
Stage 2: N1 and N2 extraction from messages A and B (Slave side). 
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Figure 4.24 Gossamer n1 and n2 random numbers extraction (Slave). 
 
Stage 3: n3, k1next and k2next creation (Master side) 
                  
                                        
                                        
 
Figure 4.25 Gossamer MixBits function, k1next and k2next creation (Master). 
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Stage 4: n3, k1next and k2next creation (Slave side) 
                  
                                        
                                        
 
Figure 4.26 Gossamer MixBits function, k1next and k2next creation (Slave). 
 
Stage 5: Message C creation (Master Side) 
                   
                                           
 
Figure 4.27 Gossamer message C creation (Master). 
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Stage 6: Message C creation (Slave Side) 
                   
                                           
 
Figure 4.28 Gossamer message C creation (Slave). 
 
Stage 7:  Message D creation (Master side) 
                                            
 
Figure 4.29 Gossamer message D creation (Master). 
 
Stage 8: Message D creation (Slave side) 
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Figure 4.30 Gossamer message D creation (Slave). 
 
Stage 9: IDS, k1 and k2 updating (Master side) 
                    
                                                  
                                              
                                             
 
Figure 4.31 Gossamer keys and IDS updating phase (Master). 
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Stage 10: IDS, k1 and k2 updating (Slave side) 
                    
            
                    
                                   
         
                     
                             
         
                           
                       
           
  
        
 
Figure 4.32 Gossamer keys and IDS updating phase (Master). 
Stage 11: SEA Encryption using k1 (Master side) 
 
Figure 4.33 SEA encryption (Master) 
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Stage 12: SEA Decryption using k1 (Slave side) 
 
Figure 4.34 SEA decryption (Slave) 
 
4.5.3 Long-term test 
Test Procedure 
The goal of this test is to verify the proper functioning of the Gossamer Authentication 
Protocol and the SEA encryption/decryption algorithm using multiple values and 
multiple rounds. 
The test-Master and the test-Slave are pre-configured to loop indefinitely executing 
the following operations: 
 Both devices: mutual authentication between the test-Slave and the test-
Master 
 Both devices: updating values for the next round. 
 Master: encrypting a 12-byte message using the SEA encryption algorithm 
(using the Gossamer key k1) and transmitting the payload to the test-Slave. 
 Slave: receiving the payload form the test-Master and decrypting it using the 
SEA decryption algorithm and the Gossamer key k1. 
The test-Master uses a delay function before transmitting messages over the radio to 
allow for better readability of the UART output. Both the test-Slave and the test-
Master output informational messages to the UART during each loop iteration.  
The time to complete an iteration of the main loop in both programs was estimated at 
approximately 1.5 seconds. The test-Master and the test-Slave programs were left 
running for 7 days. It is estimated that both programs will execute approximately 
403200 authentication and encryption/decryption rounds. 
Test data 
Master initial values: 
unsigned char idata Pi[12] = { 0x32, 0x43, 0xF6, 0xA8, 0x88, 0x5A, 0x30, 
0x8D, 0x31, 0x31, 0x98, 0xA2 }; 
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unsigned char idata IDS[12] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 
0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01 }; 
unsigned char idata ID[12] = { 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 
0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44 }; 
unsigned char idata k1[12] = { 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 
0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10 }; 
unsigned char idata k2[12] = { 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20 }; 
unsigned char idata n1[12] = { 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 
0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22 }; 
unsigned char idata n2[12] = { 0x23, 0x23, 0x23, 0x23, 0x23, 0x23, 0x23, 
0x23, 0x23, 0x23, 0x23, 0x23 }; 
 
 Figure 4.35 Code: Master Initial Values 
Slave initial values: 
unsigned char idata Pi[12] = { 0x32, 0x43, 0xF6, 0xA8, 0x88, 0x5A, 0x30, 
0x8D, 0x31, 0x31, 0x98, 0xA2 }; 
unsigned char idata IDS[12] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 
0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01 }; 
unsigned char idata ID[12] = { 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 
0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44 }; 
unsigned char idata k1[12] = { 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 
0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10 }; 
unsigned char idata k2[12] = { 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20 }; 
 
Figure 4.36 Code: Slave Initial Values 
 
After the Gossamer round the Master will use the modified key k1 to encrypt a 
message (temp array) and send to the Slave. After successful transmission the Slave 
will use modified k1 to decrypt the message and display it. 
Test Results 
Both the test-Master and the test-Slave were running continuously for 6 days and 23 
hours and successfully executed approximately 400 000 mutual authentications and 
encryption/decryption rounds. 
The UART output was periodically monitored and no abnormalities were discovered. 
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5. Performance Analysis 
5.1 Memory Code Space Requirements on nRF9E5 
The Master and the Slave prototypes used in a Long-term test required the following 
code space: 
Master: 3923 bytes + 80 bytes of xdata. 
Slave: 3937 bytes + 80 bytes of xdata. 
The main Gossamer Protocol function loop uses UART to intermittently output the 
results throughout the round. In order to verify the real size of the Gossamer loop 
without any UART overhead a special version of the program was compiled without 
any calls to the PutString or printArray functions. The results after these changes will 
be shown in a form of an extract from the Raisonance LX51 Linker Map File which 
can be found in Appendix A. 
The RAM storage requirements of the Master (229 bytes) and the Slave (244 bytes) 
seem high but it has to be noted that all arrays holding 96-bit numbers used by the 
Gossamer Protocol are initialized and stored in idata memory during the runtime of 
the program. In consequence 210 bytes of idata memory is used by the Master and 
the Slave. Approximately 80% of this space can be saved by moving the 96-bit 
values to the EEPROM trading off code space required by the external memory 
read/write functions. 
The total code space requirement by all the Gossamer-related functions is estimated 
at 1647bytes (66F Hex) on the Master side and 1710 bytes (6AE Hex) on the Slave 
side. 
The SEA functions code space requirements are identical on both the Master and the 
Slave programs and equal to 589 bytes (24D Hex). 
It has to be noted that the Raisonance RC51 compiler imports a LIB51 library which 
requires 552 bytes (228 Hex). This library is shared by many functions performing 
mathematical operations and is automatically imported even if only the SEA functions 
were to be implemented. In consequence, the code space requirements of the LIB51 
have to be taken under consideration when estimating the total requirements. 
5.2 Execution Speed 
The execution speed of different parts of the code was analyzed using an nRF9E5 
timer interrupt set to 1 millisecond ticks and small timer handling functions. The timer 
was reset before entering a given block of code and the timer value was collected at 
the exit of the block. 
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SEA Encryption/Decryption 
The full SEA (96, 8) encryption and decryption of a 12-byte block using 12-byte key 
and 93 rounds takes 27 milliseconds on an nRF9E5 microcontroller running at 
16MHz. This gives an encryption/decryption throughput of 705 bytes per second. 
Gossamer Authentication 
The full round of the Gossamer Protocol in the prototype program with no UART 
output (all PutString function calls removed) took 984 milliseconds on the Master side 
and 988 milliseconds on the Slave side. Both devices used the simplified radio 
protocol described in section 4.3. It has to be noted that the Master uses a longDelay 
function which loops for 280ms before each transmission (TX) attempt. At this time 
the Slave loops in the receiving mode (RX) waiting for messages. There are 3 TX 
attempts (messages A, B and C) so the total of 3*280ms can be subtracted from the 
total loop time on both the Master and the Slave side.  
The full Gossamer loop time without the TX delay function: 
 Master: 984ms - 3*280ms = 144ms 
 Slave: 988ms - 3*280ms = 148ms 
The Gossamer Protocol speed was also analyzed per major protocol stages: 
 Message A and B creation: 2ms each (Master). 
 Message C creation: 65ms (Master and Slave). 
 Number n1 and n2 extraction: 2ms each (Slave). 
 Message D creation and verification: 3ms (Master). 
 Message D creation 2ms: (Slave). 
 Keys and IDS update: 38ms (Master and Slave). 
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6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
6.1 Conclusions 
Lightweight Authentication and Encryption protocols have emerged to fill the security 
void created by the transition from desktop to mobile environments.  Fast processing 
and large memory has characterised desktop technologies.  By contrast, mobile 
technologies are characterised by their small processing power and small memory.  
Authentication and encryption protocols designed for desktop technologies cannot be 
easily ported to mobile Resource Limited Devices (RLDs).    
The central theme of this dissertation is that lightweight authentication and encryption 
protocols can fulfil the requirements of secure communications between RLDs 
without hardware modification.  An augmentation of the Gossamer authentication 
protocol that incorporates elements of the Scalable Encryption Algorithm (SEA) was 
implemented to confirm this assertion.  Cora Data‟s wireless sensor development 
board, comprising the Nordic Semiconductor nRF9E5 microcontroller and auxiliary 
radio communications circuitry was used as the reference platform.  The 
implementation, in software, demonstrates successful accomplishment of the key 
objectives of secure communications, but at a cost.  Success has been achieved by 
greatly simplifying the radio protocol and using almost the entire code space of 4 
Kilobytes allowed by the nRF9E5 microcontroller for the implementation of the 
security mechanisms.  As a consequence, there is zero code space left for the other 
tasks involved in the normal operation of an Infrastructure Wireless Sensor Network, 
such as sampling the ADC convertor and forming a data payload with the results.    
The research objectives, outlined in section 1.3, have been fulfilled.  A literature 
review comprising an overview of the security issues with respect to RLDs and their 
limitations (section 3), an analysis of authentication (section 2.2) and encryption 
(section 2.3) has been completed and has established that the Gossamer and SEA 
protocols, are the most suitable of the family of ultra-lightweight security protocols for 
implementation on RLDs.  The algorithms are current, resistant to attacks and 
cryptanalysis and their design has been focused on providing solutions for resource 
limited devices.  In addition, they can be implemented on an 8 bit platform.  An 
augmented Gossamer protocol that incorporates elements of the SEA is presented 
as a possible solution to the implementation of security in networks of RLDs.   
A major goal of this dissertation is to examine code space requirements of the 
augmented protocol‟s implementation (since memory is a critical resource).  The 
target is to provide secure communications with protocols that subsume as little of 
the memory as possible of the RLD.  Although Gossamer uses basic mathematical 
operations, which are easy to implement in hardware, the software implementation 
on an 8-bit CPU involves a great deal of code space overhead.  The performance 
analysis (section 5.1) shows that the total code space required by the Gossamer 
functions (~1700 Bytes) including the necessary RC51 libraries (552 Bytes) can be 
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estimated at approximately 2200 Bytes, which is 55% of the code space available on 
the reference platform.  The overhead mainly relates to operations on large numbers 
that have to be split into arrays with elements equal to the word size of the CPU.  
This leaves little room for the implementation of the radio protocol (hence the need 
for simplification) and zero room for ADC or other functionality.  
Additionally, the execution speed for each full round of the Gossamer Protocol (144 – 
148ms) is relatively high (reflecting the limitations of nRF9E5 processing power).  
The simplicity of the underlying mathematical calculations would imply fast 
performance.  In fact the actual performance varies significantly from that expected.   
This may have adverse consequences on the efficiency of the communications 
protocol.  Further code optimisation and/or native assembly code would reduce code 
space requirement and improve performance, but not by a magnitude large enough 
to justify the implementation of a software implementation of the Gossamer protocol 
on the reference platform. However, if another microcontroller without so strict 
memory limitations is used and the performance is regarded as satisfactory then the 
mechanism proposed can be considered for implementation. 
The SEA (96,8) implementation results were much more promising than the 
Gossamer ones.  As expected from an algorithm designed to be adapted easily to the 
native word size of the CPU, the code space footprint is very small (589 Bytes).  
Even when the RC51 libraries overhead is taken into consideration (552 Bytes), the 
total size of 1141 Bytes is just below 28% of the total code space available on the 
nRF9E5.  SEA has not been proven to be insecure to date, thus it can be 
recommended for microcontroller implementations with associated low data 
throughput requirements.   
The code space requirement to implement Gossamer combined with the code space 
required by SEA is 3341 Bytes (2200 Bytes + 1141 Bytes) or 83% of available code 
space.  The remainder of the code space is subsumed by simple radio functionality. 
Given the associated memory limitations, lack of hardware support for cryptographic 
primitives and the difficulty of implementing code banking with any degree of 
performance efficiency, the nRF9E5 cannot be recommended as a suitable platform 
on which to implement native authentication and encryption in security demanding 
wireless sensor networks.  Low cost microcontroller alternatives, such as the Texas 
Instruments CC430 family of microcontrollers with an embedded UHF radio 
transceiver and hardware support for 128-bit AES encryption may be viable. 
6.2 Recommendations for future work 
The promising results of the SEA (96, 8) algorithm implementation (with respect to 
code size and no. of cycles required to complete the protocol) would suggest that 
there is room for further investigation in relation to key size and the associated 
security that this brings.  It would be interesting to implement a (192, 8) version using 
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a 24-byte key and block size.  A comparative framework could then be drawn up to 
assess performance of both implementations. 
In consequence of the significantly high code space overhead required by the 
software implementation of Gossamer, further study of authentication and the 
authentication protocols needs to emerge.  The need for authentication protocols that 
can be implemented in terse code and negate all aspects of security breach remains 
a priority in the field of wireless sensor networks.  There are additional implications 
for power consumption, battery life, signal strength and propagation distance that will 
have an influence on the evolution of both sensors and security protocols. 
Implementation of the prototype on a larger scale (multiple sensors, single master 
and the back-end server) may significantly affect performance. Further research in 
this respect would identify performance-related issues and further test the suitability 
of the proposed solution for Infrastructure Wireless Sensor Networks.  
Additionally, an approach that combines authentication, encryption and key 
exchange in a single protocol with shared keys of identical length may prove to be a 
useful line of academic enquiry. 
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Appendix A 
 
Master Linker Map 
    TYPE     BASE       LENGTH    RELOCATION     SEGMENT NAME 
    ----     ----       ------    ----------     ------------ 
 
    * * * * * * *   DATA/IDATA    M E M O R Y   * * * * * * * 
    REG      0000H      0008H     ABSOLUTE       "REG BANK 0" 
    DATA     0008H      0018H     OVERLAID UNIT  _DGROUP02_ 
             0008H      0002H     ------------- ?DT?_ChangeRXAddress?MASTER 
             0008H      0009H     -------------  ?DT?gossamerMaster?MASTER 
             0011H      0004H     -------------  ?DT?_ReceiveMode?MASTER 
             0011H      0007H     -------------  ?DT?_bitRotation?MASTER 
             0018H      0003H     -------------  ?DT?_getModulo96?MASTER 
             0018H      0004H     -------------  ?DT?_indexShift?MASTER 
             001CH      0003H     -------------  ?DT?_arrayReverse?MASTER 
             0018H      0006H     -------------  ?DT?_bitShift?MASTER 
             0011H      0002H     -------------  ?DT?_TransmitBytes?MASTER 
             0011H      0003H     -------------  ?DT?_mixBits?MASTER 
             0014H      0001H     -------------  ?DT?_additionMod96?MASTER 
             0011H      0004H     -------------  ?DT?_sea?MASTER 
             0015H      0009H     -------------  ?DT?_seaCryptRound?MASTER 
             001EH      0001H     ------------- ?DT?_seaWordRotation?MASTER 
             0015H      0008H     -------------  ?DT?_seaKeyRound?MASTER 
             0011H      0007H     -------------  ?DT?_printArray?MASTER 
             0018H      0008H     -------------  ?DT?_itoa?MASTER 
    DATA     0020H      0002H     OVERLAID UNIT  _DGROUP01_ 
             0020H      0002H     -------------?DT?_subtractionMod96?MASTER 
    IDATA    0022H      00C3H     OVERLAID UNIT  _IGROUP02_ 
             0022H      00B4H     -------------  ?ID?gossamerMaster?MASTER 
             00D6H      000CH     -------------  ?ID?_mixBits?MASTER 
             00D6H      000FH     -------------  ?ID?_sea?MASTER 
             00D6H      0003H     -------------  ?ID?_itoa?MASTER 
    IDATA    00E5H      0001H     * * STACK * *  _STACK 
 
    * * * * * * *   PDATA/XDATA   M E M O R Y   * * * * * * * 
             0000H      0FB0H                    *** GAP *** 
    XDATA    0FB0H      0048H     OVERLAID UNIT  _XGROUP02_ 
             0FB0H      0008H     -------------  ?XD?main?MASTER 
             0FB8H      0040H     -------------  ?XD?gossamerMaster?MASTER 
 
    * * * * * * *   CODE          M E M O R Y   * * * * * * * 
 TYPE     BASE       LENGTH    RELOCATION     SEGMENT NAME 
    ----     ----       ------    ----------     ------------ 
    CODE     0000H      0003H     ABSOLUTE        
    CODE     0003H      008EH     INBLOCK        ?PR?MOVES?LIB51 
    CODE     0091H      0228H     UNIT           ?PR?LIB51 
    CODE     02B9H      0018H     UNIT           ?PR?C51_STARTUP? 
    CODE     02D1H      000DH     UNIT           ?PR?_SpiReadWrite?MASTER 
    CODE     02DEH      0008H     UNIT           ?PR?_PutChar?MASTER 
    CODE     02E6H      0008H     UNIT           ?PR?GetChar?MASTER 
    CODE     02EEH      0026H     UNIT           ?PR?_PutString?MASTER 
    CODE     0314H      0021H     UNIT           ?PR?SetClock?MASTER 
    CODE     0335H      0020H     UNIT           ?PR?InitUartTimer1?MASTER 
    CODE     0355H      0014H     UNIT           ?PR?longDelay?MASTER 
    CODE     0369H      0032H     UNIT          ?PR?_ChangeRXAddress?MASTER 
    CODE     039BH      0015H     UNIT           ?PR?InitRadio?MASTER 
    CODE     03B0H      004DH     UNIT           ?PR?_TransmitBytes?MASTER 
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    CODE     03FDH      006CH     UNIT           ?STR?MASTER 
    CODE     0469H      0056H     UNIT           ?PR?_ReceiveMode?MASTER 
    CODE     04BFH      00B0H     UNIT           ?PR?_itoa?MASTER 
    CODE     056FH      003AH     UNIT           ?PR?_printArray?MASTER 
    CODE     05A9H      004EH     UNIT           ?PR?_getModulo96?MASTER 
    CODE     05F7H      0028H     UNIT           ?PR?_arrayReverse?MASTER 
    CODE     061FH      0044H     UNIT           ?PR?_indexShift?MASTER 
    CODE     0663H      00CFH     UNIT           ?PR?_bitShift?MASTER 
    CODE     0732H      0045H     UNIT           ?PR?_bitRotation?MASTER 
    CODE     0777H      0010H     UNIT           ?PR?_xorArrays?MASTER 
    CODE     0787H      0041H     UNIT           ?PR?_additionMod96?MASTER 
    CODE     07C8H      0058H     UNIT         ?PR?_subtractionMod96?MASTER 
    CODE     0820H      0054H     UNIT           ?PR?_mixBits?MASTER 
    CODE     0874H      004EH     UNIT           ?PR?_seaSBOX?MASTER 
    CODE     08C2H      002FH     UNIT           ?PR?_seaBitRotation?MASTER 
    CODE     08F1H      0036H     UNIT          ?PR?_seaWordRotation?MASTER 
    CODE     0927H      0064H     UNIT           ?PR?_seaCryptRound?MASTER 
    CODE     098BH      0050H     UNIT           ?PR?_seaKeyRound?MASTER 
    CODE     09DBH      00E6H     UNIT           ?PR?_sea?MASTER 
    CODE     0AC1H      000FH     UNIT           ?PR?_copyArray?MASTER 
    CODE     0AD0H      03EDH     UNIT           ?PR?gossamerMaster?MASTER 
    CODE     0EBDH      0028H     UNIT           ?PR?main?MASTER 
 
EXECUTABLE SUMMARY: 
------------------- 
    Total INTERNAL RAM storage requirement:  00E5H (229) 
    Total EXTERNAL RAM storage requirement:  0048H (72) 
    Total     CODE     storage requirement:  0EE5H (3813) 
 
Slave Linker Map 
   TYPE     BASE       LENGTH    RELOCATION     SEGMENT NAME 
    ----     ----       ------    ----------     ------------ 
 
    * * * * * * *   DATA/IDATA    M E M O R Y   * * * * * * * 
    REG      0000H      0008H     ABSOLUTE       "REG BANK 0" 
    DATA     0008H      0017H     OVERLAID UNIT  _DGROUP02_ 
             0008H      0002H     -------------  ?DT?_ChangeRXAddress?SLAVE 
             0008H      0009H     -------------  ?DT?gossamerSlave?SLAVE 
             0011H      0004H     -------------  ?DT?_ReceiveMode?SLAVE 
             0011H      0007H     -------------  ?DT?_bitRotation?SLAVE 
             0018H      0003H     -------------  ?DT?_getModulo96?SLAVE 
             0018H      0004H     -------------  ?DT?_indexShift?SLAVE 
             001CH      0003H     -------------  ?DT?_arrayReverse?SLAVE 
             0018H      0006H     -------------  ?DT?_bitShift?SLAVE 
             0011H      0002H     ------------- ?DT?_subtractionMod96?SLAVE 
             0011H      0003H     -------------  ?DT?_mixBits?SLAVE 
             0014H      0001H     -------------  ?DT?_additionMod96?SLAVE 
             0011H      0004H     -------------  ?DT?_sea?SLAVE 
             0015H      0009H     -------------  ?DT?_seaCryptRound?SLAVE 
             001EH      0001H     -------------  ?DT?_seaWordRotation?SLAVE 
             0015H      0008H     -------------  ?DT?_seaKeyRound?SLAVE 
    DATA     001FH      000FH     OVERLAID UNIT  _DGROUP01_ 
             001FH      0007H     -------------  ?DT?_printArray?SLAVE 
             0026H      0008H     -------------  ?DT?_itoa?SLAVE 
    IDATA    002EH      00C3H     OVERLAID UNIT  _IGROUP02_ 
             002EH      00B4H     -------------  ?ID?gossamerSlave?SLAVE 
             00E2H      000CH     -------------  ?ID?_mixBits?SLAVE 
             00E2H      000FH     -------------  ?ID?_sea?SLAVE 
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    IDATA    00F1H      0003H     OVERLAID UNIT  _IGROUP01_ 
             00F1H      0003H     -------------  ?ID?_itoa?SLAVE 
    IDATA    00F4H      0001H     * * STACK * *  _STACK 
 
    * * * * * * *   PDATA/XDATA   M E M O R Y   * * * * * * * 
             0000H      0FB0H                    *** GAP *** 
    XDATA    0FB0H      0048H     OVERLAID UNIT  _XGROUP02_ 
             0FB0H      0008H     -------------  ?XD?main?SLAVE 
             0FB8H      0040H     -------------  ?XD?gossamerSlave?SLAVE 
 
    * * * * * * *   CODE          M E M O R Y   * * * * * * * 
    TYPE     BASE       LENGTH    RELOCATION     SEGMENT NAME 
    ----     ----       ------    ----------     ------------ 
    CODE     0000H      0003H     ABSOLUTE        
    CODE     0003H      008EH     INBLOCK        ?PR?MOVES?LIB51 
    CODE     0091H      0228H     UNIT           ?PR?LIB51 
    CODE     02B9H      0018H     UNIT           ?PR?C51_STARTUP? 
    CODE     02D1H      000DH     UNIT           ?PR?_SpiReadWrite?SLAVE 
    CODE     02DEH      0008H     UNIT           ?PR?_PutChar?SLAVE 
    CODE     02E6H      0008H     UNIT           ?PR?GetChar?SLAVE 
    CODE     02EEH      0026H     UNIT           ?PR?_PutString?SLAVE 
    CODE     0314H      0021H     UNIT           ?PR?SetClock?SLAVE 
    CODE     0335H      0020H     UNIT           ?PR?InitUartTimer1?SLAVE 
    CODE     0355H      0032H     UNIT           ?PR?_ChangeRXAddress?SLAVE 
    CODE     0387H      0015H     UNIT           ?PR?InitRadio?SLAVE 
    CODE     039CH      0044H     UNIT           ?PR?_TransmitBytes?SLAVE 
    CODE     03E0H      0054H     UNIT           ?STR?SLAVE 
    CODE     0434H      0056H     UNIT           ?PR?_ReceiveMode?SLAVE 
    CODE     048AH      00B0H     UNIT           ?PR?_itoa?SLAVE 
    CODE     053AH      003AH     UNIT           ?PR?_printArray?SLAVE 
    CODE     0574H      004EH     UNIT           ?PR?_getModulo96?SLAVE 
    CODE     05C2H      0028H     UNIT           ?PR?_arrayReverse?SLAVE 
    CODE     05EAH      0044H     UNIT           ?PR?_indexShift?SLAVE 
    CODE     062EH      00CFH     UNIT           ?PR?_bitShift?SLAVE 
    CODE     06FDH      0045H     UNIT           ?PR?_bitRotation?SLAVE 
    CODE     0742H      0010H     UNIT           ?PR?_xorArrays?SLAVE 
    CODE     0752H      0041H     UNIT           ?PR?_additionMod96?SLAVE 
    CODE     0793H      0058H     UNIT          ?PR?_subtractionMod96?SLAVE 
    CODE     07EBH      0054H     UNIT           ?PR?_mixBits?SLAVE 
    CODE     083FH      004EH     UNIT           ?PR?_seaSBOX?SLAVE 
    CODE     088DH      002FH     UNIT           ?PR?_seaBitRotation?SLAVE 
    CODE     08BCH      0036H     UNIT           ?PR?_seaWordRotation?SLAVE 
    CODE     08F2H      0064H     UNIT           ?PR?_seaCryptRound?SLAVE 
    CODE     0956H      0050H     UNIT           ?PR?_seaKeyRound?SLAVE 
    CODE     09A6H      00E6H     UNIT           ?PR?_sea?SLAVE 
    CODE     0A8CH      000FH     UNIT           ?PR?_copyArray?SLAVE 
    CODE     0A9BH      03D4H     UNIT           ?PR?gossamerSlave?SLAVE 
    CODE     0E6FH      0028H     UNIT           ?PR?main?SLAVE 
 
EXECUTABLE SUMMARY: 
------------------- 
    Total INTERNAL RAM storage requirement:  00F4H (244) 
    Total EXTERNAL RAM storage requirement:  0048H (72) 
    Total     CODE     storage requirement:  0E97H (3735) 
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Appendix B 
 
/*************************************************************** 
Copyright 2010 Piotr Ksiazak 
Filename: Master.c 
Project : MSc - IWSN Experimental Master 
**************************************************************** 
Version 1.0: Initial release 
***************************************************************/ 
 
#include <reg9e5.h> 
#include <intri51.h> 
#define POWER      3                // 0=min power...3 = max power 
#define HFREQ      1                // 0=433MHz, 1=868/915MHz 
#define CHANNEL  351                // Channel number: f(MHz) =   
      //(422.4+CHANNEL/10)*(1+HFREQ) 
#pragma REGPARMS     // pass arguments to registers 
 
// SPI access 
unsigned char SpiReadWrite(unsigned char b) 
{ 
    EXIF &= ~0x20;               // Clear SPI interrupt 
    SPI_DATA = b;                // Move byte to send to SPI data register 
    while((EXIF & 0x20) == 0x00) // Wait until SPI hs finished transmitting 
        ; 
    return SPI_DATA; 
} 
 
// Send character to UART 
void PutChar(char c) 
{ 
    while(!TI) 
        ; 
    TI = 0; 
    SBUF = c; 
} 
 
// Read character from UART 
unsigned char GetChar(void) 
{ 
    while(!RI) 
        ; 
    RI = 0; 
    return SBUF; 
} 
 
// Send string to UART 
void PutString(const char *s) 
{ 
    while(*s != 0) 
       PutChar(*s++); 
} 
 
// Switch to 16MHz clock: 
void SetClock(void) 
{ 
    unsigned char cklf; 
 
    RACSN = 0; // Set CSN on the radio to low (Radio will expect  
86 
 
   //instruction) 
    SpiReadWrite(RRC | 0x09);   // Read R_RF_CONFIG bytes  
       //starting at 09 (UP_CLK_FREQ) 
    cklf = SpiReadWrite(0) | 0x04;  // Set XOF to 001 (0x04 - 16MHz) 
    RACSN = 1;  // Set CSN on the radio back to low before next 
    //instruction (another high to low transition is 
    //needed thus the next line) 
    RACSN = 0;  // Back to low, radio expects another intruction 
    SpiReadWrite(WRC | 0x09);  // Instruct SPI to write RF_CONFIG 
    SpiReadWrite(cklf);   // Write RF_CONFIG 
    RACSN = 1;    // Reset CSN to high 
} 
 
// Initialize timer used for UART clocking 
void InitUartTimer1(void) 
{ 
    TH1 = 243;                      // 19200@16MHz (when T1M=1 and SMOD=1) 
    CKCON |= 0x10;                  // T1M=1 (/4 timer clock) 
    PCON = 0x80;                    // SMOD=1 (double baud rate) 
    SCON = 0x52;                    // Serial mode1, enable receiver 
    TMOD = 0x20;                    // Timer1 8bit auto reload  
    TR1 = 1;                        // Start timer1 
    P0_ALT |= 0x06;                 // Select alternate functions on pins 
      //P0.1 and P0.2 
    P0_DIR |= 0x02;                 // P0.1 (RxD) is input 
 
    SPICLK = 0;                     // Max SPI clock 
    SPI_CTRL = 0x02;                // Connect internal SPI controller to 
      //Radio 
    ES = 0; 
} 
 
// Sleep function 
void longDelay() 
{ 
    unsigned int i; 
    unsigned int n = 0xFFFF; 
    while(n--) 
        for(i=0;i<0xFFFF;i++) 
            ; 
} 
 
// Changes Receiving address of a node 
void ChangeRXAddress(unsigned int xdata *RXAddr) 
{ 
    unsigned int i; 
 
    RACSN = 0; 
    SpiReadWrite(WRC | 0x05);  //Write to RFConfig starting at byte 5 
      //(RF Address) 
    for(i=0; i<4; i++) 
        SpiReadWrite(RXAddr[i]); 
    RACSN = 1; 
} 
 
// Initialises radio transceiver on channel 0x68 
void InitRadio(void) 
{ 
    TXEN = 0; 
    TRX_CE =0; 
    RACSN = 0; 
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    SpiReadWrite(CC | (POWER << 2) | (HFREQ << 1) | (0x00)); //pass 
 //first 8 bits to the register (inlcuding channel high bit) 
    SpiReadWrite(0x68);   //pass low 8 bits of the channel 
    RACSN = 1; 
    EA = 1;     //Global enable for all interrupts 
} 
 
// Transmits a 32-byte packet over the radio 
void TransmitBytes(unsigned char data *TXAddr, unsigned char xdata *buff) 
{ 
 unsigned char i; 
 
    longDelay();    //Wait before tranmitting 
 
    //Configure TX Address 
    RACSN = 0; 
 SpiReadWrite(WTA);  //Write to RFConfig starting at byte 5 (RF 
     //Address) 
 for(i=0; i<4; i++) 
  SpiReadWrite(TXAddr[i]); 
 RACSN = 1; 
     
    //Write 32-byte packet to SPI 
    RACSN = 0; 
    SpiReadWrite(WTP);    // write packet to SPI 
    for (i=0; i<32; i++) 
    { 
        SpiReadWrite(buff[i]); 
    } 
    RACSN = 1; 
     
    //wait until channel is clear 
    while(CD == 1) 
        ; 
     
    TRX_CE = 1;      // enable radio 
    TXEN = 1;      // enable radio TX mode 
    while(DR == 0)   // wait until data ready goes high 
        ; 
 
    TRX_CE = 0;                     // disable radio 
    TXEN = 0;                       // disable TX mode 
} 
 
// Receives 32-byte packet if AM (Address Match) flag is raised 
unsigned char ReceiveMode(unsigned char xdata *buff) 
{ 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char j; 
    unsigned char amFlag; 
     
    amFlag = 0;                 //reset address match flag 
 TXEN = 0;  //Set TX_EN to low to enter Shockburst receive mode 
   
    TRX_CE = 1;                 //enable radio 
 
    j=0;                        //wait for Carrier Detect 
    while(CD == 0 && j<255) 
        j++; 
 
    if (AM)                     //If Address Match: process the SPI buffer 
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    { 
        while(DR == 0)          //Wait until Data Ready 
            ; 
         
        RACSN = 0; 
        SpiReadWrite(RRP);      //Send packet read command to the SPI 
        for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)    //Read in the packet ot the buffer 
            buff[i] = SpiReadWrite(0); 
        RACSN = 1; 
         
        TRX_CE=0;               //disable RX mode 
        PutString("\r\nRX\r\n"); 
 
        amFlag = 1; 
        return amFlag; 
    } 
    return amFlag; 
} 
 
// Inteteger to ASCII (itoa) conversion 
void itoa(int n, unsigned char *s) 
{ 
 unsigned char *charPtr; 
 int idata n1; 
 unsigned char idata len; 
   
 len=0; 
 //change the sign for negative numbers 
 if (n<0) 
 { 
  n=-n; 
  *s++ = '-'; 
 } 
 //calculate the length of the number in decimal digits 
 n1=n;  
 do 
 { 
  n1 /= 10; 
  len++; 
 } 
 while(n1); 
  
  
 *(charPtr = &s[len]) = 0; //null terminate string 
 do 
 { 
  *--charPtr = (n % 10) + '0'; 
  n /= 10; 
 } 
 while(n); 
 
} 
 
// Prints array of 12 bytes in decimal notation 
void printArray (unsigned char idata *array) 
{ 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char stringBuff[5]; 
 
    for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
    { 
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        itoa((int)array[i], stringBuff); 
        PutString(stringBuff); 
        PutString("\t"); 
    } 
    PutString("\r\n"); 
} 
  
//Returns Modulo96 of the 12-byte number (Big Endian) held in 12-element 
//array 
unsigned char getModulo96 (unsigned char idata *array) 
{ 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char modulus = 0; 
 
    for (i=0; i<11; i++) 
    { 
        //Divide and conquer approach: sum of two 4-bit numbers multiplied 
  //by 2*16 
        modulus +=  (( (array[i] & 0x0f) + (array[i] >> 4) )*256)%96; 
        modulus %= 96;  //Reduce each result Mod96 - can be done less  
    //frequently 
    } 
    return (array[11] + modulus)%96;    //Add the result to the LSB and 
       //calculate Mod96 again 
} 
 
//Reverses (mirror) the array - used by indexShift function 
void arrayReverse(unsigned char idata *result, unsigned char left, unsigned 
char right) 
{ 
    unsigned char temp; 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char j; 
 
    //Start with edges and continue until middle elements are processed 
    for (i=left, j=right; i<j; i++, j--) 
    { 
        temp = result[i]; 
        result[i] = result[j]; 
        result[j] = temp; 
    } 
} 
 
//Rotates the elements of a 12-element array by up to 11 positions left or 
right 
void indexShift (unsigned char idata *result, unsigned int direction, 
unsigned int indexShift) 
{ 
    //ArrayReverse: let array be split into A.B. After rotations it is B.A 
    //B.A = reverse( reverse(A).reverse(B) ) 
 
    //Direction: 0 for left shift, 1 for right shift 
    if (!direction) 
    { 
        arrayReverse(result, 0, indexShift-1); 
        arrayReverse(result, indexShift, 11); 
        arrayReverse(result, 0, 11); 
    } 
    else 
    { 
        arrayReverse(result, 12-indexShift, 11); 
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        arrayReverse(result, 0, 11-indexShift); 
        arrayReverse(result, 0, 11); 
    } 
} 
 
//Bitwise bit rotation of the array (up to 7 places) 
void bitShift (unsigned char idata *array, unsigned int direction, unsigned 
int bitsToShift) 
{ 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char element0; 
    unsigned char temp; 
 
    //Direction: 0 for left shift, 1 for right shift 
    if (!direction)//Shift bits to the left with carry to the lower element  
    { 
        element0 = array[0]; 
        array[0] = array[0] << bitsToShift; 
         
        for (i=0; i<11; i++) 
        {          
            temp = array[i+1]; 
            array[i+1] = array[i+1] << bitsToShift; 
            array[i] |= temp >> (8 - bitsToShift); 
        } 
        array[11] |= element0 >> (8-bitsToShift); 
 
    } 
    else    //Shift bits to the right with carry to the lower element  
    {      
        element0 = array[11]; 
        array[11] = array[11] >> bitsToShift; 
     
        for (i=11; i>0; i--) 
        { 
            temp = array[i-1]; 
            array[i-1] = array[i-1] >> bitsToShift; 
            array[i] |= temp << (8 - bitsToShift); 
        } 
        array[0] |= element0 << (8-bitsToShift); 
    } 
} 
 
//Rotates array2 by array1 Modulo96 
void bitRotation (unsigned char idata *array1, unsigned char idata *result, 
unsigned int direction) 
{ 
    unsigned char modulo = getModulo96(array1);     //First get modulo 
    unsigned char indicesToShift; 
    unsigned char bitsToShift; 
 
    //Second divide modulo by 8 and rotate the array (if modulo is bigger 
          //than 8)  
 //Direction: 0 for left shift, 1 for right shift 
    if (modulo > 8) 
    { 
        indicesToShift = modulo/8; 
        indexShift(result, direction, indicesToShift); 
    } 
 
    //Then bitshift with carry each element by the remaining shift (shift 
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 //amount will be <8) 
    bitsToShift = modulo%8; 
    if (bitsToShift != 0) 
        bitShift(result, direction, bitsToShift); 
} 
 
//Performs XOR on two arrays and saves the output to the second argument 
void xorArrays (unsigned char idata *array1, unsigned char idata *result) 
{ 
    unsigned char i; 
 
    for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
    { 
        result[i] ^= array1[i]; 
    } 
} 
 
//Performs addition Modulo96 on two arrays and saves the output to the 
second argument 
void additionMod96 (unsigned char idata *array1, unsigned char idata 
*result) 
{ 
 unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char j; 
     
    for (i=11; i>0; i--) 
    {  
        result[i] += array1[i]; //Add two bytes (no carry) 
        if (result[i] < array1[i]) //Check if carry needed and append to 
      //upper byte 
        { 
            result[i-1]++; 
            //check if previous byte was not 255 overloaded to 0 and step 
  //back to lower elements to do the same 
            j=i; 
            //If a carry bit overloads upper byte increment upper to  
  //the overloaded one 
            //Continue until the array head is met if needed 
            while(result[j-1] == 0 && j > 1)    
            { 
                result[j-2]++; 
                --j; 
            } 
        } 
    }  
    result[0] += array1[0]; //Got to the MSB - just add and ignore carry 
//(adding Mod96 anyway) 
} 
 
//Performs Gossamer MixBits function on two arrays and returns pointer to a 
//temporary array 
unsigned char* mixBits (unsigned char idata *array1, unsigned char idata 
*array2) 
{ 
    // Z = mixBits (X,Y) 
    // Z = X 
    // 32times: Z = (Z>>1) + Z + Z + Y 
    unsigned char idata result[12]; 
    unsigned char i; 
 
    for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
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    { 
        result[i] = array1[i]; 
    } 
 
    for (i=0; i<32; i++) 
    { 
        bitShift (array1, 1, 1); 
        additionMod96 (array1, result); 
        bitShift (array1, 0, 1); 
        additionMod96 (array1, result); 
        additionMod96 (array1, result); 
        additionMod96 (array2, result); 
    } 
    return result; 
} 
 
/* SEA S-Box implementation according to SEA author's suggestions 
void seaSBOX (unsigned char data *block, unsigned char i) 
{ 
    block[3*i] = (block[3*i+2] && block[3*i+1]) ^ block[3*i]; 
    block[3*i+1] = (block[3*i+2] && block[3*i]) ^ block[3*i+1]; 
    block[3*i+2] = (block[3*i] || block[3*i+1]) ^ block[3*i+2]; 
} 
*/ 
 
//Simplified S-Box - per private conversation with the author it is safe to 
//perform S-Box on the first three elements only (SEA(96,8). 
//Originally author advised to apply S-Box to any 3 elements of each block 
void seaSBOX (unsigned char idata *block, unsigned char i) 
{ 
    block[0] = (block[2] && block[1]) ^ block[0]; 
    block[1] = (block[2] && block[0]) ^ block[1]; 
    block[2] = (block[0] || block[1]) ^ block[2]; 
} 
 
//SEA Bit-rotation function for SEA(96,8). 
//Function uses Raisonance RC51 intrisic functions (_cror_ and _crol_). 
void seaBitRotation (unsigned char idata *block) 
{ 
    block[0] = _cror_(block[0], 1); 
    block[2] = _crol_(block[2], 1); 
    block[3] = _cror_(block[3], 1); 
    block[5] = _crol_(block[5], 1); 
} 
 
//SEA(96,8) word rotation - rotates the array by one byte 
void seaWordRotation (unsigned char idata *block, unsigned char direction) 
{ 
    //Direction 0 for left and 1 for right rotation 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char temp; 
     
    if (direction == 0) 
    { 
        temp = block[0]; 
        for (i=0; i<5; i++) 
            block[i] = block[i+1]; 
        block[5] = temp; 
    } 
    else 
    { 
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        temp = block[5]; 
        for (i=5; i>0; i--) 
            block[i] = block[i-1]; 
        block[0] = temp; 
    } 
} 
 
//Performs one SEA(96,8) Crypto round. Parameter direction: 0 for 
encryption and 1 for decryption 
void seaCryptRound (unsigned char direction, unsigned char idata 
*blockLeft, unsigned char idata *blockRight, unsigned char idata *keyHalf) 
{ 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char temp[6]; 
 
    //Every operation will be performed on blockLeft as this memory 
 //location will become  
    //a right block for the next round. 
    //Save the left block 
    for (i=0; i<6; i++) 
        temp[i] = blockRight[i]; 
 
    //ENCRYPTION 
    //Fe(Li, Ri, K/2i) <=> RightWordRot(Li) XOR bitRot(sbox(Ri+K/2i)) 
    //DECRYPTION 
    //Fd(Li, Ri, K/2i) <=> LeftWordRot(Li XOR bitRot(sbox(Ri+K/2i))) 
 
    //Step by step: 
    //Ri+K/2i 
    for (i=0; i<6; i++) 
        blockRight[i] += keyHalf[i]; 
    //sbox(Ri+K/2i) 
    seaSBOX(blockRight, i%2); 
    ////seaSBOX(blockRight, 0); 
    //bitRot(sbox(Ri+K/2i)) 
    seaBitRotation(blockRight); 
    //RightWordRot(Li) - encryption only 
    //Direction 0 for encryption and 1 for decryption 
    if (direction == 0) 
        seaWordRotation(blockLeft, 1); 
    //RightWordRot(Li) XOR bitRot(sbox(Ri+K/2i)) 
    for (i=0; i<6; i++) 
    { 
        blockRight[i] ^= blockLeft[i]; 
        blockLeft[i] = temp[i];     //BlockLeft(i)+1 becomes BlockRight(i) 
    } 
    //LeftWordRot(Li XOR bitRot(sbox(Ri+K/2i))) - decryption only 
    if (direction == 1) 
        seaWordRotation(blockRight, 0); 
} 
 
//Performs one SEA(96,8) key round. 
void seaKeyRound (unsigned char idata *keyLeft, unsigned char idata 
*keyRight, unsigned char Ci) 
{ 
//Fk(KLi-1,KRi-1,Ci) <=> KRi = KLi-1 XOR RightWordRot(bitRot(sbox((KRi-
//1)+Ci))); 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char temp[6]; 
     
    //Save the left key (left key will become right after the round) 
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    //Every operation will be performed on keyLeft as this memory location 
 //will become a right key 
    //for the next round. 
    for (i=0; i<6; i++) 
        temp[i] = keyRight[i]; 
    //Step-by-step: 
    //init Ci (LSW equals i) 
    ////Ci[5] = i; 
    //(KRi-1)+Ci 
    keyRight[5] += Ci; 
    //sbox((KRi-1)+Ci) 
    seaSBOX(keyRight, (Ci%2)); 
    ////seaSBOX(keyRight, 1); 
    //bitRotation(sbox((KRi-1)+Ci)) 
    seaBitRotation(keyRight); 
    //RightWordRot(bitRot(sbox((KRi-1)+Ci))); 
    seaWordRotation(keyRight, 1);    
    //KRi = KLi-1 XOR RightWordRot(bitRot(sbox((KRi-1)+Ci))); 
    for (i=0; i<6; i++) 
    { 
        keyRight[i] ^= keyLeft[i];     
        keyLeft[i] = temp[i];   //KeyLeft(i)+1 becomes KeyRight(i)  
    } 
} 
 
// SEA Scalable Encryption Algorithm (SEA 96,8) implementation 
void sea (unsigned char direction, unsigned char idata *block, unsigned 
char idata *key) 
{ 
    //Direction 0 for encryption and 1 for decryption 
    unsigned char i; 
 
    //initialization 
    unsigned char* idata keyLeft = &key[0]; 
    unsigned char* idata keyRight = &key[6]; 
    unsigned char* idata blockLeft = &block[0]; 
    unsigned char* idata blockRight = &block[6]; 
    unsigned char* idata temp;   //temp pointer used for swapping key sides 
    unsigned char tmp; 
     
    //First half of all rounds (93 as per author's recommendation for a 
 //minimum number of rounds) 
    //for (i=1; i<47; i++) 
    for (i=1; i<47; i++) 
    { 
        //Key scheduling 
        //[KLi, KRi] = Fk(KLi-1, KRi-1, C(i)); 
        //Fk(KLi-1,KRi-1,Ci) <=> KRi = KLi-1 XOR Rot(bitRot(sbox((KRi- 
  //1)+Ci))); 
        seaCryptRound (direction, (unsigned char idata *)blockLeft, 
(unsigned char idata *)blockRight, (unsigned char idata *)keyRight); 
        seaKeyRound((unsigned char idata *)keyLeft, (unsigned char idata 
*)keyRight, i); 
    } 
     
    //End of round half - swap pointers 
    temp = keyLeft; 
    keyLeft = keyRight; 
    keyRight = temp; 
 
    //for (i=46; i<92; i++) 
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    for (i=46; i>0; i--) 
    { 
        //Key scheduling part 2 
        //[KLi, KRi] = Fk(KLi-1, KRi-1, C(r-i)); 
        //Fk(KLi-1,KRi-1,Ci) <=> KRi = KLi-1 XOR Rot(bitRot(sbox((KRi- 
  //1)+Ci))) 
        seaCryptRound (direction, (unsigned char idata *)blockLeft, 
(unsigned char idata *)blockRight, (unsigned char idata *)keyLeft); 
        seaKeyRound((unsigned char idata *)keyLeft, (unsigned char idata 
*)keyRight, i); 
    } 
    seaCryptRound (direction, (unsigned char idata *)blockLeft, (unsigned 
char idata *)blockRight, (unsigned char idata *)keyLeft); 
     
    //Final: switch Key and Block halves 
    //indexShift (block, 0, 6);     //Gossamer function may be used to save 
 //space  
    for(i=0; i<6; i++) 
    { 
        tmp = block[i]; 
        block[i] = block[i+6]; 
        block[i+6] = tmp; 
    }    
} 
 
//Copies array to the location of the second argument 
void copyArray(unsigned char idata *source, unsigned char idata *target) 
{ 
    unsigned char i; 
 
    for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
        target[i] = source[i]; 
} 
 
//Main Gossamer Master loop - simplified model. 
void gossamerMaster (void) 
{ 
    //Simplifications: 
    //All data stored in RAM (idata) 
    //n1 and n2 random numbers are hardcoded; 
    //IDS, k1 and k2 for an example slave device are also hardcoded; 
    unsigned char data TXaddr[4] = { 0xC4, 0x5A, 0x5A, 0xC4 }; 
    unsigned char xdata TXbuff[32]; 
    unsigned char xdata RXbuff[32]; 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char flag; 
 
    unsigned char idata temp[12]; 
    unsigned char idata n1temp[12]; 
    unsigned char *tempPtr; 
 
    unsigned char idata Pi[12] = { 0x32, 0x43, 0xF6, 0xA8, 0x88, 0x5A, 
0x30, 0x8D, 0x31, 0x31, 0x98, 0xA2 }; 
    unsigned char idata IDS[12] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 
0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01 }; 
    unsigned char idata ID[12] = { 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 
0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44 }; 
    unsigned char idata k1[12] = { 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 
0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10 }; 
    unsigned char idata k2[12] = { 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20 }; 
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    unsigned char idata n1[12] = { 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 
0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22 }; 
    unsigned char idata n2[12] = { 0x23, 0x23, 0x23, 0x23, 0x23, 0x23, 
0x23, 0x23, 0x23, 0x23, 0x23, 0x23 }; 
     
    unsigned char idata messageA[12]; 
    unsigned char idata messageB[12]; 
    unsigned char idata messageC[12]; 
    unsigned char idata messageD[12]; 
    unsigned char idata k1next[12]; 
    unsigned char idata k2next[12]; 
     
    //Loop forever authenticating the experimental slave 
    for (;;) 
    { 
        //Tag identification: verify incoming IDS 
        flag = 1; 
        while (!ReceiveMode(RXbuff)) 
            ; 
        for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
        { 
            if (IDS[i] != RXbuff[i]) 
                flag = 0; 
        } 
        if (flag)   //If IDS is correct  continue with the protocol 
        { 
            PutString("\r\nIDS OK"); 
            //Create message A: A = ROT((ROT(IDS+k1+Pi+n1, k2)+k1, k1) 
            //messageA + n1 
            copyArray(n1, messageA); 
            //n1+Pi 
            additionMod96(Pi, messageA); 
            //k1+Pi+n1 
            additionMod96(k1, messageA); 
            //IDS+k1+Pi+n1 
            additionMod96(IDS, messageA); 
            //ROT(IDS+k1+Pi+n1, k2) 
            bitRotation (k2, messageA, 0); 
            //ROT(IDS+k1+Pi+n1, k2)+k1 
            additionMod96(k1, messageA); 
            //ROT((ROT(IDS+k1+Pi+n1, k2)+k1, k1) 
            bitRotation (k1, messageA, 0); 
             
            //MessageA created - now transmit: 
            PutString("\r\nA\t"); 
            printArray(messageA); 
            for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
                TXbuff[i] = messageA[i]; 
            TransmitBytes(TXaddr, TXbuff); 
             
            //Create message B: B = ROT((ROT(IDS+k2+Pi+n2, k1)+k2, k2) 
            //messageB + n2 
            copyArray(n2, messageB); 
            //Pi+n2 
            additionMod96(Pi, messageB); 
            //k2+Pi+n2 
            additionMod96(k2, messageB); 
            //IDS+k2+Pi+n2 
            additionMod96(IDS, messageB); 
            //ROT(IDS+k2+Pi+n2, k1) 
            bitRotation (k1, messageB, 0); 
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            //ROT(IDS+k2+Pi+n2, k1)+k2 
            additionMod96(k2, messageB); 
            //ROT((ROT(IDS+k2+Pi+n2, k1)+k2, k2) 
            bitRotation (k2, messageB, 0); 
             
            //MessageB created - now transmit: 
            PutString("B\t"); 
            printArray(messageB); 
            for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
                TXbuff[i] = messageB[i]; 
            TransmitBytes(TXaddr, TXbuff); 
             
            //Create temporary n3: n3 = mixBits(n1,n2) 
            tempPtr = mixBits(n1, n2); 
            for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
                temp[i] = tempPtr[i];   
             
            //Create keys for the next round 
            //k1next = ROT((ROT(n2+k1+Pi+n3, n2)+k2 XOR n3, n1) XOR n3 
            //k1next + n3 
            copyArray(temp, k1next); 
            //Pi+n3 
            additionMod96(Pi, k1next); 
            //k1+Pi+n3 
            additionMod96(k1, k1next); 
            //n2+k1+Pi+n3 
            additionMod96(n2, k1next); 
            //ROT(n2+k1+Pi+n3, n2) 
            bitRotation (n2, k1next, 0); 
            //ROT(n2+k1+Pi+n3, n2)+k2 
            additionMod96(k2, k1next); 
            //ROT(n2+k1+Pi+n3, n2)+k2 XOR n3 
            xorArrays(temp, k1next); 
            //ROT((ROT(n2+k1+Pi+n3, n2)+k2 XOR n3, n1) 
            bitRotation (n1, k1next, 0); 
            //ROT((ROT(n2+k1+Pi+n3, n2)+k2 XOR n3, n1) XOR n3 
            xorArrays(temp, k1next);        
             
            //k2next = ROT((ROT(n1+k2+Pi+n3, n1)+k1+n3, n2)+n3 
            //k2next+n3 
            copyArray(temp, k2next); 
            //Pi+n3 
            additionMod96(Pi, k2next); 
            //k2+Pi+n3 
            additionMod96(k2, k2next); 
            //n1+k2+Pi+n3 
            additionMod96(n1, k2next); 
            //ROT(n1+k2+Pi+n3, n1) 
            bitRotation (n1, k2next, 0); 
            //ROT(n1+k2+Pi+n3, n1)+k1 
            additionMod96(k1, k2next); 
            //ROT(n1+k2+Pi+n3, n1)+k1+n3 
            additionMod96(temp, k2next); 
            //ROT((ROT(n1+k2+Pi+n3, n1)+k1+n3, n2) 
            bitRotation (n2, k2next, 0); 
            //ROT((ROT(n1+k2+Pi+n3, n1)+k1+n3, n2)+n3 
            additionMod96(temp, k2next); 
             
            //Create temporary n1' = mixBits(n3, n2) 
            tempPtr = mixBits(temp, n2); 
            for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
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                n1temp[i] = tempPtr[i]; 
             
            //Create message C: C = ROT((ROT(n3+k1next+Pi+n1', n3)+k2next 
  //XOR n1', n2) XOR n1' 
            //messageC+n1' 
            copyArray(n1temp, messageC); 
            //Pi+n1' 
            additionMod96(Pi, messageC); 
            //k1next+Pi+n1' 
            additionMod96(k1next, messageC); 
            //n3+k1next+Pi+n1' 
            additionMod96(temp, messageC); 
            //ROT(n3+k1next+Pi+n1', n3) 
            bitRotation (temp, messageC, 0); 
            //ROT(n3+k1next+Pi+n1', n3)+k2next 
            additionMod96(k2next, messageC); 
            //ROT(n3+k1next+Pi+n1', n3)+k2next XOR n1' 
            xorArrays(n1temp, messageC); 
            //ROT((ROT(n3+k1next+Pi+n1', n3)+k2next XOR n1', n2) 
            bitRotation (n2, messageC, 0); 
            //ROT((ROT(n3+k1next+Pi+n1', n3)+k2next XOR n1', n2) XOR n1' 
            xorArrays(n1temp, messageC); 
             
            //MessageC created - now transmit: 
            PutString("C\t"); 
            printArray(messageC); 
            for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
                TXbuff[i] = messageC[i]; 
            TransmitBytes(TXaddr, TXbuff); 
             
            //Now awaiting reply (message D) - entering receive mode 
            while (!ReceiveMode(RXbuff)) 
                ; 
            //Got message D - verify if successfull 
            //Step1: calculate local messageD 
            //D = ROT(ROT(n2+k2next+ID+n1', n2)+k1next+n1', n3)+n1' 
            //messageD +n1' 
            copyArray(n1temp, messageD); 
            //ID+n1' 
            additionMod96(ID, messageD); 
            //k2next+ID+n1' 
            additionMod96(k2next, messageD); 
            //n2+k2next+ID+n1' 
            additionMod96(n2, messageD); 
            //ROT(n2+k2next+ID+n1', n2) 
            bitRotation (n2, messageD, 0); 
            //ROT(n2+k2next+ID+n1', n2)+k1next 
            additionMod96(k1next, messageD); 
            //ROT(n2+k2next+ID+n1', n2)+k1next+n1' 
            additionMod96(n1temp, messageD); 
            //ROT(ROT(n2+k2next+ID+n1', n2)+k1next+n1', n3) 
            bitRotation (temp, messageD, 0); 
            //ROT(ROT(n2+k2next+ID+n1', n2)+k1next+n1', n3)+n1' 
            additionMod96(n1temp, messageD); 
             
            //Now verify message D received with a local copy 
            for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
            { 
                if (messageD[i] != RXbuff[i]) 
                    flag = 0; 
            } 
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            if(flag) //Message D matches - key and IDS updating phase 
            { 
                //n2 array will be reused 
                //n2' = mixBits(n1', n3) 
                tempPtr = mixBits(n1temp, temp); 
                for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
                    n2[i] = tempPtr[i]; 
                //IDS = ROT((ROT(n1'+k1next+IDS+n2', n1')+k2next XOR n2', 
   //n3) XOR n2 
                //IDS+n2' 
                copyArray(n2, IDS); 
                //k1next+IDS+n2' 
                additionMod96(k1next, IDS); 
                //n1'+k1next+IDS+n2' 
                additionMod96(n1temp, IDS); 
                //ROT(n1'+k1next+IDS+n2', n1') 
                bitRotation (n1temp, IDS, 0); 
                //ROT(n1'+k1next+IDS+n2', n1')+k2next 
                additionMod96(k2next, IDS); 
                //ROT(n1'+k1next+IDS+n2', n1')+k2next XOR n2' 
                xorArrays(n2, IDS); 
                //ROT((ROT(n1'+k1next+IDS+n2', n1')+k2next XOR n2', n3) 
                bitRotation (temp, IDS, 0); 
                //ROT((ROT(n1'+k1next+IDS+n2', n1')+k2next XOR n2', n3) XOR 
   //n2 
                xorArrays(n2, IDS); 
                PutString("nIDS\t"); 
                printArray(IDS); 
                 
                //k1 update 
                //k1 = ROT((ROT(n3+k2next+Pi+n2', n3)+k1next+n2', n1')+n2' 
                //k1=n2' 
                copyArray(n2, k1); 
                //Pi+n2' 
                additionMod96(Pi, k1); 
                //k2next+Pi+n2' 
                additionMod96(k2next, k1); 
                //n3+k2next+Pi+n2' 
                additionMod96(temp, k1); 
                //ROT(n3+k2next+Pi+n2', n3) 
                bitRotation (temp, k1, 0); 
                //ROT(n3+k2next+Pi+n2', n3)+k1next 
                additionMod96(k1next, k1); 
                //ROT(n3+k2next+Pi+n2', n3)+k1next+n2' 
                additionMod96(n2, k1); 
                //ROT((ROT(n3+k2next+Pi+n2', n3)+k1next+n2', n1') 
                bitRotation (n1temp, k1, 0); 
                //ROT((ROT(n3+k2next+Pi+n2', n3)+k1next+n2', n1')+n2' 
                additionMod96(n2, k1); 
 
                //k2 update 
                //k2 = ROT((ROT(IDS+k2next+Pi+k1, IDS)+k1next+k1, n2')+k1 
                //k2 = k1 
                copyArray(k1, k2); 
                //k1+Pi 
                additionMod96(Pi, k2); 
                //k2next+Pi+k1 
                additionMod96(k2next, k2); 
                //IDS+k2next+Pi+k1 
                additionMod96(IDS, k2); 
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                //ROT(IDS+k2next+Pi+k1, IDS) 
                bitRotation (IDS, k2, 0); 
                //ROT(IDS+k2next+Pi+k1, IDS)+k1next 
                additionMod96(k1next, k2); 
                //ROT(IDS+k2next+Pi+k1, IDS)+k1next+k1 
                additionMod96(k1, k2); 
                //ROT((ROT(IDS+k2next+Pi+k1, IDS)+k1next+k1, n2') 
                bitRotation (n2, k2, 0); 
                //ROT((ROT(IDS+k2next+Pi+k1, IDS)+k1next+k1, n2')+k1 
                additionMod96(k1, k2); 
                 
                //SEA Demonstration: encrypt temp with k1 and send to the 
   //slave 
                PutString("SeaD\t"); 
                printArray(temp); 
                sea(0, temp, k1); 
                PutString("SeaE\t"); 
                printArray(temp); 
                PutString("k1\t"); 
                printArray(k1); 
                 
                for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
                    TXbuff[i] = temp[i]; 
                TransmitBytes(TXaddr, TXbuff); 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                PutString(":( D"); //Incorrect message D received 
            } 
        } 
        else 
        { 
            PutString(":( IDS");    //Incorrect IDS received 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
//Main function - intitialisation of the NRF9E5 
int main(void) 
{ 
 unsigned int xdata RXaddr[4] = { 0xC3, 0x5A, 0x5A, 0xC3 }; 
 
 InitUartTimer1(); 
 SetClock(); 
 ChangeRXAddress(RXaddr); 
 InitRadio(); 
 PutString(":)\n\r"); 
    gossamerMaster(); 
 
    return 0; 
} 
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/*************************************************************** 
Copyright 2010 Piotr Ksiazak 
Filename: Slave.c 
Project : MSc - IWSN Experimental Slave 
**************************************************************** 
Version 1.0: Initial release 
***************************************************************/ 
 
#include <reg9e5.h> 
#include <intri51.h> 
#define POWER      3                // 0=min power...3 = max power 
#define HFREQ      1                // 0=433MHz, 1=868/915MHz 
#define CHANNEL  351                // Channel number: f(MHz) =   
      //(422.4+CHANNEL/10)*(1+HFREQ) 
#pragma REGPARMS    //pass arguments to registers 
 
// SPI access 
unsigned char SpiReadWrite(unsigned char b) 
{ 
    EXIF &= ~0x20;                  // Clear SPI interrupt 
    SPI_DATA = b;                   // Move byte to send to SPI data  
      //register 
    while((EXIF & 0x20) == 0x00)    // Wait until SPI hs finished  
      //transmitting 
        ; 
    return SPI_DATA; 
} 
 
// Send character to UART 
void PutChar(char c) 
{ 
    while(!TI) 
        ; 
    TI = 0; 
    SBUF = c; 
} 
 
// Read character from UART 
unsigned char GetChar(void) 
{ 
    while(!RI) 
        ; 
    RI = 0; 
    return SBUF; 
} 
 
// Send string to UART 
void PutString(const char *s) 
{ 
    while(*s != 0) 
       PutChar(*s++); 
} 
 
// Switch to 16MHz clock: 
void SetClock(void) 
{ 
    unsigned char cklf; 
 
    RACSN = 0;   // Set CSN on the radio to low (Radio will 
     //expect instruction) 
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    SpiReadWrite(RRC | 0x09); // Read R_RF_CONFIG bytes starting at 09  
     //(UP_CLK_FREQ) 
    cklf = SpiReadWrite(0) | 0x04;  // Set XOF to 001 (0x04 - 16MHz) 
    RACSN = 1;  // Set CSN on the radio back to low before next 
//instruction (another high to low transition is needed thus the next line) 
    RACSN = 0;  // Back to low, radio expects another intruction 
    SpiReadWrite(WRC | 0x09);  // Instruct SPI to write RF_CONFIG 
    SpiReadWrite(cklf);   // Write RF_CONFIG 
    RACSN = 1;    // Reset CSN to high 
} 
 
// Initialize timer used for UART clocking 
void InitUartTimer1(void) 
{ 
    TH1 = 243;                      // 19200@16MHz (when T1M=1 and SMOD=1) 
    CKCON |= 0x10;                  // T1M=1 (/4 timer clock) 
    PCON = 0x80;                    // SMOD=1 (double baud rate) 
    SCON = 0x52;                    // Serial mode1, enable receiver 
    TMOD = 0x20;                    // Timer1 8bit auto reload  
    TR1 = 1;                        // Start timer1 
    P0_ALT |= 0x06;                 // Select alternate functions on pins 
      //P0.1 and P0.2 
    P0_DIR |= 0x02;                 // P0.1 (RxD) is input 
 
    SPICLK = 0;                     // Max SPI clock 
    SPI_CTRL = 0x02;                // Connect internal SPI controller to 
      //Radio 
    ES = 0; 
} 
 
// Changes Receiving address of a node 
void ChangeRXAddress(unsigned int xdata *RXAddr) 
{ 
 unsigned int i; 
 
    RACSN = 0; 
 SpiReadWrite(WRC | 0x05); //Write to RFConfig starting at byte 5 
      //(RF Address) 
 for(i=0; i<4; i++) 
  SpiReadWrite(RXAddr[i]); 
 RACSN = 1; 
} 
 
// Initialises radio 
void InitRadio(void) 
{ 
   TXEN = 0; 
   TRX_CE =0; 
   //ChangeChannel();//(0x00,0x68); 
   RACSN = 0; 
   SpiReadWrite(CC | (POWER << 2) | (HFREQ << 1) | (0x00)); //pass first 8 
    //bits to the register (inlcuding channel high bit) 
   SpiReadWrite(0x68);         
     //pass low 8 bits of the channel 
   RACSN = 1; 
   //Channel changed 
 
   EA = 1;     //Global enable for all interrupts 
} 
 
// Transmits a 32-byte packet over the radio 
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void TransmitBytes(unsigned char data *TXAddr, unsigned char xdata *buff) 
{  
 unsigned char i; 
 
      //Configure TX Address 
      RACSN = 0; 
 SpiReadWrite(WTA);   //Write to RFConfig starting at 
      //byte 5 (RF Address) 
 for(i=0; i<4; i++) 
  SpiReadWrite(TXAddr[i]); 
 RACSN = 1; 
     
    //Write 32-byte packet to SPI 
    RACSN = 0; 
    SpiReadWrite(WTP);    // write packet to SPI 
    for (i=0; i<32; i++) 
    { 
        SpiReadWrite(buff[i]); 
    } 
    RACSN = 1; 
     
    //wait until channel is clear 
    while(CD == 1) 
        ; 
     
    TRX_CE = 1;    // enable radio 
    TXEN = 1;    // enable radio TX mode 
    while(DR == 0)   // wait until data ready goes high 
        ; 
     
    TRX_CE = 0;                     // disable radio 
    TXEN = 0;                       // disable TX mode 
} 
 
// Receives 32-byte packet if AM (Address Match) flag is raised 
unsigned char ReceiveMode(unsigned char xdata *buff) 
{ 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char j; 
    unsigned char amFlag; 
     
    amFlag = 0;                 //reset address match flag 
 TXEN = 0;  //Set TX_EN to low to enter Shockburst receive mode 
   
    TRX_CE = 1;                 //enable radio 
 
    j=0;                        //wait fo Carrier Detect 
    while(CD == 0 && j<255) 
        j++; 
 
    if (AM)                     //If Address Match: process the SPI buffer 
    { 
        while(DR == 0)          //Wait until Data Ready 
            ; 
         
        RACSN = 0; 
        SpiReadWrite(RRP);      //Send packet read command to the SPI 
        for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)    //Read in the packet ot the buffer 
            buff[i] = SpiReadWrite(0); 
        RACSN = 1; 
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        TRX_CE=0;               //disable RX mode 
        PutString("\r\nRX\r\n"); 
 
        amFlag = 1; 
        return amFlag; 
    } 
    return amFlag; 
} 
 
// Inteteger to ASCII (itoa) conversion 
void itoa(int n, unsigned char *s) 
{ 
 unsigned char *charPtr; 
 int idata n1; 
 unsigned char idata len; 
   
 len=0; 
 //change the sign for negative numbers 
 if (n<0) 
 { 
  n=-n; 
  *s++ = '-'; 
 } 
 //calculate the length of the number in decimal digits 
 n1=n;  
 do 
 { 
  n1 /= 10; 
  len++; 
 } 
 while(n1); 
  
  
 *(charPtr = &s[len]) = 0; //null terminate string 
 do 
 { 
  *--charPtr = (n % 10) + '0'; 
  n /= 10; 
 } 
 while(n); 
 
} 
 
// Prints array of 12 bytes in decimal notation 
void printArray (unsigned char idata *array) 
{ 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char stringBuff[5]; 
 
    for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
    { 
        itoa((int)array[i], stringBuff); 
        PutString(stringBuff); 
        PutString("\t"); 
    } 
    PutString("\r\n"); 
} 
  
  
//Returns Modulo96 of the 12-byte number (Big Endian) held in 12-element 
//array 
105 
 
unsigned char getModulo96 (unsigned char idata *array) 
{ 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char modulus = 0; 
 
    for (i=0; i<11; i++) 
    { 
//Divide and conquer approach: sum of two 4-bit numbers multiplied by 2*16 
        modulus +=  (( (array[i] & 0x0f) + (array[i] >> 4) )*256)%96; 
        modulus %= 96;  //Reduce each result Mod96 - can be done less  
    //frequently 
    } 
    return (array[11] + modulus)%96;    //Add the result to the LSB and 
       //calculate Mod96 again 
} 
 
//Reverses (mirror) the array - used by indexShift function 
void arrayReverse(unsigned char idata *result, unsigned char left, unsigned 
char right) 
{ 
    unsigned char temp; 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char j; 
 
    //Start with edges and continue until middle elements are processed 
    for (i=left, j=right; i<j; i++, j--) 
    { 
        temp = result[i]; 
        result[i] = result[j]; 
        result[j] = temp; 
    } 
} 
 
//Rotates the elements of a 12-element array by up to 11 positions left or 
//right 
void indexShift (unsigned char idata *result, unsigned int direction, 
unsigned int indexShift) 
{ 
    //ArrayReverse: let array be split into A.B. After rotations it is B.A 
    //B.A = reverse( reverse(A).reverse(B) ) 
 
    //Direction: 0 for left shift, 1 for right shift 
    if (!direction) 
    { 
        arrayReverse(result, 0, indexShift-1); 
        arrayReverse(result, indexShift, 11); 
        arrayReverse(result, 0, 11); 
    } 
    else 
    { 
        arrayReverse(result, 12-indexShift, 11); 
        arrayReverse(result, 0, 11-indexShift); 
        arrayReverse(result, 0, 11); 
    } 
} 
 
//Bitwise bit rotation of the array (up to 7 places) 
void bitShift (unsigned char idata *array, unsigned int direction, unsigned 
int bitsToShift) 
{ 
    unsigned char i; 
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    unsigned char element0; 
    unsigned char temp; 
 
    //Direction: 0 for left shift, 1 for right shift 
    if (!direction)//Shift bits to the left with carry to the lower element  
    { 
        element0 = array[0]; 
        array[0] = array[0] << bitsToShift; 
         
        for (i=0; i<11; i++) 
        {          
            temp = array[i+1]; 
            array[i+1] = array[i+1] << bitsToShift; 
            array[i] |= temp >> (8 - bitsToShift); 
        } 
        array[11] |= element0 >> (8-bitsToShift); 
 
    } 
    else    //Shift bits to the right with carry to the lower element  
    {      
        element0 = array[11]; 
        array[11] = array[11] >> bitsToShift; 
     
        for (i=11; i>0; i--) 
        { 
            temp = array[i-1]; 
            array[i-1] = array[i-1] >> bitsToShift; 
            array[i] |= temp << (8 - bitsToShift); 
        } 
        array[0] |= element0 << (8-bitsToShift); 
    } 
} 
 
//Rotates array2 by array1 Modulo96 
void bitRotation (unsigned char idata *array1, unsigned char idata *result, 
unsigned int direction) 
{ 
    unsigned char modulo = getModulo96(array1);     //First get modulo 
    unsigned char indicesToShift; 
    unsigned char bitsToShift; 
 
    //Second divide modulo by 8 and rotate the array (if modulo is bigger 
 //than 8) 
    //Direction: 0 for left shift, 1 for right shift 
    if (modulo > 8) 
    { 
        indicesToShift = modulo/8; 
        indexShift(result, direction, indicesToShift); 
    } 
 
    //Then bitshift with carry each element by the remaining shift (shift 
 //amount will be <8) 
    bitsToShift = modulo%8; 
    if (bitsToShift != 0) 
        bitShift(result, direction, bitsToShift); 
} 
 
//Performs XOR on two arrays and saves the output to the second argument 
void xorArrays (unsigned char idata *array1, unsigned char idata *result) 
{ 
    unsigned char i; 
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    for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
    { 
        result[i] ^= array1[i]; 
    } 
} 
 
//Performs addition Modulo96 on two arrays and saves the output to the 
//second argument 
void additionMod96 (unsigned char idata *array1, unsigned char idata 
*result) 
{ 
 unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char j; 
     
    for (i=11; i>0; i--) 
    {  
        result[i] += array1[i]; //Add two bytes (no carry) 
        if (result[i] < array1[i]) //Check if carry needed and append to 
      //upper byte 
        { 
            result[i-1]++; 
            //check if previous byte was not 255 overloaded to 0 and step 
  //back to lower elements to do the same 
            j=i; 
            //If a carry bit overloads upper byte increment upper to  
  //overloaded 
            //Continue until the array head is met if needed 
            while(result[j-1] == 0 && j > 1)    
            { 
                result[j-2]++; 
                --j; 
            } 
        } 
    }  
    result[0] += array1[0]; //Got to the MSB - just add and ignore carry 
    //(adding Mod96 anyway) 
} 
 
//Performs subtraction Modulo96 on two arrays and saves the output to the 
//second argument 
void subtractionMod96 (unsigned char idata *array1, unsigned char idata 
*result) 
{ 
 unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char j; 
 
    for (i=11; i>0; i--) 
    {     
        if (result[i] < array1[i])  //Verify if the minuend is not smaller 
      //than the subtrahend 
        { 
            result[i-1] -= 0x01;    //borrow LSB from the lower element 
            j=i; 
            //If a borrow bit overloads upper byte decrement upper byte to 
  //the overloaded one 
            while(result[j-1] == 0xFF && j > 1)    
            { 
                result[j-2] -= 0x01; 
                j--; 
            }    
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        } 
        result[i] -= array1[i]; //Subtract (no carry) 
    }  
    result[0] -= array1[0]; //Got to the MSB - just add and ignore carry 
    //(adding Mod96 anyway) 
} 
 
//Performs Gossamer MixBits function on two arrays and returns pointer to a 
//temporary array 
unsigned char* mixBits (unsigned char idata *array1, unsigned char idata 
*array2) 
{ 
    // Z = mixBits (X,Y) 
    // Z = X 
    // 32times: Z = (Z>>1) + Z + Z + Y 
    unsigned char idata result[12]; 
    unsigned char i; 
 
    for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
    { 
        result[i] = array1[i]; 
    } 
 
    for (i=0; i<32; i++) 
    { 
        bitShift (array1, 1, 1); 
        additionMod96 (array1, result); 
        bitShift (array1, 0, 1); 
        additionMod96 (array1, result); 
        additionMod96 (array1, result); 
        additionMod96 (array2, result); 
    } 
    return result; 
} 
 
/* SEA S-Box implementation according to SEA author's suggestions 
void seaSBOX (unsigned char data *block, unsigned char i) 
{ 
    block[3*i] = (block[3*i+2] && block[3*i+1]) ^ block[3*i]; 
    block[3*i+1] = (block[3*i+2] && block[3*i]) ^ block[3*i+1]; 
    block[3*i+2] = (block[3*i] || block[3*i+1]) ^ block[3*i+2]; 
} 
*/ 
 
//Simplified S-Box - per private conversation with the author it is safe to 
//perform S-Box on the first three elements only (SEA(96,8). 
//Originally author advised to apply S-Box to any 3 elements of each block 
void seaSBOX (unsigned char idata *block, unsigned char i) 
{ 
    block[0] = (block[2] && block[1]) ^ block[0]; 
    block[1] = (block[2] && block[0]) ^ block[1]; 
    block[2] = (block[0] || block[1]) ^ block[2]; 
} 
 
//SEA Bit-rotation function for SEA(96,8). 
//Function uses Raisonance RC51 intrisic functions (_cror_ and _crol_). 
void seaBitRotation (unsigned char idata *block) 
{ 
    block[0] = _cror_(block[0], 1); 
    block[2] = _crol_(block[2], 1); 
    block[3] = _cror_(block[3], 1); 
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    block[5] = _crol_(block[5], 1); 
} 
 
//SEA(96,8) word rotation - rotates the array by one byte 
void seaWordRotation (unsigned char idata *block, unsigned char direction) 
{ 
    //Direction 0 for left and 1 for right rotation 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char temp; 
     
    if (direction == 0) 
    { 
        temp = block[0]; 
        for (i=0; i<5; i++) 
            block[i] = block[i+1]; 
        block[5] = temp; 
    } 
    else 
    { 
        temp = block[5]; 
        for (i=5; i>0; i--) 
            block[i] = block[i-1]; 
        block[0] = temp; 
    } 
} 
 
//Performs one SEA(96,8) Crypto round. Parameter direction: 0 for 
//encryption and 1 for decryption 
void seaCryptRound (unsigned char direction, unsigned char idata 
*blockLeft, unsigned char idata *blockRight, unsigned char idata *keyHalf) 
{ 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char temp[6]; 
 
    //Every operation will be performed on blockLeft as this memory 
 //location will become a right block for the next round. 
    //Save the left block 
    for (i=0; i<6; i++) 
        temp[i] = blockRight[i]; 
 
    //ENCRYPTION 
    //Fe(Li, Ri, K/2i) <=> RightWordRot(Li) XOR bitRot(sbox(Ri+K/2i)) 
    //DECRYPTION 
    //Fd(Li, Ri, K/2i) <=> LeftWordRot(Li XOR bitRot(sbox(Ri+K/2i))) 
 
    //Step by step: 
    //Ri+K/2i 
    for (i=0; i<6; i++) 
        blockRight[i] += keyHalf[i]; 
    //sbox(Ri+K/2i) 
    seaSBOX(blockRight, i%2); 
    ////seaSBOX(blockRight, 0); 
    //bitRot(sbox(Ri+K/2i)) 
    seaBitRotation(blockRight); 
    //RightWordRot(Li) - encryption only 
    //Direction 0 for encryption and 1 for decryption 
    if (direction == 0) 
        seaWordRotation(blockLeft, 1); 
    //RightWordRot(Li) XOR bitRot(sbox(Ri+K/2i)) 
    for (i=0; i<6; i++) 
    { 
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        blockRight[i] ^= blockLeft[i]; 
        blockLeft[i] = temp[i];     //BlockLeft(i)+1 becomes BlockRight(i) 
    } 
    //LeftWordRot(Li XOR bitRot(sbox(Ri+K/2i))) - decryption only 
    if (direction == 1) 
        seaWordRotation(blockRight, 0); 
} 
 
//Performs one SEA(96,8) key round. 
void seaKeyRound (unsigned char idata *keyLeft, unsigned char idata 
*keyRight, unsigned char Ci) 
{ 
    //Fk(KLi-1,KRi-1,Ci) <=> KRi = KLi-1 XOR RightWordRot(bitRot(sbox((KRi-
 //1)+Ci))); 
    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char temp[6]; 
     
    //Save the left key (left key will become right after the round) 
    //Every operation will be performed on keyLeft as this memory location       
 //will become a right key for the next round. 
    for (i=0; i<6; i++) 
        temp[i] = keyRight[i]; 
    //Step-by-step: 
    //init Ci (LSW equals i) 
    ////Ci[5] = i; 
    //(KRi-1)+Ci 
    keyRight[5] += Ci; 
    //sbox((KRi-1)+Ci) 
    seaSBOX(keyRight, (Ci%2)); 
    ////seaSBOX(keyRight, 1); 
    //bitRotation(sbox((KRi-1)+Ci)) 
    seaBitRotation(keyRight); 
    //RightWordRot(bitRot(sbox((KRi-1)+Ci))); 
    seaWordRotation(keyRight, 1);    
    //KRi = KLi-1 XOR RightWordRot(bitRot(sbox((KRi-1)+Ci))); 
    for (i=0; i<6; i++) 
    { 
        keyRight[i] ^= keyLeft[i];     
        keyLeft[i] = temp[i];   //KeyLeft(i)+1 becomes KeyRight(i)  
    } 
} 
 
// SEA Scalable Encryption Algorithm (SEA 96,8) implementation 
void sea (unsigned char direction, unsigned char idata *block, unsigned 
char idata *key) 
{ 
    //Direction 0 for encryption and 1 for decryption 
    unsigned char i; 
 
    //initialization 
    unsigned char* idata keyLeft = &key[0]; 
    unsigned char* idata keyRight = &key[6]; 
    unsigned char* idata blockLeft = &block[0]; 
    unsigned char* idata blockRight = &block[6]; 
    unsigned char* idata temp; //temp pointer used for swapping key sides 
    unsigned char tmp; 
     
    //First half of all rounds (93 as per author's recommendation for a 
 //minimum number of rounds) 
    for (i=1; i<47; i++) 
    { 
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        //Key scheduling 
        //[KLi, KRi] = Fk(KLi-1, KRi-1, C(i)); 
        //Fk(KLi-1,KRi-1,Ci) <=> KRi = KLi-1 XOR Rot(bitRot(sbox((KRi- 
  //1)+Ci))); 
        seaCryptRound (direction, (unsigned char idata *)blockLeft, 
(unsigned char idata *)blockRight, (unsigned char idata *)keyRight); 
        seaKeyRound((unsigned char idata *)keyLeft, (unsigned char idata 
*)keyRight, i); 
    } 
     
    //End of round half - swap pointers 
    temp = keyLeft; 
    keyLeft = keyRight; 
    keyRight = temp; 
 
    for (i=46; i>0; i--) 
    { 
        //Key scheduling part 2 
        //[KLi, KRi] = Fk(KLi-1, KRi-1, C(r-i)); 
        //Fk(KLi-1,KRi-1,Ci) <=> KRi = KLi-1 XOR Rot(bitRot(sbox((KRi- 
  //1)+Ci))) 
        seaCryptRound (direction, (unsigned char idata *)blockLeft, 
(unsigned char idata *)blockRight, (unsigned char idata *)keyLeft); 
        seaKeyRound((unsigned char idata *)keyLeft, (unsigned char idata 
*)keyRight, i); 
    } 
    seaCryptRound (direction, (unsigned char idata *)blockLeft, (unsigned 
char idata *)blockRight, (unsigned char idata *)keyLeft); 
     
    //Final: switch Key and Block halves 
    //indexShift (block, 0, 6);     //Gossamer function may be used to save 
 //space  
    for(i=0; i<6; i++) 
    { 
        tmp = block[i]; 
        block[i] = block[i+6]; 
        block[i+6] = tmp; 
    }    
} 
 
//Copies array to the location of the second argument 
void copyArray(unsigned char idata *source, unsigned char idata *target) 
{ 
    unsigned char i; 
 
    for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
        target[i] = source[i]; 
} 
 
//Main Gossamer Slave loop - simplified model. 
void gossamerSlave (void) 
{ 
    //Simplifications: 
    //All data stored in RAM (idata); 
    //Roll-back to previous IDS and keys in case of receiving incorrect 
 //message C 
    //not implemented. Need to copy oldk1 and oldk2 and oldIDS arrays into 
 //respective current arrays. 
    unsigned char data TXaddr[4] = { 0xC3, 0x5A, 0x5A, 0xC3 }; 
    unsigned char xdata TXbuff[32]; 
    unsigned char xdata RXbuff[32]; 
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    unsigned char i; 
    unsigned char flag; 
 
    unsigned char idata temp[12]; 
    unsigned char idata n1temp[12]; 
    unsigned char *tempPtr; 
 
    unsigned char idata Pi[12] = { 0x32, 0x43, 0xF6, 0xA8, 0x88, 0x5A, 
0x30, 0x8D, 0x31, 0x31, 0x98, 0xA2 }; 
    unsigned char idata IDS[12] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 
0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01 }; 
    unsigned char idata ID[12] = { 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 
0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44 }; 
    unsigned char idata k1[12] = { 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 
0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10 }; 
    unsigned char idata k2[12] = { 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20 }; 
    unsigned char idata n1[12]; 
    unsigned char idata n2[12]; 
 
    unsigned char idata oldk1[12]; 
    unsigned char idata oldk2[12]; 
     
    unsigned char idata messageC[12]; 
    unsigned char idata messageD[12]; 
    unsigned char idata k1next[12]; 
    unsigned char idata k2next[12]; 
     
    //Loop forever authenticating the experimental Master 
    for (;;) 
    { 
        //Send IDS 
        flag = 1; 
        PutString("\r\nIDS\t"); 
        printArray(IDS); 
 
        for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
            TXbuff[i] = IDS[i]; 
        TransmitBytes(TXaddr, TXbuff); 
         
        //Wait for message A 
        while (!ReceiveMode(RXbuff)) 
            ; 
        //message A will be used to extract n1 - save it there 
        for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
            n1[i] = RXbuff[i]; 
        PutString("A\t"); 
        printArray(n1); 
         
        //Wait for message B 
        while (!ReceiveMode(RXbuff)) 
            ; 
        //message B will be used to extract n2 - save it there 
        for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
            n2[i] = RXbuff[i]; 
        PutString("B\t"); 
        printArray(n2); 
         
        //Extract n1 from A 
        //A = ROT((ROT(IDS+k1+Pi+n1, k2)+k1, k1) 
        //rightROT A: rightROT((ROT(IDS+k1+Pi+n1, k2)+k1, k1) 
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        bitRotation (k1, n1, 1); 
        //ROT(IDS+k1+Pi+n1, k2)-k1 
        subtractionMod96(k1, n1); 
        //rightROT(IDS+k1+Pi+n1, k2) 
        bitRotation (k2, n1, 1); 
        //k1+Pi+n1-IDS 
        subtractionMod96(IDS, n1); 
        //Pi+n1-k1 
        subtractionMod96(k1, n1); 
        //n1-Pi 
        subtractionMod96(Pi, n1); 
        //n1 extracted, now process message B 
         
        //Extract n2 from B 
        //B = ROT((ROT(IDS+k2+Pi+n2, k1)+k2, k2) 
        //rightROT((ROT(IDS+k2+Pi+n2, k1)+k2, k2) 
        bitRotation(k2, n2, 1); 
        //(ROT(IDS+k2+Pi+n2, k1)-k2 
        subtractionMod96(k2, n2); 
        //right(ROT(IDS+k2+Pi+n2, k1) 
        bitRotation(k1, n2, 1); 
        //k2+Pi+n2-IDS 
        subtractionMod96(IDS, n2); 
        //Pi+n2-k2 
        subtractionMod96(k2, n2); 
        //n2-Pi 
        subtractionMod96(Pi, n2); 
        //n2 extracted now calculate message C 
        PutString("N1\t"); 
        printArray(n1); 
        PutString("N2\t"); 
        printArray(n2); 
 
        //Create temporary n3: n3 = mixBits(n1,n2) 
        tempPtr = mixBits(n1, n2); 
        for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
            temp[i] = tempPtr[i]; 
 
        //Create keys for the next round 
        //k1next = ROT((ROT(n2+k1+Pi+n3, n2)+k2 XOR n3, n1) XOR n3 
        //k1next + n3 
        copyArray(temp, k1next); 
        //Pi+n3 
        additionMod96(Pi, k1next); 
        //k1+Pi+n3 
        additionMod96(k1, k1next); 
        //n2+k1+Pi+n3 
        additionMod96(n2, k1next); 
        //ROT(n2+k1+Pi+n3, n2) 
        bitRotation (n2, k1next, 0); 
        //ROT(n2+k1+Pi+n3, n2)+k2 
        additionMod96(k2, k1next); 
        //ROT(n2+k1+Pi+n3, n2)+k2 XOR n3 
        xorArrays(temp, k1next); 
        //ROT((ROT(n2+k1+Pi+n3, n2)+k2 XOR n3, n1) 
        bitRotation (n1, k1next, 0); 
        //ROT((ROT(n2+k1+Pi+n3, n2)+k2 XOR n3, n1) XOR n3 
        xorArrays(temp, k1next); 
              
        //k2next = ROT((ROT(n1+k2+Pi+n3, n1)+k1+n3, n2)+n3 
        //k2next+n3 
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        copyArray(temp, k2next); 
        //Pi+n3 
        additionMod96(Pi, k2next); 
        //k2+Pi+n3 
        additionMod96(k2, k2next); 
        //n1+k2+Pi+n3 
        additionMod96(n1, k2next); 
        //ROT(n1+k2+Pi+n3, n1) 
        bitRotation (n1, k2next, 0); 
        //ROT(n1+k2+Pi+n3, n1)+k1 
        additionMod96(k1, k2next); 
        //ROT(n1+k2+Pi+n3, n1)+k1+n3 
        additionMod96(temp, k2next); 
        //ROT((ROT(n1+k2+Pi+n3, n1)+k1+n3, n2) 
        bitRotation (n2, k2next, 0); 
        //ROT((ROT(n1+k2+Pi+n3, n1)+k1+n3, n2)+n3 
        additionMod96(temp, k2next); 
         
        //Create temporary n1' = mixBits(n3, n2) 
        tempPtr = mixBits(temp, n2); 
        for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
            n1temp[i] = tempPtr[i]; 
         
        //Create message C: C = ROT((ROT(n3+k1next+Pi+n1', n3)+k2next XOR 
  //n1', n2) XOR n1' 
        //messageC+n1' 
        copyArray(n1temp, messageC); 
        //Pi+n1' 
        additionMod96(Pi, messageC); 
        //k1next+Pi+n1' 
        additionMod96(k1next, messageC); 
        //n3+k1next+Pi+n1' 
        additionMod96(temp, messageC); 
        //ROT(n3+k1next+Pi+n1', n3) 
        bitRotation (temp, messageC, 0); 
        //ROT(n3+k1next+Pi+n1', n3)+k2next 
        additionMod96(k2next, messageC); 
        //ROT(n3+k1next+Pi+n1', n3)+k2next XOR n1' 
        xorArrays(n1temp, messageC); 
        //ROT((ROT(n3+k1next+Pi+n1', n3)+k2next XOR n1', n2) 
        bitRotation (n2, messageC, 0); 
        //ROT((ROT(n3+k1next+Pi+n1', n3)+k2next XOR n1', n2) XOR n1' 
        xorArrays(n1temp, messageC); 
         
        //MessageC created - now await message C: 
        while (!ReceiveMode(RXbuff)) 
            ; 
        PutString("LC\t"); 
        printArray(messageC); 
         
        //Message C received - verify if matches local copy of C 
        for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
        { 
            if (messageC[i] != RXbuff[i]) 
                flag = 0; 
        } 
         
        if (flag) //C matches so Master is authenticated. Send message D 
        { 
            //Step1: calculate local messageD 
            //D = ROT(ROT(n2+k2next+ID+n1', n2)+k1next+n1', n3)+n1' 
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            //messageD +n1' 
            copyArray(n1temp, messageD); 
            //ID+n1' 
            additionMod96(ID, messageD); 
            //k2next+ID+n1' 
            additionMod96(k2next, messageD); 
            //n2+k2next+ID+n1' 
            additionMod96(n2, messageD); 
            //ROT(n2+k2next+ID+n1', n2) 
            bitRotation (n2, messageD, 0); 
            //ROT(n2+k2next+ID+n1', n2)+k1next 
            additionMod96(k1next, messageD); 
            //ROT(n2+k2next+ID+n1', n2)+k1next+n1' 
            additionMod96(n1temp, messageD); 
            //ROT(ROT(n2+k2next+ID+n1', n2)+k1next+n1', n3) 
            bitRotation (temp, messageD, 0); 
            //ROT(ROT(n2+k2next+ID+n1', n2)+k1next+n1', n3)+n1' 
            additionMod96(n1temp, messageD); 
             
            //Now send message D and go to key updating phase 
            for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
                TXbuff[i] = messageD[i]; 
            TransmitBytes(TXaddr, TXbuff); 
         
            //Message D sent - key and IDS updating phase 
            //First step: save old IDS and keys 
            //MessageD memory location will be re-used for oldIDS 
            copyArray(IDS, messageD); 
            copyArray(k1, oldk1); 
            copyArray(k2, oldk2); 
         
            //n2 array will be reused 
            //n2' = mixBits(n1', n3) 
            tempPtr = mixBits(n1temp, temp); 
            for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
                n2[i] = tempPtr[i]; 
            //IDS = ROT((ROT(n1'+k1next+IDS+n2', n1')+k2next XOR n2', n3) 
   //XOR n2 
            //IDS+n2' 
            copyArray(n2, IDS); 
            //k1next+IDS+n2' 
            additionMod96(k1next, IDS); 
            //n1'+k1next+IDS+n2' 
            additionMod96(n1temp, IDS); 
            //ROT(n1'+k1next+IDS+n2', n1') 
            bitRotation (n1temp, IDS, 0); 
            //ROT(n1'+k1next+IDS+n2', n1')+k2next 
            additionMod96(k2next, IDS); 
            //ROT(n1'+k1next+IDS+n2', n1')+k2next XOR n2' 
            xorArrays(n2, IDS); 
            //ROT((ROT(n1'+k1next+IDS+n2', n1')+k2next XOR n2', n3) 
            bitRotation (temp, IDS, 0); 
            //ROT((ROT(n1'+k1next+IDS+n2', n1')+k2next XOR n2', n3) XOR n2 
            xorArrays(n2, IDS); 
             
            //k1 update 
            //k1 = ROT((ROT(n3+k2next+Pi+n2', n3)+k1next+n2', n1')+n2' 
            //k1=n2' 
            copyArray(n2, k1); 
            //Pi+n2' 
            additionMod96(Pi, k1); 
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            //k2next+Pi+n2' 
            additionMod96(k2next, k1); 
            //n3+k2next+Pi+n2' 
            additionMod96(temp, k1); 
            //ROT(n3+k2next+Pi+n2', n3) 
            bitRotation (temp, k1, 0); 
            //ROT(n3+k2next+Pi+n2', n3)+k1next 
            additionMod96(k1next, k1); 
            //ROT(n3+k2next+Pi+n2', n3)+k1next+n2' 
            additionMod96(n2, k1); 
            //ROT((ROT(n3+k2next+Pi+n2', n3)+k1next+n2', n1') 
            bitRotation (n1temp, k1, 0); 
            //ROT((ROT(n3+k2next+Pi+n2', n3)+k1next+n2', n1')+n2' 
            additionMod96(n2, k1); 
 
            //k2 update 
            //k2 = ROT((ROT(IDS+k2next+Pi+k1, IDS)+k1next+k1, n2')+k1 
            //k2 = k1 
            copyArray(k1, k2); 
            //k1+Pi 
            additionMod96(Pi, k2); 
            //k2next+Pi+k1 
            additionMod96(k2next, k2); 
            //IDS+k2next+Pi+k1 
            additionMod96(IDS, k2); 
            //ROT(IDS+k2next+Pi+k1, IDS) 
            bitRotation (IDS, k2, 0); 
            //ROT(IDS+k2next+Pi+k1, IDS)+k1next 
            additionMod96(k1next, k2); 
            //ROT(IDS+k2next+Pi+k1, IDS)+k1next+k1 
            additionMod96(k1, k2); 
            //ROT((ROT(IDS+k2next+Pi+k1, IDS)+k1next+k1, n2') 
            bitRotation (n2, k2, 0); 
            //ROT((ROT(IDS+k2next+Pi+k1, IDS)+k1next+k1, n2')+k1 
            additionMod96(k1, k2); 
             
            //Get encrypted message from Master and save to temp 
            while (!ReceiveMode(RXbuff)) 
                ; 
            //encrypted message received 
            for (i=0; i<12; i++) 
                temp[i] = RXbuff[i]; 
 
            //Now decrypt temp with k1 and display   
            PutString("SeaE\t"); 
            printArray(temp); 
            sea(1, temp, k1); 
            PutString("SeaD\t"); 
            printArray(temp); 
            PutString("k1\t"); 
            printArray(k1);     
        } 
        else 
            //Simplification: roll-back to old IDS and keys not implemented 
            PutString("\r\n:( C");      //wrong message C 
    } 
} 
 
int main(void) 
{ 
 unsigned int xdata RXaddr[4] = { 0xC4, 0x5A, 0x5A, 0xC4 }; 
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 InitUartTimer1(); 
 SetClock(); 
 ChangeRXAddress(RXaddr); 
 InitRadio(); 
 PutString(":)\n\r"); 
    gossamerSlave();   
 
    return 0; 
} 
 
 
